UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

5-19-2011

Arregui v. Gallegos-Main Clerk's Record v. 2 Dckt.
38496

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Arregui v. Gallegos-Main Clerk's Record v. 2 Dckt. 38496" (2011). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 3177.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/3177

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

A
o

SUPRE

Ell)

COURT
OFTH

T TEOFIDAHO

- COpy

FI

MARTHA A. ARREGUI,

AY 19

Plaintiff-Appellant

ROSALINDA GALLEGOS-MAIN an
individual; FULL LIFE CHIROPRACflC
P.A., an Idaho profi ional association,

Defendants-It pondents

And
JOHNANDJ
DOFSlthroughX,
who true identities are unknown,
Defendants.
ppealed from th O' triel of the Third Judicial Oi triet
for th tat of Id h in and for anyon Count

1. H FF Oi trict Judg

am Johnson
JOHNSO
MONTELEO
U

LLP.

me for Appellant

Richard H. Greener
Loren K M serl
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER, PA

I

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO

MARTHA A. ARREGUI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vsROSALINDA GALLEGOS-MAIN, an
individual; FULL LIFE CHIROPRACTIC,
P.A., an Idaho professional association,
Defendants-Respondents,

And
JOHN AND JANE DOES I through X,
whose true identities are unknown,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No. 38496

Appeal from the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, Idaho.
HONORABLE RENAE J. HOFF, Presiding
Sam Johnson, JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, LLP.,
405 South Eighth St., Ste. 250, Boise, Idaho 83702
Attorney for Appellant

Richard H. Greener and Loren K. Messerly, GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER, P.A.,
950 W. Bannock St., Ste. 900, Boise, Idaho 83702
Attorneys for Respondents

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No.

Vol. No.

Register of Actions

1-4

I

Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed 4-1-09

5-8

I

Answer to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial,
filed 4-21-09

9 -14

I

Request for Trial Setting, filed 7-6-09

15-18

I

Order to File Stipulated Trial Dates, filed 7-28-09

19 - 21

I

Stipulated Trial Dates, filed 8-11-09

22- 24

I

Order Setting Case for Trial and Pretrial Conference,
filed 9-29-09

25- 27

I

Stipulation Re Disclosure of Expert Witnesses,
filed 7-7-10

28 -29

I

Order on Stipulation to Extend Deadlines for
Disclosure of Expert Witnesses, filed 7-12-10

30-31

I

Plaintiff's Disclosure of Expert Witnesses, filed 8-16-10

32-45

I

Defendants' List of Expert Witnesses, filed 9-30-10

46-48

I

Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum upon Oral
Examination of PInt's Expert, Tarnai, filed 10-12-10

49-52

Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts,
filed 10-26-10

53 -57

I

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,
filed 10-26-10

58 -60

I

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants' Motion
For Summary Judgment, filed 10-26-10

61- 119

I

Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment, filed 10-26-10

120 - 129

I

TABLE OF CONTENTS, Continued
Page No.

Vol. No.

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment, filed 11-12-10

130 -135

I

Affidavit of Sarah Tarnai, DC, filed

136 -148

I

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants' Motion
To Strike the Affd. Of Sarah Tarnai, filed 11-16-10

149 -166

I

Affidavit of Counsel, etc., filed 11-16-10 (Continued)

167 - 210

II

Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion
For Summary Judgment, filed 11-16-10

211- 216

II

Motion to Strike the Affidavit of S. Tarnai, filed 11-16-10

217 - 219

II

Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to
Strike the Affd. of Sarah Tarnai, filed 11-16-10

220 - 233

II

Motion for Order Shortening Time on Defendants'
Motion to Strike, filed 11-16-10

234 - 236

II

Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Strike Affd. and
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 11-24-10

237- 239

II

Final Judgment, filed 12-2-10

240 - 241

II

242 - 245

n

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration, filed 12-15-10

246 - 260

II

Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration, filed 1-20-11

261- 281

II

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, filed 1-20-11

282 - 325

II

Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration, filed 1-25-11

326 - 331

II

Notice of Appeal, filed 1-28-11

332 - 335

II

11-15-10

Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, filed

12-3-10

TABLE OF CONTENTS, Continued
Page No.

Vol. No.

Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration,
filed 1-31-11

336 - 337

II

Request for Additional Transcript and Clerk's Record,
filed 3-1-11

338 - 343

II

Certificate of Exhibit

344

II

Certificate of Clerk

345

II

Certificate of Service

346

II

INDEX
Page No.

Vol. No.

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants' Motion
For Summary Judgment, filed 10-26-10

61- 119

I

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants' Motion
To Strike the Affd. Of Sarah Tarnai, filed 11-16-10

149 -166

I

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, filed 1-20-11

282 - 325

II

Affidavit of Counsel, etc., filed 11-16-10 (Continued)

167 - 210

II

Affidavit of Sarah Tarnai, DC, filed 11-15-10

136 -148

I

Answer to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial,
filed 4-21-09

9 -14

I

Certificate of Clerk

345

II

Certificate of Exhibit

344

II

Certificate of Service

346

II

Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed 4-1-09

5-8

I

Defendants' List of Expert Witnesses, filed 9-30-10

46-48

I

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,
filed 10-26-10

58-60

I

Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration, filed 1-20-11

261- 281

II

Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts,
filed 10-26-10

53 -57

I

Final Judgment, filed 12-2-10

240 - 241

II

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment, filed 11-12-10

130 - 135

I

INDEX, Continued
Page No.

Vol. No.

Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment, filed 10-26-10

120 -129

I

Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to
Strike the Affd. of Sarah Tarnai, filed 11-16-10

220 - 233

II

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration, filed 12-15-10

246 - 260

II

Motion for Order Shortening Time on Defendants'
Motion to Strike, filed 11-16-10

234- 236

II

Motion to Strike the Affidavit of S. Tarnai, filed 11-16-10

217 - 219

II

Notice of Appeal, filed 1-28-11

332 - 335

n

Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum upon Oral
Examination of PInt's Expert, Tarnai, filed 10-12-10

49 -52

1

Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration,
filed 1-31-11

336 - 337

II

Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Strike Affd. and
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 11-24-10

237- 239

II

Order on Stipulation to Extend Deadlines for
Disclosure of Expert Witnesses, filed 7-12-10

30-3 1

I

Order Setting Case for Trial and Pretrial Conference,
filed 9-29-09

25- 2 7

I

Order to File Stipulated Trial Dates, filed 7-28-09

19 - 21

I

Plaintiffs Disclosure of Expert Witnesses, filed 8-16-10

32-45

I

Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, filed 12-3-10

242 - 245

II

Register of Actions

1-4

1

Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration, filed 1-25-11

326 - 331

II

.,.

INDEX, Continued
Page No.

Vol. No.

Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion
For Summary Judgment, filed 11-16-10

211- 216

II

Request for Additional Transcript and Clerk's Record,
filed 3-1-11

338 - 343

II

Request for Trial Setting, filed 7-6-09

15 -18

I

Stipulated Trial Dates, filed 8-11-09

22 - 24

I

Stipulation Re Disclosure of Expert Witnesses,
filed 7-7-10

28- 29

i

~V\+;" lA.e d
troM

EXHIBITC
0001.67

VO(UML

I

rt October 19, 2010

Tarnai, Sarah, DC - Pits

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

MARTHA A. ARREGUI,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

) No. CV 09-3450
)

ROSALINDA GALLEGOS-MAIN, AN
)
INDIVIDUAL; FULL LIFE CHIROPRACTIC,)
P.A., AN IDAHO PROFESSIONAL
)
)
ASSOCIATION; AND JOHN AND JANE
DOES I THROUGH X, WHOSE TRUE
)
IDENTITIES ARE UNKNOWN,
)
)

Defendants.

)

--------------------------------)

DEPOSITION OF SARAH TAMAI, D.C.
October 19, 2010
Oceanside, California

Reporter:

Sandra J. Skari, RPR, CSR
Certificate No. 7691

Associated Reporting Inc.

0001.68
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October 19, 2010
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4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

The deposition of SARAH TAMAI, D.C., was taken at
140 I Carmelo Drive, Board Room, Oceanside, California, on
Tuesday, October 19,2010, commencing at 10:41 a.m.2:30 p.m., before Sandra J. Skari, RPR, CSR No. 7691, a
Certified Shorthand Reporter in and for the State of
California.
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SARAH T AMAI, D.C.,
called as a witness and having been first sworn by the
Certified Shorthand Reporter, was examined and testified a
follows:
EXAM INA TION
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. Let the record reflect that this deposition is
being taken pursuant to federal rules of civil procedure
pursuant to agreement between the parties as to time and
place.
With that out of the way, would you please state
your full name for the record.
A. Sarah R. Tarnai.
Q. And you are a licensed chiropractic physician; are
you not?
A. I am.
Q. And I would like to just kind of go through some
preliminary matters with you before we get into the
substance of your opinions and the like.
Have you given a deposition before coming here
today?
A. No.
Q. This is your first time?
A. Yes.

2

Associated Reporting Inc.
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Page 8

Q. Okay. Because of that, I'm going to just go
1
through a little bit of background as far as what we are
2
3
doing here. I am sure that Mr. Monteleone has already
explained this to you.
4
You recognize you're testifying under oath?
5
A. Yes.
6
Q. Every question that I ask of you and every answer
7
you give and everything mentioned by Mr. Monteleone is all 8
being recorded by the court reporter. And at the end of all
9
of this, you will have a chance to review it and look at it.
10
It's important that you know, though, that this is
11
a document that wiIl be available in court ifthis matter
12
proceeds to trial and can be used by, frankly, either side
13
for a variety of different purposes.
14
With that out of the way, do you have any
15
questions as far as this is concerned?
16
A. No.
17
Q. You probably already knew that.
18
A. Yes.
19
Q. Because you have not had a deposition before or
20
given one before, I would like to have an understanding wi 1121
you because it's essential that we are communicating.
22
So ifl ask a question of you that you find you
23
don't understand or that is confusing to you in any way,
24
wi\1 you let me know?
25

I

A. I would say muscle sports, so more of an active.
So it's active release technique we do a lot of.
Q. And I trust that your license has never been
subject to any disciplinary proceeding -A. No.
Q. -- or revoked or suspended?
A. No.
Q. Have you ever been sued?
A. No.
Q. Have you ever been a party to a lawsuit?
A. No.
Q. Lucky you.
You were hired as an expert in this case by -A. Yes.
Q. -- Mr. Johnson or Mr. Monteleone's firm, right?
A. Yes.
Q. And when was that?
I have your report, just help us along here, I
wiIl be getting to it, but your report indicates a reference
to correspondence of September -- if I can see it -- 9th of

2010.
Is that about the time you were contacted?
A. I would say, yeah, maybe the end of August or
beginning of September. I don't recall the exact date.
Q. Do you know how you came into contact with the

Page 7
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Page 9

A. Sure.

, 1
,2
Doctor, so that you and I are, hopefully, communicating. I~ 3
that agreeable?
: 4
A. Sounds great.
I 5
Q. With that agreement in place, if you answer a
! 6
question I ask of you and you don't indicate otherwise, I'm
7
going to proceed with the understanding that you understoqd 8
my question. Is that also agreeable?
9

Q. And then I'm going to rephrase my question,

I

I

110

A. Yes.
Q. AIl right. And I have your CV and I want to hit
11
on it just briefly, but I want to just go ahead and cover
112
some of this stuff right now.
13
A. Okay.
114
I
Q. How long have you been licensed in the State of i 15
California as a chiropractic physician?
16
17
A. Nine years.
Q. And licensed anywhere else other than California? 18
A. No.
19
Q. And do you have any areas of specialty that you
20
21
hold out yourself as focusing on?
A. "Specialty" meaning?
22
Q. In terms of chiropractic.
23
A. So do I -24
Q. Pediatric or geriatric or?
25

plaintiffs firm?
A. A friend of a friend of a friend I guess.
Q. Can you trace it for me?
A. Sure. There's Jake, another chiropractor in my
office.
Q. Her name?
A. Jake Daly. And he is a chiropractor as well. And
he is a friend of Eri Crum, a classmate. He graduated wit ~
Eri Crum who practices in Boise, Idaho.
Q. Eri Crum?
A. Eri, E-R-I.
Q. Did you all go to Western Division of Palmer?
A. I went in a different year, but they were in the
same class.
Q. Did you know Dr. Crum?
A. No. Personally, no. I mean I know the name nov,
but ...
Q. SO that's how this matter came to you?
A. Correct.
Q. You don't advertise any publication or hold
yourself out as an expert witness?
A. No.
Q. And you have never served as an expert witness
before?
A. No.

3

Associated Reporting Inc.
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Q. And you have never testified in court as an expert
witness -A. No.
Q. -- obviously?
Are you bilingual? Do you read Spanish?
A. I can read some.
Q. When you say that, I can read some German, but I
am not bilingual.
A. I wouldn't consider myself bilingual.
Q. Are you able to read and understand Spanish in
terms of looking at medical records or do you need
assistance to do that?
A. It depends on what it is.
Q. Can you help me with that?
A. There's some parts for chiropractic that I can
read a bit. And I can speak some, but I would hardly
consider myself bilingual.
I didn't take any formal classes. It's just
picking things up as, you know, in the community, especiall)
living in San Diego.
Q. As you go along?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. And that's a yes?
If I prompt you to say is that a yes or a no, I'm
not trying to be rude, but she can't pick up --

Page 12
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frame we've talked about?
A. Correct.
Q. When you called him, do you have a memory of the
conversation in terms what you said to him and what he said
to you?
A. I believe he said -- he introduced himself. He
said thank you very much for calling. I have a case
involving a chiropractor here in Boise. I represent the
plaintiff. She suffered a stroke. And he gave me some
brief, very brief details in the case.
And I said I don't know if) am qualified as your
expert. I haven't done a deposition. I don't consider
myself an expert. I haven't done cases such as this.
And he said, well, think about it. And I said
okay. And I said, well, maybe I can contact someone else
who might know or has done more. And he said sure. If yo
want to contact them. So I gave him a couple of ideas of
different names.
And we spoke again, I don't know when that was
from the first time, but we spoke again. And he said no, I
think that if you -- we discussed how I practiced, how long
I have been in practice, what type of techniques we do in
the practice.
And he said, no, I think that you would be a gr:~t ... _
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Page 13

A. So yes -- I don't know what the question was. Can
1
you repeat the question?
2
Q. It doesn't matter.
3
A. Okay.
4
Q. It wasn't of any great -- but if you say uh-huh or
5
uh-uh, I may say is that a yes or no.
6
A. Okay.
7
MR. MONTELEONE: You have to answer audibly and 8
verbally if you could, please, Doctor.
9
THE WITNESS: Sure.
10
BY MR. GREENER:
11
Q. Then help me with this, just focusing for a
12
moment, did someone from Mr. Monteleone's office call you c 13
how did this get rolling?
14
A. As I recall, Jake asked me if I would be, if!
15
would be willing to speak to an attorney that had a case
16
that needed some expert testimony. And he felt that he
17
probably was not the best, hadn't been in practice or didn't
18
feel comfortable with it.
19
And I said I don't know what it is involving. He
20
said, well this is the attorney's name, you can talk to him
21
and see ifmaybe this is a fit for you, if you can help them
22
out, if what you know may help them with what they need.
123
So I called Sam Johnson and that's how we spoke on
124
the phone.
125

fit if you wouldn't mind writing a report and serving as th
chiropractic expert witness. And I said okay.
Q. You said you gave him some other names of
chiropractors to contact?
A. I just mentioned names, but I didn't give him
contact information.
Q. Whose names did you give him?
A. There's a gentleman in Gig Harbor.
Q. In Washington?
A. In Washington, yes. And he does a lot of
petti bon.
Q. Who is that?
A. His name is Christian Cohen.
Q. Did you talk to him about this?
A. No.
Q. Do you know how he spells his last name?
A. C-O-H-E-N I believe.
Q. Anyone else whose name you gave to Mr. Johnso ?
A. Not that I recall, no.
Q. You said when you first talked to him you
questioned whether or not you qualified to serve as an
expert.
Can you tell me what the basis for that question
in your mind was?
A. I have never done a deposition. I have never been

4 (Pages 10 to 13)
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2
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25

in court. In my opinion I would assume that an expert
1
witness would be someone who is a little bit more savvy in
2
the legal side of, perhaps, chiropractic.
3
Q. Okay. And I was going to get into this in a
4
little bit greater detail. What is the nature of your
5
practice in terms of what techniques and modalities you use?1 6
Do you regard yourself to be a pettibon
7
practitioner?
: 8
A. Yes. I am not certified, but I was at one point.
9
Q. You were certified by California as a pettibon?
10
. 11
A. It's not by California; it's by the pettibon
system.
12
Q. When was that?
13
A. I would say 2006.
14
Q. And how long were you certified?
15
A. Oneyea~
16
Q. And what did you have to do to get certified?
17
A. Complete their standard of courses, so there's a
18
set of three. And then you have to subm it x-rays. Having
19
done basically classes there or classes online they now have 20
them. But going through making sure that you are competen 21
in their field of practice.
22
I'm still on the Web site, but I am not considered
23
a certified. They would say that I am on the list for
24
having knowledge of petti bon system, but I am not certified I 25

i

tnJunes. Primarily with the muscles.
Q. When you're talking about adhesions, are you
talking about adhesions resulting from surgery?
A. No. It's not per surgical.
Q. What is the technique? Are you using a device
or -A. Hands.
Q. -- your hands?
A. Hands.
Q. Just hands?
A. Uh-huh .
Q. Is that what you're doing now? Is that your
primary focus in your practice?
A. We do adjustments as well; but we do a lot of
active release technique, yes.
Q. When you say you do adjustments, what kind of
adjustments do you do? Do you practice the diversified
methodology?
A. We do some petti bon adjustments, P-E-T-T-I-B-O-N
we do diversified; activator; and some blocking, SOT
blocking.
Q. SOT blocking?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. That's a yes?
A. Yes.

'----.c:...----....:.---'-----'------------+T----------"----------·--·--._-_ . . -.._----_.---Page 15
1
2
3

Page 17

I

at this moment.
1
Q. Why did you let the certification go in 2006 or all 2
the end of2006?
3
4
A. I started doing more, as I mentioned previously, 4
5
active release technique.
5
6
Q. What is that?
I 6
7
A. It is a manual muscle, patented manual muscle
7
8
technique. It's patented.
8
9
Q. And it's called?
9
10
A. Active release technique.
110
11
Q. You and I both speak rapidly. We have to slow. 11
12 down a little bit and sorry to bother you with that.
12
13
A. That's fine.
13
14
Q. Just do the best you can.
14
15
I wrote down active release?
15
16
A. Release technique.
16
17
Q. And what is that?
17
18
A. It's a muscle technique.
18
19
Q. And how do··
19
20
A. For -20
21
Q. -- you -. is it like a pressure point or a release
21
22 point? How would you explain it to me as a layperson? 22
23
A. As a layperson I would say it is a muscle
23
24 technique used primarily to address adhesions, perhaps 24
25 sprains/strains, tendinis issues, chronic overuse or acute! 25

I

i

Q. Okay. Does that cover your modalities of
treatment?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And so what is SOT blocking?
A. Sacro-occipital technique. They are blocks that
you use for the pelvis to help level them out. Very light,
hardly any force.
Q. It's all in the pelvic area?
A. A lot of it, yes.
Q. Anything in the cervical area?
A. Uh-huh. But we don't do the blocking up there.
Q. I might come back to this in a bit when I go
through your CV.
A. Okay.
Q. Let me move to just another background subject.
A. Okay.
Q. Did you review any documents to prepare for this
deposition, Doctor?
A. Yes.
Q. Tell me what you reviewed.
A. I reviewed part of the deposition for Martha
Arregui. I reviewed the full deposition, I believe it was,
for Dr. Gallegos-Main. I reviewed the records. I review(d
a letter from Dr. Han. And the medical records.
Did I say the medical records?
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Q. Yes. The chart?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Is that a yes?
A. Yes.
Q. In reviewing the chart, did you review all of the
medical records?
A. No. I don't think I did. I don't know.
MR. MONTELEONE: Can we go off the record for a
second?
MR. GREENER: Yeah.
(Discussion off the record.)
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. Back on the record.
A. Yes.
Q. Doctor, what I was interested in in my last
question was everything that you have looked at in terms of
getting ready to come here and testifY today.
Were you responding to that?
A. Yes.
Q. And then Mr. Monteleone has indicated you also
looked at another document that he provided you this
morning?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you have a copy of that here?
MR. MONTELEONE: It has my double secret notes on

1

2
3
4

5
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11
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19

20
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24
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And I will just preface it by saying I know we did
not send this out with 30 days' notice, but one reason why
is because we were trying to get the doctor's date that was
convenient to the doctor so we could do it. And then we
asked for this information in our document production
request anyway. I think we are entitled to what we have in
here to the extent she has them.
MR. MONTELEONE: What I have done is I have
collected some of the documents that I think would be
responsive to this, but without that 30 days to cull them
together and respond to the deposition duces tecum notice,
don't have anything to produce.
In fact, the copies of the medical literature
articles are my working copies. I can't even really give
you copies of these . They just happen to be the same
articles that Dr. Tarnai reviewed. I don't have anything to
produce for you today, Counsel.
MR. GREENER: Would it be possible for us to get
copies of those?
MR. MONTELEONE: Do you want to just read the
citations into the record? I will get you copies that arc
clean copies that don't have my notes, I'm happy to do that.
MR. GREENER: I was going to have her read your
notes to me.
MR. MONTELEONE: If she can read rather
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it.

1

MR. GREENER: Oh, good.
2
THE WITNESS: I saw that too. Do you want me to
3
mention those as well?
4
MR. MONTELEONE: Doctor, you will need to probablv 5
reference each of the medical literature articles you
6
reviewed in doing your work here today as best you can
7
recall.
8
BY MR. GREENER:
9
Q. That would be good.
10
A. I didn't bring all of that information.
11
12
reviewed -- there was a Spine article. There was an article
from Neurology I believe dated 2003.
13
Q. Why don't you go ahead and just identifY them and
14
then hand them to me if you would.
15
A. Okay.
16
Q. Would you do that, please?
17
18
A. Sure.
i 19
Q. While we are doing that -- and let's stay on the
record a minute. This might move us along. I was going to
20
hand you a deposition notice and ask you if you brought any 21
documents with you here today.
22
MR. GREENER: And I guess I will ask you, Jason.
23
Other than the documents you're giving me, did you bring
24
documents responsive to our duces tecum request?
25

inscrutable, illegible handwriting. And, more importantl),
if there's anything intelligent in any of it.
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. I think this is the quickest way to go through
this. Here is a copy of the notice of deposition.
(Exhibit 1 marked for identification.)
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. Let's do this. Here is a copy of your notice of
deposition. Have you seen this before?
A. This?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
Q. This is the document that kind of brought us here
today, Doctor.
A. Okay.
Q. And let's go through the documents we asked for
and let's see if they even exist.
Number I. I wanted to have copies of documents
reviewed by you in preparation for rendering your opinio s
in this lawsuit.
And I guess that you told me about certain
documents you reviewed. That would be part of the
deposition of the plaintiff, the full deposition of
Dr. Gallegos-Main, and the medical chart, and the Dr. Han
letter. Right?
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A. Yes.
1
Q. In addition to the documents that we will be
2
talking about here in a moment that are provided here today,
3
would that encompass all the documents reviewed by you in
4
preparing your opinions?
5
Were there any others?
6
A. Not that comes to mind, no.
I 7
Q. All right. And then that kind of overlaps into
I8
item number 2. And I think you have answered item number~. 9
Do you have any handwritten notes or memos or -- I
110
know I have your report. Do you have any underlying notes, 11
rough drafts of the report that you provided to us?
12
A. No. The working copy of the report was it. There
13
wasn't a rough draft.
14
Q. Thatwasit?
15
A. Yes.
16
Q. There was no predecessor draft that you edited or
17
that you sent to Mr. Johnson and he edited and sent back?
18
A. No.
Q. Did you make any notes while you were going
through and preparing for this? Preparing your opinion.
21
22
A. I may have; but they are probably in the garbage
somewhere.
23
24
Q. Do you have a file that you maintain on this, a
separate file?
25

!

·~~
I

A. Last Friday.
Q. Now-A. Oh, this is the same one.
MR. MONTELEONE: You need to maybe focus on
Mr. Greener's question to facilitate things a bit.
Counsel, I can represent -- I'm not testifYing -there was a draft report dated September 16. And I thought
you had gotten that.
MR. GREENER: I didn't.
MR. MONTELEONE: I don't know if you call it a
draft report. It was the initial report. And then it had a
short change to it on October 15.
So I will get you -- you never saw the
September 16 report?
MR. GREENER: Never.
MR. MONTELEONE: Okay. Then we need to give yo
that.
MR. GREENER: Can I see it right now?
MR. MONTELEONE: Of course.
THE WITNESS: Oh, that's right. Okay.
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. I was going to ask you this anyway. But do you
charge 225 an hour for your work?
A. Yes.
Q. A giveaway.
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A. No. Most of the correspondence was via e-mail.
1
just left whatever was -- if they sent me a record, it was I 2
in the e-mail.
I3
Q. Incidental to this, were there any letters or
I 4
e-mails from Mr. Monteleone's firm to you on this subject? 5
i 6
A. Were there any e-mails?
Q. Yes.
7
A. Yes.
I 8
Q. And did they contain any -- do you have those witp 9
you here today?
10
A. No.
11
Q. Do you recall if they contained anything other
12
13
than just statements to the effect that we're transmitting
14
these records to you?
A. They were probably -- no. It was sending records 15
asking for a date for a phone conference, asking for dates 16
17
for the deposition, what would be most convenient.
Q. Taking a slight detour. Was there a phone
18
19
conference then that you had after you worked on your
opinion?
20
A. No. I just completed the opinion.
21
Q. When did you complete the opinion?
22
A. Oh, the date that's on there.
23
Q. That's fine. It is dated October 15. So it was
24
Friday, right?
25

I

A. I didn't know what to charge, actually. I didn't
know what was appropriate. I asked them, "What do I charge
you?"
Q. I want to cover one thing before I get into this
September 16, 2010, draft.
From the time that you were hired around
September 9 up to the time you finalized your report, did
you have any phone conversations with Mr. Johnson or anyon
else from his firm that you can recall?
A. Yes.
Q. How many?
A. Two.
Q. Okay.
A. Well, three including the very first one when we
spoke.
Q. There is the first one we talked about?
A. Right.
Q. When was the second, to the best of your
recollection?
A. Probably around the time of the first draft.
Q. All right. And what was the nature of the
conversation -- first of all, who was involved? Just you
and Mr. Johnson?
A. Yes.
Q. And he called you or you called him?
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It doesn't matter -1
A. I don't recall.
2
3
Q. -- but one of you called the other.
3
4
A. Yes.
4
5
Q. How long was the conversation?
5
6
A. Maybe a halfan hour.
6
7
Q. And do you have a recollection as to the substance
7
8 of what you guys discussed?
8
9
I know you can't say he said X to me and I said Y,
9
1.. 0 but I want to know the substance of what you talked about. 10
1.. 1.
A. There was, he had sent me a letter with those
11
1.. 2 records that you have written saying that there was a date
12
1.. 3 that they wanted information by. I believe it was
13
1..4 September -- it might have been September 9 was the date. 114
1.. 5 don't know if that's absolutely correct.
15
1.. 6
So I had drafted a report to get out to them.
16
1.. 7 Maybe it was -- it had to be after the 16th, actually.
: 17
1.. 8 Regardless. Maybe it was the 20th.
1118
1.. 9
And we spoke and I said is that date still on.
19
20 And he said no, actually, I believe they want to take your
2 J.. deposition. So we don't have to get them the report by this 21
22 date, whichever date it was.
122
23
And we discussed, we discussed my opinions on the I 23
24 records that they had sent, what I thought of what he had ,- 24
25 sent me. And we briefly discussed my report that you have 25
-------I
Page 271
J..

2

120

I
i
I

in your hand. And he asked me a couple of questions that
1
would be more pertinent to, I guess, forming a more concrete
2
3 opinion as the expert witness in the case.
3
4
Q. Anything else?
4
5
A. That we would be in contact again at some point.
5
6
Q. Okay. Focusing just on this conversation.
6
7
A. Sure.
7
8
Q. What did you talk about in terms of what you
8
9 thought about what had been sent to you?
9
l O A . I said I was rather confused by the depositions,
10
11.. they didn't seem to add up to me.
11
12
Q. And why is that?
12
13
A. Probably, as with most cases, Martha Arregui
13
14 seemed to say one thing happened and Dr. Gallegos-Main sai~ 14
15 another. And I couldn't really make heads or tails of what
i 15
16 really happened based on what was printed on the deposition. i 16
17
Q. Does your opinion assume that the plaintiff,
! 17
18 Ms. Arregui, was telling the truth about what occurred and
i 18
19 Dr. Main was not?
19
20
A. No. I don't have an opinion either way. I don't
21 know.
21
22
Q. You don't know who is being candid or not being
22
23 candid?
123
24
A. No. I don't know.
24
25
Q. Anything else in terms of your confusion that you
25
1..

2

20

I

discussed with Mr. Johnson?
A. No. I just said something was not right. I just
said I didn't know what was not right, but there are two
different stories about a same date. And I was confused.
Q. Would it be necessary for you to finalize your
opinion to assume one of the two individuals -- either the
plaintiff or Dr. Gallegos-Main -- was telling the truth?
A. Probably, yes.
Q. And you haven't determined that yet?
A. No. I mean there can be something happen and two
people see the same thing and come away with two different
opinions. Perhaps it's a blend, but I don't know.
Q. Okay. If Dr. Main, Dr. Gallegos-Main, is
truthfully recounting what occurred with the plaintiff on
June 4 of 2007, do you have an opin ion that she vio lated the
standard of care for chiropractic physicians in Napa and
Caldwell, Idaho, on that day?
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: What does that mean?
MR. GREENER: You can go ahead and answer.
MR. MONTELEONE: You can go ahead and answer
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. He is making an objection for the record.
Do you want the court reporter to read it back to
you?
...
Page 29

_----------

A. Sure.
Q. I want you to listen to it carefully, if you
would.
A. That would be helpful, please.
(Record read.)
THE WITNESS: Are you referring to the examinatiOl
or the treatment?
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. Everything she did.
A. Yes.
Q. Your opinion is she did?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And I will be getting into your opinion
then later.
MR. MONTELEONE: I'm confused. I apologize for
interrupting, Counsel.
Your opinion is yes, she did violate the standard
of care?
THE WITNESS: For the examination.
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. Okay. That's what I want to get at.
In your opinion her examination that she did on
that date was a deviation from the standard of care?
A. Yes.
Q. But her diagnosis you agree with; do you not?
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A. The torticoIlis?

1 to cover and I never stay with the outline. We start
2 talking about something and it leads to something else.
A. Yes.
3 Just bear with me. If you don't know for some reason wher~
Q. And you don't disagree with her treatment of her
4 I am in my line of questioning, say wait a minute. what are
on that date or her treatment plan?
5 you talking about here.
A. No.
6
Is that agreeable?
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
7
A. Yes.
THE WITNESS: Of what was written in the record,
8
Q. Back to September 16-yes.
9
A. Okay.
Say it again.
10
Q. -- and that conversation.
BY MR. GREENER:
11
Do you remember anything in any more substance
Q. And I take it that although you believe she
12 other than what we talked about?
violated the standard of care in terms of the examination,
13
A. No.
you do not have an opinion that she violated the standard of 14
Q. Okay. And so on September -- did Mr. Johnson
care in terms of her treatment of the plaintiff on June 4 of 15 have -- this says Sam Johnson's work copy on it.
20017
I 16
Did you have a copy of the September 16 -- I would
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
17 like to mark this if I could.
THE WITNESS: No. According to what was writter 18
MR. MONTELEONE: Let me see it.
in the record.
19 BY MR. GREENER:
BY MR. GREENER:
20
Q. Let me ask you this.
Q. She did not?
21
Whose handwriting is that?

Q. Yes.

!

A. Correct.
Q. Okay. That's no, she did not violate the standard
of care -A. Standard of care.

22
23
24
25

A. I don't know.
Q. I take it it's not yours?
A. No.
MR. GREENER: Well, look at it and see if I can

I - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - -..~-------+-----.-----------. .- -.. -..-..._.....
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1
Q. -- according to what was written in the record -2
A. According to what -- yes.
3
Q. -- in terms of the treatment she provided?
A. In terms of the treatment she provided.
4
5
Q. Yes?
5
6
A. Yes.
6
7
Q. Good.
7
8
A. I'm actuaIly very confused as to what you just
8
9 said.
9
10
MR. MONTELEONE: I was going to say. Doctor, ar 10
11 you tracking the question -11
12
THE WITNESS: No.
12
13
MR. MONTELEONE: -- that Mr. Greener is asking . 13
14 you?
II 14
15
THE WITNESS: No. He kind of went one way and
15
16 then he went this way.
16
17 BY MR. GREENER:
17
18
Q. We 11, you'Il get another chance.
18
19
A. Good. Round 2.
19
20
MR. MONTELEONE: No, I get the other chance.
20
21 BY MR. GREENER:
21
22
Q. I want to go back to the September 16th
22
23 conversation.
23
24
24
And, I'm sorry, in these depositions you will find
25 that we get into a topic and -- I actually have an outline
25

1
2
3
4

mark it.
MR. MONTELEONE: That's the problem I have,
Counsel. This is a working copy. I can tell you that's Sam
Johnson's handwriting.
MR. GREENER: All right. Okay.
MR. MONTELEONE: As is on the first page of
September 16.
MR. GREENER: What I'm thinking what I might do -can I have it back for a second?
What I would like to do is maybe use something to
cover this up and have it copied here.
Well, maybe I don't need to do that. Just to movc
it along, I would like to conditionaIly mark this and then
talk about it. Because I want to ask her a question about
the difference between this and her actual expert report of
last Friday.
MR. MONTELEONE: Why don't we take a break?
will make a copy that doesn't have the handwritten
interlineated notes.
MR. GREENER: That's fine.
There's some other e-mails that I haven't seen
that are attached. I would like to have those. I don't
think there is any -MR. MONTELEONE: Right. And that's the issue,
Counsel. Without the 30 days allowable under the procedural

9 (Pages 30 to 33)

Associated Reporting Inc.

0001.76

Tarnai,

Sarah, DC - Plts

t

October 19, 2010
Page 36

Page 34
~

2

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1 0
1 ~
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
2~

22
23

24
25

rules to figure out exactly what you're entitled to in your
duces tecum notice, that's why we don't have the production.
And I understand the scheduling of the matter is the reason
why it's -MR. GREENER: Well, there's that. And, Jason,
also, in truth, we had asked for all this -- I can show you
the interrogatory, or pardon me, the document production
request. We asked for all of this information anyways and
it hasn't been produced. I think we are on solid ground to
say we are entitled to it.
Let's work this out. Okay?
MR. MONTELEONE: I agree.
MR. GREENER: Let me ask you this before we take a
quick break.
MR. MONTELEONE: And, for the record, I agree on
working it out. I am not sure I agree on the notice.
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. Okay. Do you remember discussing with Mr. Johnson
at any time whether an adjustment of the cervical spine was
indicated?
A. Yes.
Q. And what did you tell him?
A. I said personally I wouldn't have done one.
Q. And in your opinion Dr. Gallegos-Main didn't do
one either, did she?
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A. No.
Q. Do you know whether or not the medical doctor 01
June 5th came to essentially the same diagnosis as
Dr. Gallegos-Main on June 47
A. No.
Q. Would that be of significance to you if the
medical doctor did?
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: I don't know.
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. When you say you don't know, what causes you t<
answer that question that way?
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: If I didn't review it, I don't know
what tests were performed or not performed.
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. We will get into that then.
A. Okay.
Q. That's fine. I just wanted to -- let's take a
break.
Was there a difference between your report of
October 15 and this document other than the handwriting
"This document" being your rough draft or your
draft of September 16, 2010.
A. This one includes those questions t~.~.~.e.. ~~.~_d ....
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A. According to the record, no.
According to her records, no.
Q. And her testimony.
A. But according to Martha's, she doesn't know if it
5
was an adjustment, but her head was rotated when she was
6
face down and face up.
7
Q. And she doesn't know what kind of work was done on
8
her in those positions?
9
A. No.
10
Q. Okay. And then there's another question. Should
11 the chiropractor have phoned ambulatory services under those
12 circumstances.
13
And do you recall discussing that with
14 Mr. Johnson?
15
A. Yes.
16
Q. And what did you tell him in that regard?
17
A. I said that if she had been my patient and had
18 difficulty walking, I probably would have called for care.
19
Q. You say "probably." Are you certain of that?
20
A. Yes. If I had seen her not walking well, yes.
21
Q. In this particular case are you aware of the fact
22 that she went to an emergency room in Weiser, Idaho, on
23 June 5th?
24
A. Yes.
25
Q. Have you reviewed those records?
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me. He asked me to basically opine on those two question.
Q. So you added those?
A. Uh-huh ..
Q. That's a yes?
A. Yes.
Q. And then the e-mail is not attached to your expert
report.
May I see the one you have there? I want to make
sure it's the same one I have.
MR. GREENER: Okay. Let's go off the record.
(Recess held.)
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. Doctor, back on the record.
And I will probably remind you periodically, you
are still under oath and you recognize that.
We're waiting to have some documents copied. In
the meantime let's go back and look at Exhibit I, your
deposition notice, and get through it and get it out of the
way.
I would like to ask you this. Have you ever been
to Idaho?
A. No.
Q. And have you talked to any chiropractic physician
in Idaho?
A. I talked to Eri Crum for about three minutes.
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Q. And when was that?
A. After the first conversation with Sam Johnson at
some point.
Date? I don't know.
Q. Did you call him?
A. Yes.
Q. And what was your purpose in calling him?
A. To touch base with him to say are they good
attorneys, have you worked with them before.
Q. What did he tell you?
A. He said he had worked with them before and that
they were good guys.
Q. Did he say they are really smart lawyers?
A. Oh, sure.
Q. And so then did you talk about anything else or
was that the extent of your conversation?
A. No, that was it.
Q. Other than Dr. Crum, have you talked to any other
chiropractic physicians in Idaho?
A. No.
Q. As we sit here today do you know if there is any
difference between the standard of care for chiropractic
physicians in Caldwell Napa, Idaho, and chiropractic
physicians who practice where you practice in California~
A. Are you --
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report dated September 16, 20 I O. Other than that e-mail.do
you recall if there are any other e-mail transmissions
between you and Mr. Johnson?
A. I don't recall.
Q. And would you need to go back to your server to
make that determination?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you be willing to do that and -A. Sure.
Q. -- then let Mr. Monteleone know if there is
anything else in there?
And then I would ask him to advise me if there are
any other e-mail transmissions. I think we are entitled to
those. And I would make the request for them or any
writings of any kind between you and Mr. Monteleone's tim.
Would you be kind enough to do that?
A. Yes.
You're requesting e-mails?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And so that kind of covers -- we are on
item number 3 on the second page of the notice of
deposition.
So in terms of that, would there be any other kind
of document -- other than notes you made, drafts or your
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MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
1
THE WITNESS: Are you asking if there's a
2
3
difference?
3
4
BY MR. GREENER:
4
5
Q. Yes.
5
6
Do you know if there is or not?
: 6
7
A. I am not aware of a difference, no.
; 7
8
Q. Do you know if the standard of care is the same1 8
'9
9
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
10
THE WITNESS: I believe it is. Because we are 10
11. both -- what? -- regulated or under the national board of 11
12 chiropractic examiners. But I can't say with 100 percen 12
13 certainty yes or no.
13
14 BY MR. GREENER:
14
15
Q. SO it is really your supposition?
15
16
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
16
17
THE WITNESS: It is my estimation. I am not. .17
18 BY MR. GREENER:
18
19
Q. It'syourestimation?
19
20
A. Uh-huh.
20
21
Q. Do you have those documents?
21
22
Let's go ahead and finish up Exhibit No. I.
22
23 That's what I said I was going to do before we do the
23
24 documents.
24
25
There's an e-mail attached to the draft of your
25

opinion or report, and your final report, and the e-mails ""~
have just referenced -- would there be any other kinds of
writings that you would have either received or sent relat d
to this matter?
A. No.
The other are -- I mean at the very end of the
report there are references, but that's it.
Q. Right.
A. You have those, right?
Q. Those references are a part of your report?
A. Yes.
Q. Then item number 5, if you look at that. It says
we request a copy of every article, journal, publication,
manual, treatise, or other similar authority upon which yo~
intend to rely to support your opinion.
Are there any such documents?
A. Yes.
Q. What are they?
A. Those. These.
Q. All right. And those are the -- let's take those
up then.
MR. MONTELEONE: There's four articles that ar~
being referenced. The first one is Risk ofVertebrobasila
Stroke and Chiropractic Care by Cassidy, Boyle, Cote. H ,
Hogg, two g's, hyphen, Johnson, Silver and Bondy in
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volume 33, number 4S of Spine magazine.
MR. GREENER: Date?
MR. MONTELEONE: 2008.
The second article is from Neurology -MR. GREENER: Pardon?
MR. MONTELEONE: It's from Neurology, the journal.
MR. GREENER: That's the publication?
MR. MONTELEONE: Correct.
And the title of it is Spinal manipulative therapy
is an independent risk factor for vertebral artery
dissection by Smith, Johnston, Skalabrin, Weaver, Azari,
Albers and Gress, with a G and two S's.
MR. GREENER: And the date?
MR. MONTELEONE: 2003.
MR. GREENER: Okay.
MR. MONTELEONE: The third article is entitled
Cervical artery strokes - Serious complications with neck
manipulation and informed consent from the column Lessons
from Practice from the MJA, which I believe is the Medical
Journal of America, volume 173, number 4, page 213 is its
beginning. And that's from August of2000.
And then the final ofthe four articles is
entitled Chiropractic's Dirty Secret: Neck Manipulation and
Strokes.
THE WITNESS: I believe that's offofa Web site.

I
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MR. MONTELEONE: We will get you clean copies.
Ifwe can have a stipulation that we are not going
to discuss my notes on these articles, which have not been
reviewed by the witness.
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. With your testimony -- you are sure you have not
looked at those notes?
A. No.
Q. Let's do it this way.
MR. MONTELEONE: Wait. Are you sure you have no
looked at the notes?
THE WITNESS: Well, I looked at the article.
MR. MONTELEONE: His question had a negative
embedded in it and you gave a no to a negative, so I got
confused.
Have you looked at my notes?
THE WITNESS: I saw them on the page. I did not
read them.
MR. GREENER: That answers it.
Let's do it that way. So we have something, a
reference, I would like to at least mark them, Jason. And
then -- or have the agreement that -- so we don't get all
cluttered up here. I would like to give you these tabs.
Will you put exhibit numbers on them and then I
understand you will take them back. Sandy can reserve an

25
25
~---------------------------------------------+----------~--------------------~------------~,
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MR. MONTELEONE: Yes.
And that's off the Web site www.quackwatch.org,
Q-U-A-C-K, W-A-T-C-H, a scholarly Web site.
MR. GREENER: Yes.
Is there a date on that one?
MR. MONTELEONE: April 21, 2005.
And the only reason, Counsel, I am not giving you
these copies is they have my notes all over them. And these
are not what Dr. Tarnai reviewed. I believe the doctor, this
witness, reviewed clean copies that were e-mai led to her.
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. Did you review clean copies?
A. Yes.
Q. And you didn't bring those here with today?
A. No.
MR. GREENER: Can I get clean copies of those?
MR. MONTELEONE: I will be happy to.
MR. GREENER: Hand them back to her, if you would.
While we are on it, I might as well exhaust it and get back
to the draft and the report in a minute.
MR. MONTELEONE: Well, if she looks at them with
my notes, you will ask her about my notes, Counsel.
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. Did you read his notes?
A. No.
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exhibit for them and you will provide those to me and I will
give them to her and we will get them into the record.
Does that make sense?
MR. MONTELEONE: It does. But what might be
easiest is if we have Internet here, and we do, I will just
have clean copies e-mailed down right now.
MR. GREENER: Let's do that.
MR. MONTELEONE: And we can print them. And whe~
we print them, we can have them as exhibits. And that way
Sandy doesn't have to do the fussing around.
MR. GREENER: That's fine.
Can we mark them right now and then we will mark
the others? Just to get through it and we will do that at
the next break to keep going.
MR. MONTELEONE: Okay.
MR. GREENER: Why don't you do it so I won't be
tempted to read all of your brilliant handwritten notes?
MR. MONTELEONE: In the immortal words of
Shakespeare: Much ado about nothing. There is nothing
brilliant in the notes.
Do you want me to number them in the order that I
read them?
MR. GREENER: Yes, please.
Risk ofvertebro-MR. MONTELEONE: Basilar stroke.
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We'll make Exhibit 2 Risk ofVertebrobasiiar
Stroke and Chiropractic Care.
MR. GREENER: Spinal magazine 2008.
3
(Exhibit 2 marked for identification.)
!
4
MR. MONTELEONE: And Exhibit 3 is the Neurology 5
6
article.
(Exhibit 3 marked for identification.)
MR. GREENER: Regarding manipulations and
dissections of 2003.
9
MR. MONTELEONE: Correct.
10
MR. GREENER: Number 4 will be cervical artery
11
strokes and informed consent from the MJA 2000.
12
(Exhibit 4 marked for identification.)
13
MR. GREENER: And number 5 will be the quack
14
document.
15
16
(Exhibit 5 marked for identification.)
BY MR. GREENER:
17
Q. While those are being marked so we can identify
18
them, could you tell me when did you read these?
19
A. When they were e-mailed to me.
20
Q. When was that?
21
A. I don't have a date for you.
22
Q. Sometime in September or October of this year?
23
A. Yes.
24
Q. And prior to your
iving them bye-mail, had

I

I~

Q. Men and women both?
A. Yes.
Q. And perhaps children?
A. Yes.
Q. And when you do those, what type of adjustment
technique or modality do you use? I am assuming you us~
diversified.
A. Yes.
Q. And what level of force do you deliver?
Does it depend?
A. Yes.
Q. And what would it depend on?
A. It would depend on what that patient presented
with and what their injuries were and who I was working
with.
Q. And say that person presented with torticollis.
You have had that occur and diagnosed a person, a woma~,
presenting with torticollis?
A. Yes.
Q. And would torticollis only occur in the neck or
can it occur elsewhere?
A. It is typically not called torticollis if it's
elsewhere, but it can.
Q. It's really a muscle spasm, isn't it?
A. Correct.

----
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1
you ever read them before?
2
A. Yes.
3
Q. And in what context did you read these?
4
Let's look at Exhibit No.2. Do you have that
5
before you?
6
A. Yes.
Q. We have already identified that sufficiently; have 7
8
we not?
9
MR. MONTELEONE: I think so, Counsel.
10
BY MR. GREENER:
11
Q. Exhibit No.2. When in point of time did you
12
become aware of that document and read it?
13
A. The entire document? I had not read the entire
document.
14
The reference, the abstract? I had read about, I
15
would say, earlier this year and perhaps last year.
16
Q. Was that the first time you had ever read it, to
17
18
your recollection?
A. Yes.
119
Q. SO this particular document, did it impact the way 1 20
you practice chiropractic?
I 21
A. No.
' 22
Q. You do cervical adjustments of the neck on humarl23
beings; do you not?
i 24
A. I do.
125

Page 49
Well, the kind that we would be able to treat,
yes. There are other kinds that are not treatable by
chiropractors.
Q. Such as?
A. Congenital.
Q. Any others?
A. I believe there are four, but that's the only one
that I can recall off the top of my head.
Q. Now going back to a person presents to you,
Doctor, with torticollis -A. Yes.
Q. -- and complaining of a severe headache and
complaining of dizziness and complaining of some numbness n
her face, would you, depending upon the way she presented
with those symptoms, undertake a cervical adjustment?
A. Not using diversified technique, no.
Q. What technique would you use?
A. I may not adjust that person at that time.
Q. Would there be any adjustment that that person
would be a candidate for, in your opinion?
A. Perhaps activator.
Q. Of the type that Dr. Main used?
A. No. According to the record of what I read, it
was ArthroStim or PTLMS.
Q. Would either of those be contraindicated under
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those circumstances?
1
A. For torticollis?
2
Q. Yes.
3
A. No.
4
Q. Has Exhibit No.2, the abstract that you read,
5
changed anything about the way you practice?
6
A. No.
7
Q. Is Exhibit No.2 of any significance to your
8
opinion?
9
Did you use it really other than you read it and
10
it was interesting, but does it provide any underpinning o~ 11
basis for your opinions?
I 12
A. Opinions on?
Q. That you're expressing here today on
14
Dr. Gallegos-Main.
15
A. No.
16
Q. How about Exhibit No.3? When did you read th 17
for the first time? The Neurology journal.
18
A. When this one was e-mailed to me.
19
Q. Okay. Sometime in September/October?
20
A. Uh-huh.
21
Q. That's a yes?
22
A. Yes.
23
Q. Has that had any impact on how you do your
124
chiropractic, practice your chiropractic?
__ ~.

j113
>
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A. In the same e-mail as Exhibit 3.
Q. When did you first read it?
A. When it was sent to me.
Q. Has that had any effect on the way you practice?
A. No.
Q. And I take it that that wasn't used by you in
forming your opinions in this case?
A. Correct.
Q. Exhibit No. S. Sent to you at the same time,
correct?
A. Yes.
I have seen this before.
Q. Oh, you saw it before?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. That was a yes?
A. Yes.
Q. And what occasioned you seeing it prior to
receiving it from Mr. Johnson?
A. It had been discussed by several journals,
American Chiropractic Association I believe, the ACA,
discussing this Web page.
Q. Has that had any effect on the way you practice
chiropractic?
A. No.
Q. And wa~~~hibit No. 5 us~~y you_~::~ _::v_atJ~
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A. No.
1
Q. Is that of any significance or is that a -- does
2
that information in the Neurology journal form any basis fo 3
your opinion?
4
A. Repeat the question.
5
Q. Sure.
6
Does that Exhibit No.3, the Neurology journal,
7
did you use that at all in developing your opinion?
8
A. In this report?
I 9
Q. Yes.
A. Or the way I practice?
11
Q. In the report.
12
A. No.
13
Q. Because of your last answer I want to make sure I 11145
didn't miss something.
Did the Exhibit No.2, the risk ofvertebrobasilar
16
strokes in the Spine magazine -- I know you said that didn'til 7
affect the way you practiced.
18
Was there anything about that that you used in
19
forming your opinions? I think you said no, but I want to 20
make sure I didn't miss anything.
121
A. I believe I said no; and I would say no again.
I 22
Q. Okay. Let's go to Exhibit No.4.
23
Do you have that in front of you?
24
When did you receive that?
25

\10
i

I
>

>

formulating your opinions in this case?
A. So when you say "formulating opinions," it wasn't
referenced. So in reading the articles -Q. It wasn't.
A. Right.
So I didn't reference it, but I read it as a
journal that's out there. But it doesn't affect the way I
practice.
Q. Right. I understand.
A. I am confused the way you're asking the question.
Q. I will ask it again.
A. Okay.
Q. Is there anything in Exhibit No.5 that you can
point me to that you used in formulating your opinions that
are set forth in your report of October 15 of 20 1O?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Other than Exhibits 2 through 5 and the
references that you cited in your report of October 15,
2010, are there any other documents that you would refer n e
to that you used in any way in developing your opinions or
had reference to?
A. I read something online, but it was referencing
the first article. Exhibit 2.
Q. And did that have any impact on your opinion?
A. No.
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Q. Okay. Let's go back to Exhibit No.1 for a minute 1
2
and get done with this, the duces tecum request.
3
I have your CV. We have talked about all of the
items responsive to item number 5. And you have alread~ 4
covered that you haven't testified before, so we can leave I 5
6
that.
7
Now that I have gotten completely off course, I
i
\
will go to something else. I will come back to these at
I 8
some point in time.
(Exhibit 6 marked for identification.)
11
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. Here is Exhibit No.6, Doctor. This is a copy of 12
13
your CV.
14
Let's see if we can make it through this quickly,
15
hopefully. I think we have covered a lot ofthis.
This is a complete updated version of your CV; is 16
17
it not?
18
A. I believe so.
19
Q. Nothing else you need to add, right?
20
A. Not that I see.
21
Q. Okay. And this covers your entire educational
22
background; does it not?
23
A. Entire?
24
Q. Yes.
25
A. Not during high school, but college.

11~
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Q.
A.

i

1
All right.
Well, he said "entire." I'm trying to be very
II 32
truthful.
!
Q. When and where did you graduate from high schooIp. 4
5
A. Los Gatos-Q. What year?
I 6
A. -- California.
I 7
8
1990.
9
Q. And then you enrolled in the University of
10
California?
11
A. Yes.
12
Q. In terms of your current licenses and
13
certificates, we have talked about the pettibon
14
certification. We have talked about the active release
15
technique.
16
That doesn't have a license with it, does it?
17
A. No. Neither of them have licenses.
: 18
Q. Does it have a certification? The active release
; 19
technique.
20
A. Certification? Yes, of sorts.
21
I mean you become -- you can say certified
22
practitioner. You complete their course. If you pass
23
their -- at the end of the training session if you complete
24
their testing, then you're qualified to be a practitioner
25
listed on their Web site. I don't know if you call that

!

I

in Idaho?
A. I do not.
Q. Your career development. That covers everything
in terms of your specific training for the practice of
ch iropractic?
A. Additional training than what I would get in
school, yes.
Q. Ifwe can just go through these maybe starting
with the latest. Bio geometric integration.
What is that?
A. That is a light force technique that involves very
light holes on anywhere from the lower back and hip area t
the neck.
Q. What does that do?
A. It is to help release -- the theory is that it
helps release pressure on the dura mater in the neck and the
sacrum.
Q. Does it work?
A. Does it work? Yes.
Q. Do you use it in your practice?
A. Briefly.
Q. Do you still use it?
A. No.
Q. When did you stop?
A. 2004 maybe.
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I

Q. Then we have the several petti bon system notations 1
here under career development.
2
A. Yes.
3
Q. That would all have to do with your petti bon
4
Straining?
5
6
A. Correct.
6
7
Q. And are all of those various training references
7
8
that you have here, are those all necessary to become
8
9
certified as a petti bon practitioner?
9
10
A. Yes.
10
11
Q. Then we get into your active release technique
I 11
12 certification. We talked about that I think. 2008.
112
13
And you're still practicing that, correct?
13
14
14
A. Vh-huh.
1S
Q. Is that yes?
15
16
A. Yes.
1 16
! 17
17
Q. And what is kinesiotaping?
18
Am I pronouncing that correctly?
19
A. Kinesiotaping, yes.
19
20
Q. What is that?
20
21
A. It's not specific to chiropractic. It is a
21
22 patented tape that is used that allows full mobility of the
22
23 joint after it's injured, but it gives it support.
23
24
If you saw the Olympics, Women's Olympics, when 24
2S they had the black on their shoulders, the women that plaY(~25
1
2
3
4

I

118
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Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

Yes.
Yes.
What's the name of it?
Tarnai Chiropractic.
Oh, all right.
Is that an LLC?
A. It's an S-Corp.
Q. And then you were the treating doctor in 2008 a
the VS Open?
A. Yes.
Q. And then your practice in Carlsbad from 2001 t<
2002. Were you practicing by yourself or -A. Yes.
Q. -- with someone else?
A. No, just me.
Q. All alone?
A. Vh-huh.
Q. Is that yes?
A. Yes.
Q. What is locum tenens?
A. Locum tenens is where if a chiropractor or a
practicing physician goes on vacation or they need som
relief work, but you are not an actual doctor in that
practice.
Q. That was in Redwood City?
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1
volleyball.
2
Q. Got it.
3
A. That's what it is.
Q. Then your experience. At the present time, I take 4
it from your earlier testimony, you practice with someone v 5
A. Yes. He's an independent contractor.
I 6
Q. Does he work for you as an independent contract17
or do you work together? How does that work?
8
A. No. Independent contractor. He was an employe , 9
but now he's an independent contractor. He does his own 10
Q. And that's Jake?
11.
12
A. Yes.
13
Q. And D-A-I-L-E- Y?
A. D-A-L-Y.
1.4
Q. Is there anyone else in your office other than you 15
16
and Jake?
17
A. There is an acupuncturist.
18
Q. What's that person's name?
19
A. Michael Woodworth.
20
Q. Anyone else?
21
A. There are three part-time massage therapists.
22
Q. And anyone else?
23
A. Front desk staff.
24
Q. SO is this your business?
25
A. Tarnai Chiropractic?

A. Yes.
Q. Who was the doctor you were relieving?
A. I do not recall her name.
Q. And then you also note you were in chiropractic
practice in San Ramon and San Carlos, Costa Rica?
A. Yes.
Q. What took you there?
A. I didn't know where I wanted to practice in
California.
Q. Who did you practice with there? By yourself or
with others?
A. In San Carlos I was by myself; in San Ramon I
practiced with Jimmy Lee.
Q. With who?
A. Jimmy Lee.
Q. Is he a gringo?
A. Yes.
Q. What was your reason for leaving that Costa Rica
practice?
A. Wanted to come back to California.
Q. Who were you a chiropractic assistant to in
San Francisco in '95 through '99?
A. Alan Cheng.
Q. And is he solo?
A. Yes.
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1

Q. Is he still practicing in San Francisco?
1
A. Oh, that was back in 1999. 11 years ago.
A. I don't know.
2
Q. Did you go on a world tour?
Q. Then your professional services. The Panama
i 3
A. No, I didn't go. A world tour came. It was big.
4
Mission and the Costa Rica Mission. What were those? , 4 It's chiropractic pediatrics. It was a lot of people that
5
A. Those were chiropractic, chiropractors from the
5 work on children. And it was a big expo.
6
United States that go over to Panama or Costa Rica wher 6
Q. And then you mention Dr. Alan Cheng in the fourth
7
there are not many chiropractors and work on the local
7 bullet from the bottom. Is that the gentleman -8
people who may perhaps needed chiropractic care.
I8
A. Yes.
9
Q. Were you doing work for free then?
9
Q. -- the doctor in San Francisco you worked for?
l O A . Yes.
10
A. Yes.
11
Q. Did anyone pay you or did you pay your own way?ll
Q. What is the motion palpation technique -12
A. Paid our own way.
12
A. Motion palpation-13
Q. How long do you do that?
13
Q. -- in 1998?
14
A. It was in October 2000 and April 2000.
14
A. -- is in school. So you look at segments and
15
Q. For the entire months?
15 basically motion them to see how they are moving or not
16
A. No, it was a week.
16 moving.
17
Q. A week each month?
17
Q. That's part of --I'm sorry.
18
A. I believe so.
18
A. That would be the layman's explanation of what it
19
Q. Okay. Then your professional organizations. Ym 19 is.
2 0 were in the International Chiropractic Association -20
Q. It's part of the palpation process?
2 J..
A. Yes.
21
A. Yes -- no. They consider it a separate technique
22
Q. -- until 2009.
22 of the way that they check the spine and check segments, tt e
23
Are you still in it?
I' 23
way they move.
24
A. No.
24
Q. In this I don't -- maybe it's in here and I missed
1-2_S_ _,Q_;..-._W_h...c:.y_d_i_d.,.:.y_o_u_d_r_o'-p_i,t_?_________
2_5~i"t~. ,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _,____.____._____
2
3

l'

._--+1-

Page 63

i

I

A. 2009 was a difficult year and I trimmed a lot of
1
things.
2
Q. Economic downturn?
3
A. Yes.
4
Q. And CCA member. What is -- the chiropractic -- 5
A. California Chiropractic Association.
6
Q. And you were a member from 2005 to 2008.
7
Why are you no longer a member?
8
A. That was the beginning of the downturn for us.
9
10
Q. SO for economic reasons?
10
11
A. Yes.
II
12
Q. And then just let's quickly do this. Educational
12
13 programs and presentations.
13
14
What is LeTip?
, 14
15
A. LeTip International is a networking organization. 15
16
Q. For chiropractors?
16
17
A. No. For anybody who has a small business.
17
18
Q. And then what were you doing with CORE in 200~;L8
19 2007?
I' 19
20
What does CORE stand for?
! 20
21
A. You know, I don't know.
121
22
CORE is a group of chiropractors that meet in
! 22
23 San Diego. And they just get together and meet and
: 23
24 occasionally have speakers come.
: 24
2S
Q. And then what was the Chiropractic World Tour? 125
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
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Do you have any continuing chiropractic education
courses that you've attended?
A. Yes.
Q. Are those listed?
A. No.
Q. What have you done in that regard?
A. There are annual seminars all over that are
available and I will take those. I mean I could get those
for you.
Q. No. Are you required to do that under
California -A. Yes.
Q. -- to be licensed in California?
A. Yes.
Q. And you're current?
A. Yes. That's where my license is, the current
license. I couldn't be licensed if I didn't complete that.
Q. All right. In addition to -- and I'm switching
gears with you for a second.
In addition to looking at the documents we've
talked about that you reviewed prior to coming here today
prepare for your deposition, did you talk to anyone other
than Mr. Monteleone or Mr. Johnson about this deposition
A. I told my front office staff that I would be
coming to a deposition.
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I

Q. Did you talk to anyone else about it?
1
A. I also e-mailed the LeTip group that I would not
2
be making a meeting today because of the deposition.
3
Q. Have you talked to anyone other than the attome Y!4
I mentioned about this case?
5
A. I talked to my husband about it.
6
Q. Anyone else?
7
A. I mentioned to Jake that I took the case and I was i 8
writing a report.
i 9
Q. Okay. And is your husband a chiropractor?
: 10
A. No.
: 11
112
Q. And do you have children?
I
il3
A. One.
'14
Q. How old?
15
A. Almost two.
16
Q. Little boy or little girl?
17
A. Little girl.
18
Q. That's nice.
Before we get into these, your reports, have you
19
ever had a patient experience a stroke while in your clinic?2 0
A. No.
21
Q. Do you know of that ever occurring with any
22
practitioner chiropractic physician who you have an
23
acquaintanceship with?
24
A. No.
25

Page 68
you asked it. But a stroke is relatively very rare and that
wouldn't preclude a person from going to see a chiropractor.
Is that what you're -Q. Yes. You answered my question.
A. Okay.
Q. And because of the extremely rare nature of a
stroke under these circumstances, is that something that you
are looking for in every patient that comes in with a
headache and a neck ache?
A. Yes. It's part of my differential diagnosis.
Q. How do you go about doing that?
A. It's primarily symptoms. The orthopedic tests
have been shown to be not necessarily accurate or helpful.
George's maneuver is -Q. George's, for example.
A. -- one ofthem.
Yes. So it would be primarily based on what the
symptoms of are of how the patient presented.
Q. And what are the symptoms in your mind, in your
opinion as a doctor of chiropractic, would alert you to a
person being a potential stroke victim or in the process of
having a stroke?
A. The obvious signs would be someone who would have
difficulty speaking, some slurring of speech, some acute
dizziness, inability to state day or time, year. Basically

Page 69

Page 67
1

2
3
4

5
6
7
8
9

1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
20
21
22
23
24

25

Q. Do you know of any instance that you've learned ( f 1
in your private practice where a person as a patient has
2
experienced a stroke that was the result of chiropractic
3
care?
4
A. Repeat the beginning of the question.
5
MR. GREENER: Can you read it back? I think it
6
was the way I wanted it. Maybe I will rephrase it if it
7
doesn't make any sense.
8
(Record read.)
9
THE WITNESS: Is that a chiropractor or just
10
11
anybody?
12
BY MR. GREENER:
13
Q. Anyone as a result of chiropractic care.
14
A. No.
15
Q. In your opinion is the risk of a stroke from
cervical adjustment by a chiropractor a risk that is an
16
acceptable risk in going about diagnosing, caring, and
17
18
treating for patients as a chiropractor?
19
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: Acceptable risk to whom?
20
21
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. To the patient.
22
23
In tenns of the percentage of its occurrence and
the rarity of its occurrence.
24
A. I am not sure if I'm answering the question ofhowj25

presenting to that day. Those are the very obvious ones.
Q. Okay. When you say acute dizziness, in other
words, a more severe dizziness than just "I'm dizzy"?
I'm kind of dizzy today, for example.
A. Yes. Well, not everybody. But, in general, I
would say that that would be a fair statement.
Q. For example, when people are laying down -whether they are in the chiropractic clinic or wherever -and they get up, a lot of people experience dizzincss upor
arising; is that right?
A. Yes. That's why I always tell people to take a
breath in before you come up. Come up off the table.
Q. SO if a person was on your chiropractic tablc -A. Yes.
Q. -- and sat up and said, "oh, I'm dizzy," would
that be a sign to you that that person was experiencing
stroke?
A. It would be in the back of my mind. I would mak
sure. I would say are you okay to stand up? Take a deep
breath. Rest. Stay here. Don't move unti I you feel like
you can stand or move on your own.
Q. And if they are able to stand up and move on their
own, you would feel comfortable letting them depart you
clinic?
A. No. I would want to make sure. I would check 0
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:1
2
3
4

5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12

13
14
1.S
1.6
1.7
18
1.9
20
21
22

23
24

25

them.

1

We have open adjusting, it's not rooms. So I can
2
see them as they go from the treating area over to the
3
waiting area to the door.
I 4
So I would check their eyes, make sure they can
! 5
track, follow my fingers. Ask them, make sure do you knowi 6
where you are, do you know what day it is, can you speak. II 7
Q. And if they can do all of those things, you would
B
feel comfortable having them depart?
9
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form. Incomplet' 10
hypothetical.
11
THE WITNESS: If they felt that they were able to
12
leave on their own.
13
MR. GREENER: I haven't mark these yet and I am
14
going to.
15
Off the record for a minute.
16
(Discussion off the record.)
17
BY MR. GREENER:
18
19
Q. Back on.
20
Are you familiar with a PICA stroke? Do you know
21
what that is?
22
A. A PICA?
23
Q. Yes.
24
A. No.
25
Q. Are you familiar with the subarachnoid stroke?

A. Yes. As a general statement, yes.
Q. Do you hold your opinions that you are going to
express in this case on a more probable than not basis?
A. Yes.
Q. And what does that mean to you? When you say it's
more probable than not.
A. I would say if you hear the sound of hooves, think
horses, not zebras if you live in California.
Q. Can you say it again?
A. If you hear the sound of hooves, think horses not
zebras. So in general common things occur commonly and ra
things do not.
Did I confuse you?
Q. No, Ijust couldn't hear zebra.
A. Oh.
Q. All right. Let's talk about your opinion.
How much time did you put in preparing your
opinion that you have in your expert report of October 15,
201O?
A. Total time?
Q. Yes.
A. Probably in the neighborhood of six hours
including research.
Q. Six hours including research?
A. Uh-huh.

Page 73

Page 71
1
2
3

A. I know the word; but symptoms --

Q. You don't know.

A. -- diagnosis? No.
4
Q. And you don't have any opinion on what could or
5
could not cause a PICA stroke in a human being?
6
A. No.
7
Q. That's no, you do not?
S
A. No, I do not.
9
Q. Let's tum our focus now to your expert opinions
1. 0 in this case.
1.1
Do you hold your opinions on a more probable thaT
1.2 not basis? That is, is your opinion based upon a better
1.3 than 50 percent?
1.4
A. My opinion based on 50 percent of what?
1. 5
Q. Are you fam iliar with the term reasonable
1.6 chiropractic certainty?
1. 7
A. No.
1. S
Q. SO you can't tell me if you hold your opinions to
1. 9 a reasonable chiropractic certainty or on a more probable
20 than not basis?
21.
A. I don't know what reasonable chiropractic
22 certainty is.
23
Q. Okay. Let's leave it.
24
Are you familiar with the term on a more probable
25 than not basis? Are you familiar with those terms?

e

1.
2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

17
18

19
20
21
22
23

24
25

Q. Have you sent a biJI for your time?
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

No.
Do you know what the total bill is?
No.
Do you plan to?
Yes. I don't work for free.
Q. And out of the six hours including research -A. Yes.
Q. -- how much was spent on research?
A. Three. Two to three.
Q. Pardon?
A. Two to three.
Q. And how was the balance of the six hours spent?
A. Looking at the research, looking at the records,
and writing a report.
Q. How much time did you spend -- if you can break it
out. I know you're not going to be able to say 10 minutes
here and five minutes here. I am not asking for that.
A. Okay.
Q. We have two to three hours on research. Would
that have been -- what would that have involved exactly?
What research did you do?
A. I did an online research. I looked at the records
that we mentioned previously. I reviewed the e-mails.
Q. E-mails from Mr. Johnson?
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A. With -- yeah, that included the records. So I
1
wanted to make sure I had all of the records because they
2
3
were sent in different e-mails.
3
4
Q. All right.
4
5
A. I went back and looked at my research in terms of
5
6 journals, the chiropractic journals.
6
7
Q. And those are referenced in the expert report you
7
8
prepared, correct?
8
9
A. I believe so.
I
9
J.O
MR. GREENER: We are up to Exhibit 6; are we nott 10
J.J.
MR. MONTELEONE: 7 I believe.
I 11
1.2
MR. GREENER: 7.
I 12
1.3
(Exhibit 7 marked for identification.)
! 13
14 BY MR. GREENER:
14
Q. Here is Exhibit 7. And that is a copy of your
15
1.5
1.6 expert report of October 15.
16
1. 7
A. Yes.
17
J.8
Q. And that was prepared by you. It's a mUlti-page
18
1.9 document. It hasn't been Bates numbered yet, but it looks 19
20 like the body of it -- do you have a page number on this,
20
21. Doctor?
21
22
A. A page number meaning -- I mean I believe it's
22
23 seven pages. Is that what you are asking?
23
24
Q. Is it seven pages in length?
24
1-2_5_____1 guess would you do me a favor? We don't have a 125
2

this to pin down with a little bit more precision the two to
three hours on research.
Item number I makes reference, on page 7 of
Exhibit 7, to Leslie M. Wise, professor of clinical science
at Sherman College of Straight Chiropractic, a power poi t
presentation of August 10,2008, at a certain reference.
Did you pull this up on the Internet?
A. Yes.
Q. You didn't attend this, you just -A. No.
Q. What use did you make of this?
A. This was -- these are noted in the report in
parentheses.
Q. Is this the first time -- when you were preparing
your report, was that the first time you ever reviewed this
particular power point presentation?
A. Yes.
Q. You never reviewed it before?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever talk to Dr. Wise?
A. No.
Q. What was your purpose in reviewing this?
A. I was looking for a standard of care that was
clean and easily understood and something that was, I fel
representative of the standard of care in chiropractic.

Page 75,
1.
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

9
1.0
1.1.
1.2
1.3
14
1. 5
1.6
1.7
1.8

19
20
21.
22
23
24
25

Bates number on this. You have a pen there. Let's
11
circle -- let's number each page and circle it in the lower I 2
right-hand comer just so we have a reference. If I ask you 3
I4
a question, I wiJJ know what page we are on.
II
5
A. Okay.
Q. Tell me when you're done.
I
6
7
A. Okay.
Q. I have seven pages. This is your report to Sam
8
Johnson dated October 15, 20 I O.
9
10
I think there is a copy of your signature on
page 6, correct?
11
A. Yes.
12
Q. And then just for the record, page 7 references
13
six items. And what do we have here on page 7?
14
A. The references.
15
Q. Yes.
16
What are they?
17
A. Do you want me to read them?
18
Q. No, no. What's their significance to your
19
opinion? Are these materials you used to developing you 20
opinion?
21
A. Yes.
122
Q. Does this detail your research?
123
A. Yes.
,24
I
Q. All right. And so maybe we can kind of go through25

I

Page 77

Q.
regard
A.
Q.
A.

And did you find all of your questions in that
answered with the Leslie M. Wise power point?
All of my questions?
Yes. Regard ing standard of care.
I felt that it was appropriate.
Q. Was there any other part -- was there anything
else that you relied upon in determining what the standar<
of care was?
A. Those are documented in number 2 and number 3
Q. All right. And number 4 as well?
A. Number 4 is the definition of torticollis.
Q. And what about numbers 5 and 6? Did they have
anything to do with standard of care?
A. No. Those are referencing pettibon.
Q. I through 3 would be where you gleaned the
standard of care?
A. Yes.
Q. What in terms of the standard of care as it
relates to this case did you obtain from the Leslie M. Wis
power point presentation?
A. Where it's stated here, the quote:
"The level at which the average.
prudent provider in a given community
would practice. It is how similarly
qualified practitioners would have managed

20
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~

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1
the patient's care under the same or
similar circumstances."
2
3
Q. SO that is a direct quote from Dr. Wise?
4
A. Yes.
5
Q. That's not your definition of standard of care?
6
A. No.
7
Q. And this does make reference to in a given
community. Would that then be -- if we look at this then, 8
9
and we're looking now at page I of the report that you
prepared in the second paragraph where you write:
10
11
"An apt definition of standard of care
can be defined as 'The level at which the
12
13
average, prudent provider in a given
14
community would practice. It is how
similarly qualified practitioners would
15
16
have managed the patient's care under the
same or similar circumstances.'"
17
End of quote.
18
I read this correctly, didn't I?
19
20
A. Yes.
Q. And do you adopt that standard of care for the
121
22
purposes of your opinion in this case?
23
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
24
THE WITNESS: Did I?
/ / /
25
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BY MR. GREENER:
Q. Do you agree with that standard of care for the
purposes of your opinion in this case?
A. Yes.
Q. SO ifI am understanding that correctly then, that
would be the level at which the average, prudent provider in
Caldwell or Napa, Idaho, would practice?
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: Perhaps given community could be th
chiropractic profession.
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. Well, do you understand where Dr. Main's clinic is
located?
A. No. I know it's in Idaho, but no.
Q. With this language here, wouldn't the standard of
practice be applied have to be the level at which the
average, prudent provider in the community in which she
practices?
A. Well, that's what I was saying before -MR. MONTELEONE: Excuse me for interrupting,
Dr. Tarnai.
Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: I was saying that a given community
would be or could be also construed as chiropractic
profession, not necessarily a physical location.

BY MR. GREENER:
Q. And where do you -- how do you obtain that
construction from this language?
A. It says the level at which an average, prudent
provider in a given community.
A community can be a physical location, but it can
also be a -- it could chat on an Internet site. I mean a
group. So you can have a community of chiropractors.
Q. Do you know if there is any different standard of
practice of chiropractic physicians in Caldwell, Idaho,
than, for example, other locations in the country incJudin~
California?
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: I don't know Caldwell. I don't
know.
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. All right. In terms of the standard of practice,
is there anything else that you obtained -- let me ask it
this way -- from Dr. Wise power point presentation, othel
than what you specifically set forth in your report?
A. Other than what I put in the report?
Q. Yes.
A. I don't believe so, no.
Q. And then the Council on Chiropractic Practice
Clinical Practice Guideline. Did I read that me ;tly?_

1
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1
2
3
4
5
6
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A. Yes.
Q. Third edition 2008.
You took that off the Internet as well, right?
A. Yes. I have also seen a hard copy of it.
Q. What is that?
A. That is a guideline that is put together that -there are two. So the CCP, the Council on Chiropractic
Practice Clinical Practice Guideline, and the Guidelines f, r
Chiropractic Quality Assurance and Practice Parameters,
Proceedings of Mercy Center Consensus Conference.
Those two documents in general in the chiropractic
community are the basis or the guidelines that are often
quoted in standard of care referencing treatment guidelin~s.
Q. Do you know if they are followed in the State of
Idaho?
A. I do not.
Q. Do you know if they are adopted by any
chiropractic board in the State of Idaho?
A. Adopted by the board?
Q. Yes. Do you know?
A. I don't know if there's a board in Idaho.
believe it's national.
Q. And do you know if any of these references that
you have there -- such as the Council on Chiropractic
Practice Clinical Practice Guideline or the Guidelines for
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Chiropractic Quality Assurance and Practice Parameters,
Proceedings of Mercy Center Consensus Conference -- do you
3 know if those have been adopted by the legislature in the
4
State of Idaho?
5
A. Which legislature?
6
Q. The Idaho legislature.
7
A. For chiropractors?
8
Q. Yes. As being applicable to chiropractors.
9
A. Repeat the beginning of the question.
J. 0
Q. I just want to know do you know whether or not the
J.1. Idaho legislature has adopted any of these for chiropractic
]. 2 practitioners in the State ofIdaho to be applicable -J. 3
A. I don't know that the legislature has control over
J. 4 chiropractor's practice.
J. 5
Q. SO your answer is no, you don't know?
]. 6
A. I don't know.
]. 7
Q. How about in California? Has the California
J. 8 legislature adopted any of these guidelines that you have
J. 9 referenced?
20
A. As I stated previously, I don't think the
21. legislature has reference or controls what happens to the
22 chiropractic profession in California.
23
Q. You have a chiropractic board in California; do
24 you not?
25
A. We do.
1.

1

2

2
3
4

5
6
7

8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17

18
19

20
21
22
23
24

on you as a chiropractor practicing in California?
A. I do not know.
Q. Would you know if that had occurred?
A. Yes.
Q. And-A. I hope so.
Q. Thank you.
I would like to ask you the same question. Do you
know if the board that licenses you has adopted the Council
on Chiropractic Practice Clinical Practice Guideline, Third
Edition 2008 referenced in footnote number 2 to your expert
report Exhibit 7 so that it is binding on chiropractors
practicing in the State of California?
A. I do not know.
Q. And do you know if the power point by Leslie M.
Wise has been adopted by the board that licenses you in the
State of California so that it is binding on chiropractors
in California?
A. I do not know.
Q. Does the practice of chiropractic in California in
terms of standard of care vary from community to community
within California, to your knowledge?
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: I do not believe so.
The California board licenses us, but the
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Q. Do you know if your -- what is it called?
1
A. I don't know what it's called off the top of my
2
head.
3
Q. Do you know if-4
A. California Board of Examiners. I believe that's
5
what it is called.
6
Q. But whatever name it is called, do you know
7
whether or not that board or that entity -8
A. Yes.
9
Q. Let me back up.
10
A. Okay.
11
Q. Would that be -- who licenses you? Is it the
12
13
Board of Examiners for chiropractors or -A. Yes, yes.
14
Q. Do you know if whoever licenses you has adopted
15
the items set forth in footnotes 2 and 3 of your expert
16
report that's Exhibit No.7?
17
A. Is there more to the question?
18
Q. I'll ask it again.
19
A. Okay.
120
Q. Let's do it individually. Do you know if the
21
board that licenses you in California has ever formally
, 22
adopted the Guidelines for Chiropractic Quality Assurance
'I 23
and Practice Parameters, Proceedings of Mercy Center
24
Consensus Conference so that they are mandatory requirementb 25

governing board is the national board.
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. Okay. What's the name of the national board?
A. National Board of Chiropractic Examiners.
Q. And does the National Board of Chiropractic
Examiners, do you know whether they have adopted any )f
these same items that we have just been talking about -specifically footnotes I, 2 and 3 to your expert report -so that any of those, according to the national board. are
binding on chiropractors practicing in the United States 0
America?
A. I do not know that.
Q. You would know if it had occurred, wouldn't you
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to -THE WITNESS: I don't know.
MR. MONTELEONE: -- the form.
THE WITNESS: If they sent a letter to me, I woul
know.
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. Do you know if the national board has adopted an
policies or guidelines that you can point me to that apply
to standard of care of chiropractors in the United States?
A. I do not know.
I know they have a Web site and they are
responsible for licensing.
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1
Q. I have asked you about whether the standard of
care varies within the State of California. Do you, in your 2
3
opinion -- strike that.
Do you know, as a practicing chiropractor in the
4
United States, ifthere is any kind ofa difference at all
5
between chiropractors practicing in California and
6
7
chiropractors practicing in Idaho?
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: In terms of standard of care -BY MR. GREENER:
Q. Yes.
A. -- expectations or the way they practice?
12
Q. In terms of the standard of care that is
13
applicable to them in their practice.
14
15
A. I do not know.
Q. So, for example, if we talk about the Mercy
16
guidelines, you know what I'm talking about, don't you?
17
A. I do. That was number 3.
18
Q. Yeah. That's number 3.
I 19
So you don't know, as we sit here today, if I
I 20
understand your question (sic) correctly, whether the Merd 21
guidelines have been adopted by the State of Idaho as their 22
standard of practice?
I 23
A. I do not know.
i 24
Q. Same question with regard to number 2.
I 25

I

Getting it online, getting it offline, reviewing it. How
long did you spend doing that?
A. I don't know. I didn't know that I would be asked
this question, so I didn't even pay attention.
Q. Did you keep track of your time so you could
accurately bill Mr. Johnson?
A. Actually it's more of an estimate.
Q. Well, I understand that.
A. Okay.
Q. I'm not trying to -- I'm just trying to find out
how much time you spent, to the best of your recollection.
All you can tell me is your best recollection. You don't
need to say it was 20 minutes or 10 minutes and 50 second .
I understand you can't do that.
I just want to get a glimpse, if you will, of how
much time you spent on these various items.
Let's talk about Leslie Wise's power point again.
How long is it in terms of what you downloaded? Is it 50
pages? 100 pages, 10 pages?
A. I believe it was somewhere in the neighborhood of
20 screens, pages.
MR. GREENER: Okay. I guess we would ask for a
copy of exactly what the doctor reviewed and that's attache
to her report, Counsel.
Can we have an agreement that we will get that?

Page 87

Page 89

You do not know, do you?
1
A. The number 2?
2
3
Q. Is the -3
4
A. Oh, the CCP guidelines?
4
5
Q. Yes.
5
6
A. I don't know ifthey have adopted it formally as
6
7
the standard of care -7
8
Q. In Idaho.
8
9
9
A. -- for chiropractors in California or Idaho.
10
I don't know if there is such a document.
10
11
Q. I have got off course and we will probably come
11
12 back to that again; but, hopefully, not repeating areas we
12
13 have covered.
13
14
I want to make sure I fully understand your six
14
15 hours in preparing this. And we have talked about -- do yo 15
16 know how much time out of that six hours you spent on
16
17 footnote number I? The Leslie Wise materials.
17
18
A. How much time I spent on reading it or -i 18
19
Q. Yes. Reading it, working with it, doing whatever ! 19
20 you did with it.
: 20
21
A. However long it took me to find it on the Web site 21
22 online and going through and looking at the power point
22
23 presentation.
23
24
I am not sure what you're asking.
24
25
Q. I just wondered how long you spent reviewing it.
25
1

2

I

MR. MONTELEONE: That's fine.
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. Okay. So about 20. Would it be 20 sheets this
size?
A. It was a power point presentation online. I don't
know.
Q. You didn't download it?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Do you have a memory as to -- can you give
me any recollection as to how long it took you to read it
and digest it?
A. Read it and digest it? To read it probably took
me -- I don't know -- 10, 15 minutes.
And digest it? I mean I probably digested it the
whole time I was trying to prepare the report to see whethe
it was appropriate.
Q. SO it took you about 10 minutes to read it?
A. Uh-huh. Just to read each screen.
Q. And the same question regarding the CCP practice
guidelines, item number 2 on page 7 of your expert report.
How long is that document?
A. Very long. I did not read the whole thing. I
looked in there for the clinical practice -- for what was in
terms of applicable to the report, what I wanted, what I was
looking for, what I had an idea of what I wanted to write.
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7
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1. :1.
1.2
1. 3
1.4
1. S
1. 6
1. 7
1.8
1. 9
20
2:1.
22
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1
I looked in there to see what would be appropriate
2
for -- they had recommendations for a lot of different
scenarios. But in terms of an intake and a re-exam, that's I 3
4
what I looked at.
5
Q. How many pages?
I 6
A. How many pages of what?
7
Q. Did you look at then? How many pages of that
8
lengthy treatise did you look at? Five? 10?
9
A. Probably -- no. I looked at probably in the
neighborhood of probably 20. Maybe 15. Those are pages 10
11
Q. Have you provided what you looked at to
12
Mr. Johnson?
A. Well, I put it in the note here. It's -- what I
I
looked at is written in the report. It's here.
114
15
Q. Oh, everything -116
A. This is referencing what I wrote in the report.
I
117
So according to the -- if you look back on page I?
1 18
Q. Yes.
19
A. And it says -- the third paragraph.
20
Q. Yes.
21
A. "There are also several documents which serve as
guidelines for the chiropractic community and these includ 22
23
the" -- I will say the CCP, which is 2; and then the
Guidelines for Chiropractic Quality Assurance and Practice 24
25
Parameters is number 3. The Mercy guidelines.

i13

different places to try to formulate my opinion. And I cam
down to these.
Q. That's fine if you can't.
Item number 3. How many pages of that did you
pull off the Web site or the -A. I don't know.
Q. Would you be able to go back and find them and
give them to Mr. Johnson?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know how much time you spent on that or
would you have the same -A. I would have the same. It was altogether.
Q. If we put the items one, two, and three together
in terms of the amount oftime that you spent with it, can
you give me your best recollection as to how much time yo J
spent with those in terms of reading them?
A. Within the two to three hours that I -Q. Yes.
A. Probably an hour and 45 minutes.
Q. Okay.
A. I mean I looked at -- those are the ones that I
really took a close look at. When I was looking online to
see ifthere are -- because I know about these -- to see if
there were other guidelines, there really wasn't anything
that I felt was as good of a guideline or referenced as much

Page 91

Page 93

Q. Right.
i 1
A. So the CCP. And then it continues on from page I. I 2
3
That's what is in the CCP.
' 3
4
Q. Is that all that you would have read from the CCP, , 4
5
which is footnote number 2, that would start at the bottom
5
6
of page 1, go through page 2 and onto page 3, or did you
6
7
read more of it?
7
8
A. No. I read more it.
8
9
Q. But you took this directly out of it?
9
10
A. Correct.
10
11.
Q. What I am asking is did you ever provide
11
12 Mr. Johnson a copy of what you were focusing on out oftht 12
13 CCP?
I 13
14
A. No.
14
15
Q. Could you do that? I would like to just be able
15
16 to know what part of that, I don't want to read the whole
16
17 thing if you didn't look at it. 1 want to know what part of
17
18 the CCP guideline you actually looked at.
18
19
A. I could go back online and look at it.
19
20
Q. And then let Mr. Monteleone or Johnson know.
20
21.
A. Okay.
21
22
Q. And then can you tell me how much time you spent, 22
23 on that? Reviewing it.
: 23
24
A. No, not really. Because all of these -- so one,
I 24
25 two, three, and I looked at a lot of other items in
I 25
1.
2

as these two.
Q. And then the Wikipedia. How much time did you
spend with that looking at torticollis?
A. As long as it took me to type it in and then read
the page.
Q. One page?
A. Yeah.
Q. And then the team training seminars. Are those
lengthy?
A. The entire booklet, yes, is lengthy.
Q. How much time did you spend with 5 and 6 on
page 7?
A. That I knew what I was looking for, so maybe five,
10 minutes.
Q. SO we have that much time then. How much time di(
you spend reviewing the records, the medical records, the
chart from Dr. Gallegos-Main?
A. A lot. I looked at it probably three hours. So
that's not included in the six hours of the actual report
writing.
So when you said how much time was for the report,
I didn't include that in that total. So it would be nine
hours total. Because three hours oflooking at the
deposition, the letter, and -- both depositions, the
letters.
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I

online and the like with the time now?
I would like to just kind of hastily get through
this and have an idea as to how much time you spent on these
various efforts out of the full nine hours. We have three
hours really well accounted for. I am a little bit vague on
how much time in total you spent on the Internet search.
Can you just help me out with that? I would like
to know that. And then how much time you spent writing and
rewriting and things.
A. What I was explaining is that I had six hours
initially. So the three hours was looking online, looking
at these guidelines, looking online at the power point
presentation, looking at other documents that I ended up not
using or not feeling were appropriate.
There were the three hours of looking at the
actual depositions and letters and other materials that were
e-mailed to me. And then I would say the remaining three
hours was actually composing the report.
Q. Do you recall any of the documents that you looked
at that were not appropriate or that you looked at, but
didn't -A. No.
Q. Did you ever talk to anyone from the plaintiffs
family?
A. No.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

12
13
14

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

don't neglect to mark this.
Here is Exhibit No.8.
(Exhibit 8 marked for identification.)
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. This is I believe your rough draft, or your draft,
your first draft, of September 16, 20 I 0, that you sent to
Mr. Johnson.
It contains essentially the same footnotes that
you have in Exhibit 7, your final report. But it also has
an e-mail on the last page that does not appear in
Exhibit 7, which is an e-mail from 1 believe you to
Mr. Johnson of September 21, 2010. "Opinion on two point
we discussed today."
And I have correctly identified the document,
haven't I?
A. Yes.
Q. And the only difference I can see, just for
starters, between your report, Exhibit 7, and the prior
draft of Exhibit (sic) 16, that's Exhibit 8, is found if we
go to your signature page on Exhibit 8.
That does not include -- let me find it. It does
not include what would be the two paragraphs at the bottom
of page 5 of Exhibit 7. Am I reading this correctly?
A. Yes.
Q. And that is the only difference, isn't it?
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1 negative result would occur.
A. Yes. 1 believe so.
So something such as taking an x-ray of an unborn
Q. And then the e-mail of September 21, 2010, the
I 2
3 fetus where you could have permanent damage to the growing
last page of Exhibit 8. Let's talk about that for just a
4 infant, but it's not a conservative or pain-free approach to
minute.
5 helping Ms. Arregui.
What was your purpose in preparing and sending
6
this?
Q. SO the bottom line, if 1 am understanding this
A. I'm sorry, 1 missed it. Where are you?
7 correctly, is if you take Dr. Main's records and her
Q. The last page of Exhibit 8, your draft.
8 testimony that the plaintiff presented with the torticollis
A. Oh, the e-mail.
9 and with dizziness, in your opinion it would not be a
'10 deviation of the standard of care with that type of
Q. It's the e-mail of September 21, 20 10.
111 presentation to do a diversified or a manual adjustment, but
A. Okay.
Q. It's my birthday.
i 12 it would be ajudgment call by the chiropractor under those
113 circumstances?
A. Oh.
14
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
Q. SO what was your purpose in preparing this?
15
A. This was in response to the subject line the
THE WITNESS: There was a lot to that question.
opinions on two points we discussed today. So that was the 16 BY MR. GREENER:
17
day that we had the conversation that we talked about.
Q. Yeah. Let me ask it this way.
18
Q. And if you would focus with me on the first full
A. Okay.
19
paragraph where you say in the second sentence:
Q. If a person presented to you on June 4 of 2007
20 with a torticollis that you diagnosed and complaining of
"The first question as to whether an
21 dizziness, based upon those two factors alone, would you
adjustment was contraindicated is a little
22 consider it to be a deviation of the standard of care to do
complicated. "
Why did you regard it to be complicated?
23 a cervical adjustment, manual or diversified cervical
24 adjustment, to that person?
A. As 1 stated in here, to me, in words from school,
! 25
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
contraindication would mean that there would be, there

1------------------------.-----+---
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are -- there's evidence to say that doing something would: 1
create a negative result.
i 2
So a contraindication to taking an x-ray would be
3
pregnancy. So there would be negative result of taking a~ 4
x-ray of not necessarily the mom, but the unborn fetus and 5
there could be damage to the fetus. That's where I took I 6
contraindication to be.
I 7
The second sentence said 1 could feel comfortable
8
saying that a manual or diversified adjustment would be
9
contraindicated if Dr. Gallegos-Main's diagnosis of
I 10
torticollis is correct.
I 11
Q. Okay.
12
A. Because of the confusion, as I was stating
13
earlier, between the deposition of the plaintiff and the
14
defendant, then I said:
15
"IfI take only Ms. Arregui's
16
testimony, she complained of tiredness,
17
neck pain, and crookedness, not
18
necessarily dizziness, which was on
19
Dr. Gallegos-Main's exam form."
20
And that "would not be a contraindication to a
21
22
manual adjustment."
23
So then taking Dr. Gallegos-Main's diagnosis of
torticollis and her written documentation of dizziness, it
wouldn't be a contraindication to mean that something -- 25

!

I

I

Page 101
THE WITNESS: So a minimal baseline, I would say
no. But to be conservative and I guess reasonable or as
little pain being created to the patient as possible, I
don't think that an adjustment would be rendered -- should
be rendered in that instance.
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. But when you say you don't think an adjustment
should be rendered in that instance, if I'm understanding
you correctly, you're not saying -A. A diversified adjustment.
Q. I will start over.
Well, what is your distinction between a
diversified and a manual adjustment? You make reference t
both here.
A. There are different kinds. A diversified is the
technique. So it's like activator is a technique or SOT is
a technique. Where a manual adjustment is hands-on, but
it's not necessarily diversified.
Q. All right. And so would there be a difference in
terms of whether you used diversified or manual?
A. 1 wouldn't use either.
Q. Now in stating that -- I want to make sure I
understand this -- is it or is it not -- well, pardon me.
In stating that you wouldn't do it under those
circumstances where a person presents with torticollis and
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with dizziness, in your opinion would it be a deviation frorrl 1
the standard of care for a chiropractic physician to do a
2
3
diversified adjustment on that person?
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
4
THE WITNESS: Deviation from?
5
BY MR. GREENER:
6
Q. A violation of the standard of care.
7
A. So in reference to what would be an average,
8
prudent provider?
9
Q. Yes.
10
A. I would say that it would be a deviation because
11
an average -- so average means in the middle, right? So yo ~ 12
have either side. And there's some that may attempt to do 13
14
an adjustment and others that wouldn't.
In the middle I would say probably more of
15
16
practitioners in chiropractic wouldn't do an adjust in that
instance if they had torticollis.
17
Q. And you understand that Dr. Gallegos-Main has
18
19
testified that because of her diagnosis of torticollis and
because of the other considerations such as dizziness, she
20
21
maintains she did not do an adjustment diversified or
manual?
22
A. Yes. I saw that in the deposition and I saw that
23
in the notes.
24
Q. Do you have any reason to disbelieve her other
25

I

So that's alii have to look at. I was, like I
said, I was rather confused. So I don't know what happened.
Q. From just the description of what was done in the
morning in the first session on June 4 of2007 by Dr. Main
to the plaintiff, what is your understanding of what the
plaintiff is saying occurred?
A. What I understood is that she went, she was not
feeling well, she waited until the end of Dr. Main's
adjusting hours. And they met.
So I don't know ifshe performed the x-ray in the
morning, I don't know if she performed the x-ray in the
afternoon. I think she performed it in the morning, read
it, marked it, and then tried to review it with her in the
afternoon.
I believe that a brief examination perhaps was
performed in the morning. But I don't know when this womar
Daniella came to drive her home. I don't know if that was
in the morning or the afternoon.
Q. When you say morning and afternoon, is it your
understanding -- and I'll tell you why I'm asking this.
It's my understanding that the plaintiff presented
and came in complaining of the severe headache and other
symptomology, dizziness, at some point in time earlier in
the day and then returned after 5:00 for a session and
signed up for additional treatments. And that there wasn't

~------~--~--------~-------------------------+----~--~-------------------------------------.--
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Page 103
1.
2
3

than -- do you have any reason to disbelieve her position on
1
2
that?
A. Her specifically? No. But taking Ms. Arregui's
3
4
testimony with that, there is -- the events don't correlate.
4
5
Q. Just so we can narrow down on this. What is it
5
6
about Ms. Arregui's testimony that doesn't correlate with
6
7
that particular position?
7
8
A. Is that how you pronounce it? Sorry.
8
9
Q. Yeah. I think so.
9
10
A. Ms. Arregui states that she went in and she was
10
11. not feeling well and she waited and she was told to come
11
12 back later for an adjustment.
12
13
According to what I read in the deposition, it
13
14 appeared that Dr. Gallegos-Main did work on her in the
14
15 morning of the manual -- the PTLMS and the ArthroStim. Bu. 15
16 the plaintiff states that that happened, something happened
116
17 in the afternoon.
117
18
i 18
So I actually went back and reviewed it and I was
I
19 trying to get a time line as to when, when something
! 19
20 occurred, whether it was actually hands-on. I know that
21 they met twice on that day. But I don't know -- it sounds
21
22 like Dr. Gallegos-Main said something happened -- you know} 22
23 that Daniella was perhaps there in the morning, but she was
23
24 there for sure in the afternoon. And I believe the
24
25 plaintiff was saying she wasn't there.
25

120

anything really in the afternoon per se.
Is that your understanding or am I missing the
boat here?
A. No. I think that that's what I was reading is
that -- so typically chiropractors, if they work a full day,
have a morning session and somewhere around, you know,
starts 8:00, 9:00, 7:00, whatever, and ends somewhere
between II :00 and noon.
And that's when I'm thinking if she came twice,
that that's when she came, at the end of that morning into
afternoon session. And then she came back, yes, later that
night.
Q. Did you understand either of the individuals -Dr. Main or the plaintiff -- to testity there was any
treatment given to the plaintiff when she returned for the
second time on June 4?
A. That's what I was confused as to.
Q. You don't know?
A. I don't know.
Q. If there was no treatment on the second occasion
and if it was just she was just there to go to an
explanatory course about what future chiropractic treatmen
could do or not do for her and if we assume that to be the
case, would that alter your opinion on the standard of care?
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
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THE WITNESS: Not necessarily. Because I don't i 1
know -- so obviously at some point she was not feeling well 2
enough to drive and had this woman Daniella come and pick 3
her up because she couldn't drive home.
I 4
Now did Daniella come and pick her up in the
: 5
morning and then return her back to Dr. Main's office in th~ 6
afternoon?
7
BY MR. GREENER:
; 8
Q. Let me see if I can help out here.
9
A. Please.
i 10
Q. It's my understanding that Daniella was with her
! 11
when they came back. And DanielIa was an employee oft~e12
plaintiff. Do you understand that?
I 13
A. Okay.
14
Q. Is that, do you -- do you understand those facts?
15
A. I heard that she worked in the same location. I
16
didn't know she was an employee.
17
Q. Okay. And it's my understanding, tell me if you
18
have any facts to dispute this, that when they came back,
19
they came back for this informative session on whether or 20
not to sign up for more chiropractic care over a long period 21
of time with Dr. GalIegos-Main. And that was late in the --I 22
that was the early evening of June 4 of2007.
123
124
And they both attended the class and they both
signed up. And at that time the plaintiff also complained
25

BY MR. GREENER:
Q. No, no. Would that have any effect
I'm not objecting to your opinions.
A. I didn't know what you were saying.
Q. No. Counsel objected to my question.
I want to know if my -- let me start over.
A. Please.
Q. Do you understand my understanding of the facts in
the second visit as I have related them to you?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Ifmy understanding ofthe facts are
correct on what happened on the second visit, that there, in
essence, was no chiropractic treatment rendered at all, it
was an informational session, does that have any effect on
your opinions in this case?
A. No. Because then that means the examination and
whatever work was performed was done in the morning, but it
still -- no, that doesn't change it.
Q. All right. And I want to make sure I understand
this because, number I, I have understood that you -- I
understood earlier today that you indicated that you will
perform a cervical adjustment on patients who present with a
torticollis. If I misunderstood you, correct me.
A. Yes. So I will correct you.
Q. What?

I - - - - - ' - - · - - ' - - - - - - - - - - ' - - - - - - - ' - - - - - - ! - I- - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - -..-.----.-
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i

I

1
2

of not only the torticollis, the headache and the neck ache
1
and dizziness, but also complained of some numbness in h 2
3
face. Do you understand that?
3
4
A. Okay.
4
5
No. I read in there something about Bell's palsy,
5
6
but I didn't know what it was in reference to.
6
7
Q. SO then it's my understanding that she left with
7
8
DanielIa and that -- after that evening session. And that
8
9
GalIegos-Main tried to call her to see how she was doing.
9
1.0
That would be within the standard of care,
10
1.1 wouldn't it?
11
1.2
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
12
1.3
THE WITNESS: I don't know if it's within the
13
1.4 standard of care.
14
1.5 BY MR. GREENER:
15
1.6
Q. Okay. WelI, in any event, it's my understanding
16
1.7 that she left, walked out with DanielIa. And that those are 17
1.8 the circumstances of the second appearance by the plaintif~ 18
1.9 at the GalIegos-Main clinic.
119
20
Do you have any reason to dispute that?
! 20
21.
A. I don't know. Like I said, I was confused.
iI 21
22
Q. I fthe facts as I related them to you are correct,
I 22
23 would that have any effect on your opinions in this case? 123
24
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
! 24
25
THE WITNESS: Object to my opinions on the case?1 25

I

Page 109
A. I will correct you.
I would do an adjustment, but not a diversified
adjustment. I may do an activator adjustment, which is an
instrument that basically has a very light impulse. If I
were to do an adjustment, that would be the type I would do.
Q. And is the activator sim Har at all to the
petti bon instrument or the ArthroStim?
A. I would say more similar to the ArthroStim.
Q. Any difference?
A. Yes.
Q. Any difference in what regard?
A. The ArthroStim -- A-R-T-H-R-O-S-T-I-M, arthro Iik
joint, and then S-T-I-M. The ArthroStim is handheld
similarly, but it is electrical. It's loaded so it can give
repetitions of a very light impulse.
And it has different heads. Basically it can be a
single tip, a rounded tip, a double pronged, or a larger
double pronged. And it can, instead of the activator, which
is a single impulse, the ArthroStim can do different
frequencies. So it can be very separated like the
activator -- one click, one click -- or it can go kind of a
medium or it can do sort of a repetitive.
Q. Do you know any chiropractic materials in writing
or otherwise that would indicate that either the ArthroStim
or the pettibon device used by Dr. Main can cause or
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contribute to a stroke in a human being?
1
A. Do I know of any materials that would indicate
2
that?
3
Q. Yes.
4
A. No.
5
Q. In your opinion are those both modalities that you 6
would use with a person who presented with torticollis?
7
A. I wouldn't use the PTLMS on somebody's neck.
8
Q. Why is that?
9
A. It's pretty hard. I mean it's a deep manual. If
10
someone has torticollis, they're oftentimes very pain
11
sensitive anyway.
12
Q. Do you know if she used that on her neck or on -- 13
A. I don't.
114
Q. -- her thoracic?
! 15
A. I don't. It just said PTLMS on her records.
16
Q. And it can be pulled a notch back so the impact is 17
not as great; can it not?
18
A. I don't know what kind she has. There are
19
different ones that are out there. So the one we have in
20
the office, yes. But I don't know what kind she had.
21
Q. Here is Exhibit 9.
22
(Exhibit 9 marked for identification.)
23
BY MR. GREENER:
124
Q. Can you identify this for me?
25

Page 112
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. Can you identify that for me, please?
A. This is the ArthroStim.
Q. And Exhibit 10. Do you have one of those in your
office?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you use it?
A. Yes.
Q. And in your opinion this could be used on a person
with torticollis?
A. Yes.
Q. And torticollis and dizziness?
A. Dizziness as a separate or with the torticollis?
Q. Yeah. Torticollis and dizziness.
A. It wou Id be okay.
Q. And same question with Exhibit No.9. The PTLMS.
In your opinion could that be used with the standard of care
on a person with torticollis and dizziness?
MR. MONTELEONE: On the neck?
MR. GREENER: Yes.
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: I wouldn't use it on the neck.
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. Whether you would or would not, in your opinion
does it deviate from the standard of care or do you have any

r-..----~-----~----~------------------------~--------------------------------~------~~
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A. I believe that looks like the PTLMS from one
1
angle, but I can't tell.
2
Q. Is that the type you have in your office?
3
A. No.
4
Yes, this is it. The first page I couldn't tell;
5
the second page I can.
6
Q. And it is what again?
7
A. A PTLMS. Petti bon tendon ligament muscle
8
stimulator.
9
Q. And is that the one that you -- you have one like 10
that in your office?
111
A. That's what I was saying. No, we have a differentl12
one.
; 13
Q. Can I see that for a minute?
: 14
A. Yes.
15
Q. Do you know of any problems with the use ofthisl16
particular device in terms of treating torticollis?
117

15
16
17
18
A. Do I know?
19
Q. You said you wouldn't use it. But do you know
20 any contraindication for using that on a person with
21 torticollis other than increasing, perhaps, pain?
22
A. No.
23
Q. Here is Exhibit JO.
24
(Exhibit 10 marked for identification.)
25 / / /

!
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0

19
20
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125

basis to render an opinion on that?
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: I am no longer certified in the
technique. But when they demonstrated us using it, they di d
not have us run it on the back of someone's neck. Came up
to the upper traps here.
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether the use of it
on the neck would be a deviation from the standard of care
MR. MONTELEONE: Same objection.
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. And maybe you do and maybe you don't.
A. No. I wouldn't say it was a deviation from
standard of care, but it wouldn't be -- it was not how they
demonstrated using the instrument.
Q. Can you tell me then -- and I want to go back to
Exhibit 7 and go through that in a little bit more detail.
Could you just give me the opinions that you're
prepared to testify to in court?
A. Can I give you my opinions that are not stated in
here?
Q. No, no. Just set that aside. I just want you to
tell me -- I don't think they are going to allow you to get
on the stand and read that.
A. Okay.
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Q. I want to know what you're going to tcstify to in
1
court.
2
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form. That's a
3
tough question to answer unless the questions at trial are
4
pending.
5
6
6
MR. GREENER: I don't think -- with all due
7 respect, I don't think she's going to be able to get on the
7
8 stand and read her opinion. I want to know what she is
8
9 going to testify to.
9
10
I have her report and I understand that. I think
10
11 I'm entitled to know what her express verbal opinions are
11
12 going to be rather than her written.
12
13
MR. MONTELEONE: Right. All I'm saying is I don' 13
14 know how any witness can answer that unless a question is . 14
15 pending for that witness to answer.
15
16
Her opinions are outlined in her report. I object
16
17 to the form.
17
18
MR. GREENER: I thought I asked the question.
18
19 BY MR. GREENER:
19
20
Q. Can you tell me what are your opinions regarding
20
21 whether or not Dr. Gallegos-Main deviated from the standar 21
22 of care in her diagnosis, care, and treatment of the
I 22
23 plaintiff on June 4 of 2007?
! 23
24
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
! 24
25__._,__THE WITNESS: So just verbally
what "______
I think -! 25
___.___
1
2
3
4
5

Q. Do you believe that's a deviation of the standard
of care?
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: That's what I'm saying. Standard 0
care for an average, prudent provider? Yes.
But, you know, you were asking before if the
national board had adopted this as a standard of care or the
California board has adopted it. I can't say with certainty
yes or no because I don't know if it was adopted or not.
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. Okay. So just to refine this down. It's your
opinion that her examination on June 4, because of
presenting with a new symptomology that had not been
presented in 2005, required a re-examine -- required a real
examination rather than just a re-examination?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Let me take a step back.
The 2005 diagnosis, care, and treatment that you
talk about in your report, Doctor, in your opinion does
anything that Dr. Main did or didn't do in 2005 have any
effect on what occurred in 2007 in terms of your opinion?
A. In terms of treatment of that injury?
Q. Yes.
A. No.
But ____
as a reference point to say -- say__
in 2005 she

+-_~_._"_.

' w _ ... _.~_, _ _ _ .
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BY MR. GREENER:
1
Q. Yes.
2
3
A. -- that she didn't?
Q. Exactly. I would like to know what you are
4
critical of in terms of her diagnosis, care, and treatment.
5
A. As I stated in the report, the biggest thing that
6
I had a problem with, just as a treat -- another
7
chiropractic physician, was the fact that she -- so
8
9
Martha -- Arregui?
Q. You're close.
10
A. Sorry.
I 11
-- presented initially in 2005 and she did a very
basic examination. And then she returned in 2007
113
complaining ofa new condition. And Dr. Gallegos-Main did 14
re-exam. However, for billing purposes, it would have been 115
labeled as a re-examination, but it should have been a new
116
examination because it was a new complaint.
17
So she was an existing patient, correct;
118
however -- for example, if you had come to see me previously 119
for a lower back issue and we treated it or not treated it,
I 20
and you came back two years later and said you know what,
21
now I have a shoulder problem, and if! didn't do a complete I 22
examination, a new examination of that shoulder, I believe
i 23
that that is not good judgment on the part of the
. 24
practitioner.
25

112

J

i

!

had done -- she had had the same complaint and an
examination had been done then, then a re-examination rna
have been more appropriate.
However, because in 2005 it was completely
different set of chief complaints that she had come to
Dr. Main for, taking that into consideration looking at
2007, she really didn't do much of an OPQRST.
Q. What is that?
A. OPQRST is a simple way that they taught us in
school to break down a subjective complaint.
Q. What does it stand for?
A. 0 -- there's some variance depending on what
people say. But 0 is object. What is it, what is the
problem. P is pain. So a lot of times is it painful. what
kind of pain, where is the pain. Quality. Q is quality.
The type. So is it dull, is it throbbing, is it sharp, is
it achy. S is sight. So show exactly where it is. And T
is timing.
Q. What is it?
A. Timing. Is it better in the morning, is it worse
at night.
Q. When did it onset?
A. When did it start. You know, what are things -- P
can also bc palliative. That's why I was saying there's
some variance. What makes it better, what makes it worse.
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And then oftentimes in there is rating the pain on
1
a scale of one to 10. So one being very minimal, 10 being
2
excruciating.
3
4
And that oftentimes is the intake, the SUbjective
part of what the patient will bring to you, or you should be
5
asking them. They say a lot of it can come from the
6
symptoms of what a patient has. Sometimes it's not so much 7
the examination, it's a lot of times being very good at
8
looking at what the patient is telling you.
9
Q. Just to kind of move us along.
10
A. That's fine.
11
Q. Listen to this question carefully. I want to make
'12
sure we are on the same page.
: 13
If I understand your testimony correctly, what
114
Dr. Gallegos-Main did or did not do in 2005 doesn't have an 15
relationship to what occurred in terms of the diagnosis,
16
care, and treatment of the plaintiff on June 4 of2007?
117
A. What I'm saying is that in terms of occurrence,
j18
yes, she did not do a complete examination.
19
Q. In 2005 -- 7?
120
A. 2007.
' 21
Q. She did a complete exam in 2005.
22
A. There were some things that were missing, but it
23
was more complete than the 2007 for sure.
I 24
Q. Well, in your opinion was there anything done in
I 25

Page 120
me for is -- I would have done it differently.
Q. You would have done it differently -A. Yes.
Q. -- but do you know of any standard of care that
was violated by that?
That's what I'm trying to find out. If you do,
tell me; if you don't, tell me that.
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: As stated in the report there
were -- in the 2005 visits or visit, I think she didn't make
the second visit. So the subjective part, the clinical
profile, if you look on page I at the bottom, one, two,
three, four, five, and six.
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. Page? Which one at the bottom?
MR. MONTELEONE: Which exhibit number?
THE WITNESS: Exhibit No.7, page I, at the bottor
where it started with I, 2 -- and then continue onto
page 2 -- 3, 4,5,6.
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. Yeah.
A. In 2005 that was covered much better. Where she
sort of dropped the ball a little bit was on the examination
in 2005.
Q. And where did she drop the ball in that regard?
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2005 that deviated from the standard of care?
1
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
2
THE WITNESS: Like I said before, I don't know i 3
4
there is -- if the national board adopted that standard of
care.
5
BY MR. GREENER:
I
6
Q. But in your opinion. In your opinion was there
7
anything done -8
A. My standard of care?
II 9
Q. Yes.
: 10
A. In 2005 it really wasn't a great exam to begin
with. But it was not the same body part, it wasn't the sam~12
complaint.
I 13
It was just those records I think were provided as
a base or a reference point.
115
Q. But you can't tell me whether there was a
16
deviation from the standard of care in 2005 in terms of he 17
diagnosis, care, and treatment?
18
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
. 19
THE WITNESS: I don't think she was ever really 20
treated.
21
BY MR. GREENER:
22
Q. In terms of what Dr. Main did.
23
A. No. I think there were some things that were
24
missing. But the standard of care as you're trying to ask 25

i

I

III

114
r

A. There is somehow patient noted, but she didn't
really mention -- she did one, I think one or two, maybe
three orthopedic tests, which for each body part there can
be anywhere from two at minimum to, you know, however man
you wanted to do, say like the lumbar probably has at least
15 that you could probably use or do to help you in your
diagnosis.
Q. Are they discretionary or are they essential?
A. It depends on what the problem the patient is
presenting with.
Q. Are there any essential tests that she didn't do
in your opinion?
A. She didn't mention anything about muscle
involvement. She did dermatomes and she did myotomes in
2005. But I didn't see that in 2007.
Q. In all fairness, isn't the 2005 exam -- let me
strike that and back up.
Have you done IMEs? Independent medical
examination evaluations.
A. No, I have not.
Q. Have you ever looked at other chiropractor's chart
notes and records?
A. IMEs?
Q. No. Have you ever had occasion to review other
chiropractors chart notes or records to see how complete
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they are, to see what is written down and what's not?
A. In passing perhaps with other colleagues, but not
for the purposes of reviewing the quality of their chart
notes.
Q. In doing this in passing, have you noticed that
some chiropractic physicians are more detailed in what they
are writing down in the chart notes and in their records
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1

2
3
4

5
6

7
8
A. Yes.
' 9
Q. And isn't that kind of part of human nature that
i 10
11 some people are more meticulous about writing down each an' 11
12 everything they do and others simply don't write down as
12
ili~~~

13 thoroughly as others?
14
A. To a degree. But if you have a chart note and
15 someone came in to see you and if you were to pass that on
16 to, say, even another chiropractor, perhaps even an MD says
17 what happened on this visit, you would want to be able to
18 explain to them what transpired.
19
If there is nothing written down, they don't have
20 anything to reference as to what they had, what they
21 complained of, what you did.
22
Q. But that would mean that maybe the chiropractor
23 fai led to adequately record everything done?

13
14
15

16

24

A. Yes.

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25

Q. But it doesn't necessarily lead to the conclusion

25

have an opinion on whether, what are your opinions on
standard of care in terms of this particular case.
Can we have that understanding? I think that
might be the easiest way to do it.
A. Okay. Yes. That would be great.
Q. Okay. Now going back to that.
Then you have talked about -- and let's foclls on
your opinions on the deficiency in the exam or the
re-examine. What are those?
A. As I stated in the report-Q. Okay. Why don't you cite me where you are in th
report.
A. Okay. We are in Exhibit 7. And page 3, the first
paragraph. The last sentence starts:
"Lacking is follow up by
Dr. Gallegos-Main adding to her intake as
to the onset of her current chief
complaint as well as palliative or
provocative measures for her three
complaints other than icy hot for her
right wrist/thumb pain and weakness."
Q. In your opinion is the deviation of the standard
of care within the definition we are talking about for her
to have failed to record that in her chart?
A. Yes.
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that the chiropractor because of not recording something and
1
actually having done it violated the standard of care, does
2
it?
3
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
4
THE WITNESS: But if they didn't write it down,
5
how do you know it was done?
6
BY MR. GREENER:
7
Q. Well, if you believe the chiropractor and he or
8
she says it's done.
9
A. But that's hard to say. I mean if you take it on
10
good faith, perhaps. But if you're trying to track
11
someone's treatment, then it's not helpful.
12
Q. Let's go back for just a minute. I would like to
13
have this understanding with you so we can move through this 14
as expeditiously as possible.
15
In the second paragraph of Exhibit 7, you say:
116
"An apt definition of standard of care
i 17
can be defined as 'The level at which the
' 18
average, prudent provider in a given
19
community would practice. It is how
20
similarly qualified practitioners would
21
,22
have managed a patient's care under the
[23
same or similar circumstances.'"
I
Let's use that as the criteria or the definition
! 24
when I ask you -- going forward -- when I ask you do you
i 25

Page 125
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. Anything else other than that failure to record
with regard to this point?
A. The next paragraph states -Q. Let's stay with this point for a minute.
Anything else other than the failure to record in
the notes, in the chart notes?
A. For?
Q. For the last sentence of that first full paragraph
on page 3 of Exhibit 7.
A. Is there anything else for the OPQRST? No.
Q. Is there anything else about that particular
sentence other than the failure to record that in her chart
notes that you're saying is a deviation of the standard of
care?
A. No, that was the initial one.
Q. Okay. All right. Go on with the next one.
A. The next paragraph starts with Dr. Gallegos-Main
And she did range of motion, myotome is for muscle and
dermatome is sensory for the skin. And that's checking It e
levels of each nerve in either the neck or the lower back.
And so because Ms. Arregui -- gosh, I'm not sayin~
it right.
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1
Q. You can just say the plaintiff.
Q. And then let's go to the -- we get into the exam
A. Okay. The plaintiff was complaining of the right
2 section. Let me back up for a minute.
wrist and thumb, she did do a check of the dermatomes and
3
I'm sorry. Strike that.
4
the reflexes.
Go to the last paragraph on page 4. There you
Q. Okay. Isn't this all in 2005?
5 talk about -- and we don't need to read it specifically.
A. Yes. That's what you asked for.
6 But you talk about the examination.
7
Q. Okay. No. I wanted to know about 2007. I'm
Do you have an opinion as to whether or not the
sorry. Let's leave 2005.
8 examination deviated from the standard of care?
Let's go to your deviation of standard of care in
9
A. Yes.
10
2007.
Q. And your opinion is yes, it did.
A. That would be the next page on page 4.
11
In what respect did it?
12
Q. And where does that start?
A. She marked range of motion, but she didn't mention
A. It is the one, two, three, fourth paragraph.
13 anything about, again, about soft tissue. So soft tissue
Well, fifth if you include -- because the very top one is a
14 meaning muscles, ligaments, tendons, skin, palpable pain i
continuation.
15 certain areas.
She only marked that there was one orthopedic test
Q. Right.
116
"Based on," right?
I 17 that was performed. And even with torticollis, it's very
A. Yes -- no. The next one. "Moving onto."
18 painful to move, even if she attempted to do some other
Q. Okay.
19 ones, she didn't mark it on the form that they couldn't
A. Moving onto examination (sic) performed June 4,
20 perform them. It was just -- the assumption was, that I
there's no subsequent OPQRST -- that we just discussed -- 0 21 took looking at the examination form, that it wasn't done.
her new complaint.
22
Q. In your opinion that could have been due to the
Q. Okay. And that's the recordkeeping issue?
23 inability because of pain of the patient in having the test
A. That's recordkeeping.
24 performed?
She's -- eight out of 10 was circled. But on the
25
A. It's possible.
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deposition, the plaintiffsaid she doesn't recall, she might
1
have verbally stated it, but she doesn't recall actually
2
marking it.
3
And I basically explained in this paragraph why,
4
as I just stated to you previously, why because although she
5
was a returning patient, it was a new chief complaint. So
i 6
she should have done a much better job of taking the OPQRS~, 7
taking the history of what happened, if there are any new
8
issues that happened in the last two years that might affect
9
either this new chief complaint or just affect her health
10
history in general.
11
Q. SO you're critical of her history that she took
12
that she recorded in the chart notes?
13
A. Uh-huh.
14
15
Q. You don't feel that those comply to the standard
of care; is that correct?
16
A. No. That's correct.
17
Q. Okay. And then anything else about the history?
18
A. That's the history. I mean the OPQRST is -19
20
Q. SO we have covered the history?
21
A. The history was that specific chief complaint, but
she also didn't find out if there was anything that
22
23
transpired in the past two years, sometimes patients don't
realize, that might affect the new issue of why they are
24
there.
25

I

Q. SO you don't know whether or not Dr. Main
attempted to or considered performing those other tests?
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. Or do you know if she did?
A. I don't know.
Q. Okay. And go ahead then.
The leg check really has nothing to do with the
PICA stroke, does it?
A. The leg check is -- no. The leg check is to see
if you have a patient either prone or supine, S-U-P-I-N-E,
on the table, that is, to see if they have what's called a
functional short leg. So an anatom ic short leg, but
functionally it can be from muscle spasm.
Q. That paragraph deals with her exam, which you are
critical of.
Let me be clear on this. In terms of your opinion
on the examination performed by Dr. GallegOS-Main, are yo
critical of the examination or of what was recorded?
In other words, was she a poor record keeper?
A. I have no way -MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: I have no way to make that
distinction.
/ / /
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i

BY MR. GREENER:

1

Q. Okay. Then next we go onto the top of page 5 on~ 2
the x-ray, right?
: 3
A. Yes.
4
Q. And what is your opinion -- which is part of the
5
exam, of course, right?
6
A. Yes.
7
Q. What is your opinion on the x-rays performed?
8
A. She, as I stated in this paragraph, she did one
9
view. Typically two views are considered a full series.
10
you do -- she did a lateral, so looking from the side.
11
Whereas, a complete view would be to take a look 12
at it from the other dimension, from the front or the back. 13
And she only did one.
14
And if she was stating that she did pettibon, I
115
have some familiarity with it -- and this I don't think has 16
changed since I have taken the classes -- but a full
17
petti bon series they consider seven views to be a complet 18
pettibon series.
19
Q. Okay.
1 20
A. So of those five are cervical views and two are
1 21
lumbar.
122
Q. In the last sentence of, I think it's the first
~ 23
full paragraph on page 5, you write:
24
"With Ms. Arregui in torticollic
: 25

f

I

examination of the affected areas."
I read that correctly, didn't I?
A. Yes.
Q. Isn't that the essence of your opinion?
A. Yes.
Q. And then you go on to indicate that you're
assuming that the medical reports are true and complete.
And then you go on and talk about some of the
other matters that we have already discussed.
I want to make sure I am clear on this. Do you
have any other opinions other than what you have -- you and
I have talked about here on whether Or not Dr. Gallegos-Main
deviated from the standard of care?
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: Any additional opinions not stated
here?
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. Yes.
A. Not that come to me right now, no.
Q. All right. And I want to just touch quickly on
the last paragraph. In the last paragraph of page 5, you
write:
"Lastly, when Ms. Arregui began to
experience dizziness and uneven gait, and
her inability to drive herself home, this

--------~----,-----~-~-,--~----~------------~---------,-''''---,--.-,
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1
spasm, according to Dr. Gallegos-Main,
2
both would be appropriate based on a
3
complete examination and history, though I
4
personally might have exchanged the PTLMS
for the vibracussor, a vibration
5
instrument associated with the ArthroStim,
6
7
all of which are used in my personal
practice. If
8
I read that correctly, didn't I?
9
10
A. Yes.
11
Q. And we've talked about that, right?
12
A. Yes.
13
Q. That's your comment and your opinion on that
14 particular subject?
15
A. That is my personal opinion.
16
Q. In the next sentence, the first full sentence of
17 the next paragraph, this really is your opinion, isn't it?
18
"In summary, Dr. Gallegos-Main DC
19
performed both 2005 and 2007 examinations
20
below the standard of care within the
21
chiropractic" possession -- "within the
22
chiropractic profession." Pardon me.
23
"There are several instances where she
24
failed to gather case history information
25
and then failed to perform a complete

..
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should have alerted Dr. Gallegos-Main that
Ms. Arregui was having an unexpected
reaction and as a health professional,
Dr. Gallegos-Main should not have let her
leave alone without assistance at a
minimum and requested emergency room
transport at a" minimum (sic).
A. Maximum.
Q. I read that correctly, didn't I?
A. No. You put minimum at the very end instead of
maximum.
Q. Maximum. You have the maximum and the minimum
Pardon me. Thank you.
And are you saying in your opinion the standard of
care required Dr. Main to do the things that you're
mentioning here or is this just an observation?
A. An observation.
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: Observation.
1 don't think that there's anything written down.
But for patient safety and other people's safety -- you
know, I think this is independent of being a health care
professional as well. If you see someone who is not able to
drive themselves or ambulate alone, they should be -require some sort of help.
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I

BY MR. GREENER:
Q. Do you have any facts, though, that would show
2
that Ms. Arregui was unable to drive or was unable to walk 3
A. Nothing other than her testimony at the
4
deposition. That's all the record that I have.
5
Q. SO I want to make sure I understand this. You are
6
not going to express an opinion in this case then that
7
Dr. Gallegos-Main's failure to either drive or make sure
8
that the plaintiff was driven home was a deviation from the 9
standardofcare?
10
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
. 11
THE WITNESS: I don't think that that is required; 112
but, again, recommended.
, 13
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. Something you would do?
' 15
A. I would do, yes.
16
Q. And the second part of that. In your opinion
17
was -- we know Dr. Main didn't send Ms. Arregui to an
18
emergency room or to any medical doctor.
19
In your opinion was her failure to do that under
20
the circumstances a deviation of the standard of care?
21
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
22
THE WITNESS: Was a deviation? No. I think as I 23
understand your question.
24

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25 / / /

2010

it very well myself.
A. Reports went to chiropractor for neck pain -looks like CD. Nausea?
Q. That's all right. Let's move along with this.
The final impression at the bottom is cervical
spasm, migraine headache.
That doesn't deviate to too great an extent by the
diagnosis of Dr. Gallegos-Main, does it?
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. Let me ask you this. In your opinion is that a
diagnosis that is different from torticollis?
A. As the terms of ICD code, perhaps.
Q. In your mind as a chiropractic physician.
A. Well, spasm. There are different codes for muscl
spasm. So, you know, muscle -- right cervical spasm
indicates muscle, but, like I was saying, I don't know wh
the ICD9 code is because there are different codes, but it
would be similar.
Q. The way that you understand the plaintiff to have
presented, could this have also been a migraine headache
A. I don't recall headache being mentioned in the

i

2007.
Q. All right. There are various tests done. If we

: 25

look at the -- look at the second page, Bates number 184.
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BY MR. GREENER:
1
Q. Okay. Then you said you hadn't seen the medical
2
records from Weiser.
3
A. No.
4
Q. And I will show those to you. Here is Exhibit -5
I will put it right here. Exhibit 11.
6
(Exhibit 11 marked for identification.)
7
BY MR. GREENER:
8
Q. 1 want to go through these quickly if we can.
9
Exhibit II is a multi-page document. It's an emergency rooi 10
record from 6/5 of'07 at the Memorial Hospital in Weiser. I
It's got Bates numbers. Those are these numbers
112
right here, Doctor. ARRI83,00183. Do you see that?
i 13
A. Yes.
114
Q. And the one I have have those numbers
115
consecutively, hopefully, up to 187.
16
Are we on the same document?
17
A. Yes.
18
Q. You have not seen this before?
19
A. No.
20
Q. Can you read this -- I'll represent to you,just
21
to move this along, the doctor's name is Wootton,
, 22
W-O-O-T-T-O-N. Doyouseethat?
123
A. Yes.
I 24
Q. Can you read the nursing assessment? I can't read ! 25

11

I think this is the physician's signature in the
lower left-hand comer. There he goes through the histor •
the physical, and his diagnosis.
His diagnosis is cervical muscle spasm, migraine
headache, right? Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And then his plan was, if we look at plan, to
discharge her with Ibuprofen, with Vicodin, with ...
A. I think it says Flexeril.
Q. Yeah. Flexeril. Exactly.
And what are the last two entries?
A. Follow up PMD something. I don't know. I can't
read it. I don't know what it says.
Q. SO here we have a medical doctor who is looking t
this plaintiff on the next day with the symptomology doin
the tests that he did and sending her home, right?
A. I thought it was -- oh, no. Same day.
Okay. The next -- I thought she saw -- no. It
was the 4th.
Q. Yes. This is the next day.
A. Okay.
Q. Is that of any significance to you in terms of
your opinion?
A. No.
Q. Okay. You do not disagree with
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Dr. Gallegos-Main's diagnosis, do you?
1
A. No. It's a working diagnosis.
2
Q. SO you told me, I believe, about all of the areas . 3
in Dr. Gallegos-Main's diagnosis, care, and treatment of t~e 4
plaintiff where there was a deviation from the standard ofl 5
care; have you not?
6
7
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Let's see if we can get through this
I 8
quickly.
9
MR. GREENER: What are we up to? 12?
10
MR. MONTELEONE: 12.
11
(Exhibit 12 marked for identification.)
12
BY MR. GREENER:
13
Q. Here is what I am going to represent to you is the 14
chart from Dr. Gallegos-Main's clinic. And if we look at 15
it, I guess the first page doesn't have a Bates number on
16
it, but if you look at the second page in the lower
17
right-hand corner it is OneLife00002. And it continues 0 18
through Bates number on this last kind offoldout deal, thi~19
is -- where is it? -- it's right there. OneLi fe00040.
! 20
Are we on the same document?
i 21
A. Yes.
• 22
Q. Is this the chart that you reviewed?
23
A. I think so. I haven't looked at it yet, but I
24
think so.
25

I
i

Page 140
Okay. And under notes, what has she written
there?
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

I don't know.
You can't tell?
No.
And what is this chart? Pardon me.
What is this part of her chart called, to your
understanding?
A. I don't know what she would call this. Maybe
recommendations?
Q. Are you critical of any of her recordkeeping on
this page? Bates number 18.
A. There really isn't much here. I think this is for
petti bon.
Q. Pardon me?
A. Looking at the rest of the page, I think this is
for pettibon.
Q. And go to page 19.
Well, let me ask you this. Are you critical of
anything done on that page in terms of record keeping?
A. Well, if she's doing petti bon, she doesn't have
anything marked as to what -- I mean she just has the bas
rehab care goals, but she doesn't say -- I am assuming the
three is next to increased strength. But it doesn't say
what she is supposed to do.

Page 139
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Q. Let's go to Bates number 18. Can you do that for
1
me, please?
2
A. Okay.
3
Q. And this particular document -- this is on the
4
plaintiff. If we look in the upper right-hand -- well, look
5
at the right-hand margin.
6
Can you find the date where it says under rehab
7
care start date 6/4/07? Do you see that?
8
A. Yes.
9
Q. And what do you find recorded here based upon yo r10
background and expertise as a chiropractor?
11
A. What do I find?
12
Q. What has she recorded on this particular page?
13
A. She's recorded a visit frequency, recommended
14
visit frequency with three times a week with her initials.
15
116
Q. And under complications, cervical, what has she
recorded there?
I 17
A. Spinal degeneration. It looks like there's two
118
circles. One encompassing one and two and then the secon~19
one circling two.
: 20
And below that it says cervical. And it looks
J 21
like head forward posture and reversed curve.
I 22
Q. And we're talking about lordotic curve?
I 23
j
A. No. A reverse curve is a kyphotic.
'24
Q. Kyphotic.
125

Page 141
Q.
Bates
A.
Q.

In the upper left-hand comer of the next page,
19 of Exhibit 13 --

Okay.
-- there it shows an exam.
Have you seen that before?
A. This page?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
Q. And she has recorded things she has done on her
exam. Is there anything that she hasn't done here that you
would be critical of in terms of standard of care that would
have been required?
A. Well, this isn't really an examination. It shows
what her x-ray was.
Q. Okay.
A. You can see under the exam where the box is C 1.
In the parentheses you can see that these are what the
recommended numbers should be and what the plaintiffs ar
But you can also see that she is missing from disk
height down as well as the little dots right here to the
left of the spine are the markings of where you would put
the A to P markings.
1'\11 assuming -- the date isn't down, but I am
assuming it's the 4th.
Q. And what critical information is missing from this
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1
that in your opinion should be there?
2
A. Well, if she's doing petti bon -- well, she didn't
do the x-rays, so there is no way she can have the markings 3
4
here.
5
Q. Is it your testimony she didn't do an x-rayon the
6
June 4th?
7
A. She did just a lateral x-ray, but she didn't do
8
the rest of the petti bon x-rays.
9
Ifshe were doing rehab for petti bon, as stated on
! 10
page 18, she would need the other ones.
Q. Let's go to Bates number 20. In the daily
111
12
treatment notes, if you would look under visit number I.
13
Did you note this when you were reviewing these
14
documents?
15
A. I saw it. And I didn't know what the C-slash -- I
16
don't know if it's L or chief complaint. Maybe C/C.
17
But I saw stiffness in neck and dizziness and
18
initials.
19
Q. And then in the next entry called to check up in
20
p.m., no answer.
21
Do you see that?
22
A. Yes.
Q. Would that be something that would be -- ifshe
23
called to check on her that evening, would that be somethin~2 4
that would be in compliance with the standard of care in
25

Page 144
place where you can do additional notes. And she has four
orthopedic tests and only one was circled.
As I was saying before, I don't know. Maybe she
did do them and couldn't perform them, but it wasn't marked.
Q. 1 want to get into that in just a minute.
A. Okay.
Q. SO I will hand you what is marked as Exhibit 14.
MR. MONTELEONE: Should we make it 13. Counsel?
MR. GREENER: I thought -- oh, I'm sorry.
MR. MONTELEONE: The chart is 12.
MR. GREENER: Did I miss one? Pardon me.
MR. MONTELEONE: Yeah.
(Exhibit 13 marked for identification.)
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. Here is Exhibit 13. Pardon me.
A. This looks like an extra one. I think 1 have one.
Do you have one of these?
Q. That's for the court reporter.
A. Oh.
Q. I have handed this to you. It's Exhibit 13. Now
I have to find it in my stuff.
I'm going to represent to you that Exhibit 13 are
Dr. Gallegos-Main's responses to interrogatories.
Did you have a chance to look at these?
A. 1 have never seen this before.

-----.------'--------------+-----------------------1
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your opinion?
1
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
2
THE WITNESS: Standard? I think that's more of 3
preference. I don't know if it's a standard of care.
4
BY MR. GREENER:
5
Q. Next page. Does that include her physical exam? 6
A. Yes.
7
I think part of it too is what she marked on the
8
previous page on OneLife20 is what she did as well.
9
Q. That's right. Right at the top.
10
A. Uh-huh.
11
Q. Okay. Let's leave that. Set that aside.
12
So we have covered every criticism that you have 13
of her chart note-taking, correct?
14
A. Of the examination, yes.
15
Q. Any other deficits in her chart notes?
16
A. Well, at the bottom of that page you were asking 17
about--Ietmesee. Page21.
18
At the top she has a word I can't read.
, 19
Cervi co-genic vertigo. And she has torticollis and some 20
range of motion with yes circled, which I am assuming is 121
painful, but I don't know what that means.
122
And she didn't do a motor check. She did do a
23
dermatome check.
, 24
But in here on her examination form, she has a
125

I

Q. AU right. Then I want to go through this with
you real quickly. And I would like to have you look at-for starters -- if you would, please, page 12.
Just in the interest of time -- forgive me. Let's
go to page 14. And on page 14 Dr. Gallegos-Main is
responding to interrogatory number 18, which says:
"Please set forth in specific detail
each and every examination of plaintiff
you performed; and, for each examination
please state."
And then there are various items requested.
And then the answer really starts, that I want to
focus with you on, starts right at the bottom of the second
full paragraph right under answer to interrogatory numbe
18.
Do you see where it says "during plaintiffs
second visit on May 10, 2005"?
A. Yes.
Q. And I want to read -- I would like to have you
read along with me and make sure I'm reading accurately
And it says:
"Plaintiff began by watching an
orientation video. Following the
orientation video, defendant and plaintiff
discussed the information contained on the
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Page 148
A. Oh, okay.
Q. Read over to, if you would, the beginning of
interrogatory number 19.
A. 197
Q. Yeah, on the next page. Just stop there.
A. Okay.
(Pause in proceedings.)
THE WITNESS: Okay.
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. If her answers set forth in the section that we
have been talking about from pages 15 through 16 of the
responses to plaintiffs first set of interrogatories
request for production of documents and request for
admissions are accurate in terms of what happened, is the e
anything there that is recorded that would be a deviation f
the standard of care?
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: She didn't do an examination.
mean she examined, but -- okay. Can I explain?
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. Yeah. Sure.
A. In the sentence where it says:
"Nothing in the x-rays caused
defendant any concern. Defendant then
examined plaintiff and gave what treatment

1
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of care?
A. Okay. So start at the very beginning?
Q. Where it says plaintiff presented to defendant.
A. Okay. Plaintiff presented to defendant-Q. Just-A. Oh, just read it?
Q. -- read it to yourself.

119
I
i 20

121
122
i 23

: 24
125

she could based upon plaintiffs current
status."
If she had done a complete examination, I would
say that that is a fair and accurate judgment. But you
can't really recommend a treatment plan if you haven't don
a fair examination.
Q. SO you're quarreling with whether or not she did a
fair and complete examination?
A. Yes.
Q. Under circumstances where a patient presents in a
lot of pain and is requesting immediate relief, would a
reasonable chiropractor maybe not do an extensive
examination, but do an abbreviated form of an examinatio
A. Yes.
Q. And that's acceptable and within the standard of
care, isn't it?
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
But they couldn't recommend a complete treatment
plan based on a modified or a brief examination.
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. In terms of taking a history -- let's take that
component -- likewise, when a patient presents in a
significant amount of pain and is a repeat patient, can
there be certainly an abbreviated kind of history done just
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in terms of focusing on where is the pain, what is going on? 1
2
A. Yes.
3
Q. And that would not be contrary to the standard of
4
care?
5
A. Focusing on pain and finding out what is going on.
But then also trying to complete a palpatory examination or 6
at least marking what -- if they couldn't perform something, 7
8
noting that. I have done that before. I know that they
9
cannot do these other orthopedic tests that would be
10
probably within the standard of care and I would note that
on the chart ..
11
Q. Of course, some patients could present -- you have
12
patients present in such an amount of pain that you can't do 13
any orthopedic exams, right?
14
A. You could try to do -- there's two cervical
15
compression and distraction where they really don't have to 16
move where you try to lift and compress. You could do thosp 7
at minimum.
18
Q. And that's part of the exam; but going back to the
19
history.
20
When someone is coming in and they're really
21
having problems, have you on occasion taken a real
22
abbreviated history in terms of where is the pain, what is
23
going on here, you have seen the patient before, and then
24
you don't go into anything really much further on the
: 25
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about here with a person presenting with a tremendous amoun
of pain, doesn't a chiropractor approach that patient with
what is functionally necessary for the patient under the
patient's circumstances where they are there in that type of
physical condition?
A. I am not sure 1 understand your question.
"Functionally necessary"?
Q. Yeah. You didn't understand that term.
In other words, what will best get that patient
from point A to point B where you can see if you can do
something to alleviate the pain or determine what else to
do?
A. Is the chiropractor equipped for a torticollis?
Q. Let's use torticollis. Strike that. I think we
have covered everything we need to do there.
So you are not going to do any additional work and
modify your opinion, I trust?
A. Not that I -MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: Not that I am aware of. Unless
something in terms of evidence comes up that someone would
ask me to render my opinion upon.
MR. GREENER: Counsel, if there is any additional
work done, we would like to be advised of it, if there are
any modifications. We would like to take the deposition or

pag;-~~;
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I

history?
1
A. I would do more than that on the history.
2
Q. What would you do?
3
A. If they came with the same complaint of
4
torticollis and spasm?
5
Q. Right.
i 6
A. How long have you had it, has it gotten worse.
I7
The P part ofOP. Has it gotten worse, has anything made it 8
better. Have you seen anyone else, have you gone to see
your primary care physician. What other things have you 10
tried at home. Are you sleeping through the night. Knowi gll
if the pain is keeping them lip at night is an indicator
12
oftentimes of how severe it is.
113
Q. And you don't know whether Dr. Main did that or
14
did not do that?
15
A. I do not know that.
16
Q. Would you record all of that during taking the
17
history while this person is in a lot of pain? Would you go 18
through all of that and record all of that?
19
A. I would chart note very quickly. Basically
20
whatever makes it worse, makes it better. Pain started last 21
Tuesday, has gotten worse. Or pain was really bad last
22
week, has gotten slightly better, but not good. Scale of
23
one to 10.
24
Q. SO just talking about what we have been talking
125

19

I

get updated on the deposition of the witness on that.
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. In your opinion are chart records in terms of
completeness all that important if the chiropractic
physician was able to reach a correct diagnosis?
A. Chart notes are very important.
Q. But a doctor can maybe not completely fill out the
chart notes and still reach a correct diagnosis and properly
diagnosis and care for a chiropractic patient?
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: It's possible, but a lot more likely
if do you a complete examination.
MR. GREENER: Okay. That's aliI have.
Thank you very much.
MR. MONTELEONE: Let me ask a few questions t(
clarify things a little bit.
EXAMINATION
BY MR. MONTELEONE:
Q. If you would look at Exhibit 13, which are
Dr. Gallegos-Main's answers to plaintiffs first set of
discovery and go to interrogatory 28, please.
MR. GREENER: What page is that on?
MR. MONTELEONE: That is on page 20.
/ / /
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I

1 BY MR. MONTELEONE:
1
Q. Okay. And in there the plaintiff asks the
2
2
3 defendant chiropractor:
3
"Did you render any treatment to
4
4
plaintiff which is not recorded in your
5
5
medical records?"
6
6
And Dr. Gallegos-Main responded:
7
7
... "Defendant responds that all
8
8
treatments and appointments which
9
9
defendant had with plaintiff are reflected
10
10
in the chart notes and records produced
11
11
herewith ... "
12
12
Did I read that correctly?
13
13
14
A. Yes.
14
15
Q. Does that give you some level of comfort that if 15
16 any treatment was rendered, it should be recorded in
16
17 Dr. Gallegos-Main's notes?
17
18
I' 18
MR. GREENER: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
19
19
20 BY MR. MONTELEONE:
1 20
Q. And the fact that certain items, particularly
I 21
21
22 three of the four orthopedic tests, are not shown to have ! 22
23 been performed in Dr. Gallegos-Main's records, does thatl 23
24 give you a level of comfort that, in fact, those tests were I 24
25 not performed and it was not simply a recordkeeping
! 25

---.
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from the defendant. Dr. Gallegos-Main was asked "did you
give any recommendations or orders for treatment" that are
not recorded in your medical records.
And Or. Gallegos-Main, the defendant, responded
"that all of her recommendations and orders for treatment
are recorded in the OneLife medical records."
Does that also give you a level of comfort that if
something is in the medical record, it occurred; if it's
absent, it did not occur? And we are not talking about a
matter of simply medical recordkeeping oversight?
MR. GREENER: Same objection.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. MONTELEONE:
Q. When you were talking about OPQRST, what does the
R stand for?
A. Radiation.
Q. And is that used in the diagnostics model, is that
referring to the type of pain the patient is experiencing?
A. Not the type, that's quality.
Radiation is if it goes, ifit travels. So if
it's localized to one area or if it moves to another place.
Q. Any reference in the defendant's medical records
from the 2007 visit that Martha Arregui was experiencing any
radiating pain?
A. No. From what I saw, it was the neck. I believe
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1 1

oversight?
!
MR. GREENER: Same objection.
2
THE WITNESS: Yes.
3
BY MR. MONTELEONE:
4
Q. Same series of questions with respect to
5
I 6
interrogatories 29 and 30.
Interrogatory number 29 asks Or. Gallegos-Main did 7
she receive any information from any nurse, doctor, or othe~ 8
health care provider about plaintiffs medical conditions.
9
And she responds:
i 10
... "she did not receive any
information from anyone about plaintiffs
12
medical condition that are not recorded in
I 13
her OneLife medical records."
114
Did I read that correctly?
15
A. Yes.
I 16
Q. And does that give you a basis from which to
17
believe as an expert witness in this case that if something
18
was in the medical record, it occurred; and ifit was not in 19
the medical record, it did not occur?
20
MR. GREENER: Object to the form.
21
THE WITNESS: I take what was written in the
22
record as what happened.
23
BY MR. MONTELEONE:
24
Q. And then with respect to interrogatory number 30
25

.

it was the right side of the neck.
Q. And from reviewing the defendant's medical
records, is it your understanding that the working diagnosis
was torticollis?
A. Yes.
Q. Now has it been long known in the professional
chiropractic community that vertebrobasilar artery strokes
can be caused by diversified manual adjustment of the
cervical region?
MR. GREENER: Object to the form. Lacks
foundation.
THE WITNESS: If it is applied with too much force
or too much rotation. Possibly.
BY MR. MONTELEONE:
Q. And is there literature that discuss that
association between VBA strokes and cervical adjustments?
A. There is such in the literature. It's very rare,
but there is medical research on that.
Q. In the literature that discusses it, do those VBA
strokes occur in people under 45?
MR. GREENER: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. MONTELEONE:
Q. When Dr. Gallegos-Main, the defendant in this
action, treated Martha Arregui, was Martha under 45 years 0
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I

1 age?
1 description of a cervical rotational adjustment?
2
A. I believe she was 39 or 40, so yes.
! 2
A. She -- according to her deposition, she didn't
3
Q. Why is there this known association between YBA. 3 know what it was. But she said that her head -- she said
4 strokes and cervical manipulation? What's the anatomy ard4 her head was rotated from side to side when she was both
5 physiology that is going on that supports that association~ 5 face down and face up. So I don't know.
6
MR. GREENER: Object to the form. Lacks
6
According to the patient, I mean according to the
7 toundation.
7 plainti ff -- I'm just trying to recall from the deposition.
S
THE WITNESS: The anatomy is reference to the i 8 The patient said she was face down and her head was rotat~~
9 circle of Willis. As the vertebral artery goes up the neck, I 9 from side to side, both face down and tace up. According tp
10 it circles around the atlas, which is the C I, and can be
10 her testimony she doesn't know if that was an adjustment 0
11 stressed with a lot of excessive rotation.
I I I not. But her head was rotated. So I don't know because sh
12 BY MR. MONTELEONE:
12 doesn't know.
13
Q. Does that artery travel through the foramen of C I': 13
Q. Would the rotation of the head as described by
14
A. Yes.
14 Martha Arregui in her deposition be consistent with a
15
Q. Does that make the artery particularly susceptible 15 cervical rotational adjustment in chiropractic?
16 to injury when the cervical region is torqued on as in a
16
MR. GREENER: Object to the form.
17 cervical manipulation or adjustment?
17
THE WITNESS: It's possible. It could also be the
18
A. If it's done with too much force or rotation, yes.
18 range of motion, but it's possible it was an attempt to an
19
Q. In the name of saving time here, I just want to
19 adjustment as well.
20 touch on a couple of things that counsel asked about.
'20 BY MR. MONTELEONE:
21
Do you recall Mr. Greener asking you about
121
Q. Even with it being done with face up and face
22 acceptable risk for the patient?
122 down?
23
A. You can do a cervical adjustment face up or face
23
A. Yes.
24
Q. Does acceptable risk for the patient require that
24 down.
25 the patient be fully advised of the risks, benefits, and
25
Q. Right.
r--'-'--"-.-------f------"'------------------Page 159
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!

alternatives of a given procedure so they have informed
1
consent?
! 2
A. Informed consent is part of our initial paperwork.
3
So a stroke is mentioned -- I don't believe it's mentioned ! 4
specifically with a cervical adjustment. But it says it's
5
mentioned in there that this is a possibility; very rare,
6
but it's there.
7
Q. In reviewing Dr. Gallegos-Main's chart, did she
8
ever mention that stroke was a possible outcome from her
9
chiropractic visit with Martha Arregui?
10
A. Not that I -11
MR. GREENER: Object to form.
12
THE WITNESS: Not that I recall.
13
BY MR. MONTELEONE:
14
Q. You were asked by counsel about whether you're
15
mindful of certain risk categories that a patient that you
16
work on may have.
17
Does that include the potential risks for a YBA
18
stroke resulting from a cervical manipulation?
119
A. Yes. It's something that is mentioned a lot in
i 20
the community. And it's something that I think all
i 21
chiropractors are aware of and don't want to want to happed 22
to them.
i 23
Q. In reading Martha Arregui's deposition transcript, i 24
the portions that were provided to you, did it contain a
125

But with the description that the head was turned
side to side in both the face down or supine position as
well as face up, is it more likely that that is a cervical
rotational adjustment than a simple ROM check?
MR. GREENER: Same objection.
THE WITNESS: Yes. Because you wouldn't
necessarily need to do range of motion both prone and
supine, but I don't know.
BY MR. MONTELEONE:
Q. To wrap up. I want to ask you about what a
reasonable and prudent chiropractor would do. I want to gc t
away from this term standard of care.
With a diagnosis oftorticolIis, was it reasonable
and prudent for Dr. Gallegos-Main to have performed any
cervical rotational adjustment presuming that adjustment
occurred?
MR. GREENER: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: No. If reasonable and prudent is
the basis that you're taking it for, no. That would not be
a recommended treatment.
BY MR. MONTELEONE:
Q. And it would, therefore, by definition, be
unreasonable and imprudent for a cervical rotational
adjustment to be performed on a patient with torticollis?
MR. GREENER: Same objection.

41

Associated Reporting Inc.

000208

(Pages 158 to 161)

Tarnai, Sarah, DC - Plts

October 19, 2010
Page 162

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Page 164

TIlE WITNESS: Yes.
MR. MONTELEONE: I don't have any further
questions.

1 reporter, a copy of the transcript upon its review by the
2 court reporting service will be provided to this witness,
3 who will review it for accuracy and make any changes to t/'
4 copy as if it were the original.
FURTHER EXAMINATION
5
THE REPORTER: And return the original to?
BY MR. GREENER:
6
MR. MONTELEONE: And the original would be
7 returned to counsel for the defense, Dick Greener.
Q. Just so I can be clear on this. Counsel mentioned
other orthopedic tests.
8
(Whereupon, at 2:30 p.m., the deposition
Give me just a list of the orthopedic tests that
9
session held October 19,2010, was
in your opinion Dr. Gallegos-Main should have performed tha 10
concluded.)
the records do not reflect that she did.
11
*****
A. As I mentioned before, there's cervical
12
compression and cervical distraction. She performed the
13
14
shoulder depression test, but she did not perform -- there's
15
an extension rotation. There are a couple of different
names for it, so I don't know what you would call it.
16
17
There is Soto Hall, which was on the form, which
was not marked either. There is -- she didn't have any
18
radiation, but there are other tests to check for
19
impingement coming down through the arm.
20
21
Q. Do you do those if you don't have the radiation?
22
A. Not at that time, no.
23
If she started -- no. According to Exhibit 13
when she started having the numbness in the face and in the
24
arm, if she had come in for an examination at that point, I
25
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1
would have done those, yes.
2
Q. Any others?
3
A. Off the top of my head there's Spurling's, there's
4
Jackson's. Yergason's is shoulder, but you can use it for
5
the neck as well. I believe it's spelled Y-E-R-J-E-S-O-N
6
(sic).
7
Q. Do you know if the standard of care requires all
8
of those tests be performed under the circumstances that
9
Ms. Arregui presented on on June 4, 2007?
10
MR. MONTELEONE: Object to the form.
11
THE WITNESS: If the standard of care is what we
12
discussed as the sentence in my report, I don't think it's
13
written down that all of those tests need to be performed,
14
but I don't know. But 1 would say some of them.
15
BY MR. GREENER:
Q. And then as we sit here today, you're unable to
: 16
form an opinion on whether or not there was actually an
i 17
adjustment or it was a range of motion test in the two
: 18
instances that counsel discussed with you, correct?
119
A. Yes. Because there's conflicting statements in
i 20
the depositions.
i2l
MR. GREENER: Okay. Thank you. That's all.
, 22
MR. MONTELEONE: Off the record.
123
,
(Discussion off the record.)
~ 24
MR. MONTELEONE: It was pointed out by madam cou 25

DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY
I, Sarah Tarnai, D.C., hereby declare under
penalty of perjury that the foregoing is my deposition under
oath; that these are the questions asked of me and my
answers thereto; that I have read my deposition and have
made any corrections, additions or changes that 1 deem
necessary.
Dated this
day
20_.

Sarah Tarnai, D.C.

i
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

2

I, Sandra J. Skari, Certified Shorthand
Reporter in and for the State of California, do hereby
5 certify:
6
That the witness in the foregoing deposition
7 was by me first duly sworn to testify to the truth, the
8 whole truth, and nothing but the truth in the foregoing
9 cause; that the deposition was then taken before me at the
10 time and place therein named; that said deposition was
11 reported by me in shorthand and later transcribed under my
12 direction, and the preceding pages contain a true record of
13 the testimony of the witness; and I do further certify that
14 I am a disinterested person and am in no way interested in
15 the outcome of said action or connected with or related to
16 any of the parties in said action or to their respective
17 counsel.
18
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set m,
19 hand this 28th day of October 2010.
20
3

4

21

22
23
24
25

Sandra J. Skari, RPR, CSR
Certificate No. 7691

I

i
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Richard H. Greener, ISB No. 1191
Loren K. Messerly, ISB No. 7434
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER P.A.
The Banner Bank. Building
950 West Bannock Street, Suite 900
Boise,ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 319-2600
Facsimile: (208) 319-2601
Email: rgreener@greenerlaw.com
lmesserly@greenerlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendants Rosalinda Gallegos-Main
and Full Life Chiropractic, P.A.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD mDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

MARTHA A. ARREGUI,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV 09-3450

v.
ROSALINDA GALLEGOS-MAIN, an
individual; FULL LIFE CHIROPRACTIC,
P.A., an Idaho professional association; and
John and Jane Does I through X, whose true
identities are unknown,

REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

Defendants Rosalinda Gallegos-Main ("Dr. Gallegos-Main") and Full Life Chiropractic,
P.A. (collectively the "Defendants"), by and through their counsel of record, Greener Burke
Shoemaker P.A., hereby submit their Reply Memorandum in Support of their Motion for
Summary Judgment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on October 26,2010. The motion
was supported by a memorandum, an affidavit from counsel with several exhibits including all
relevant excerpts from the deposition of Plaintiff s disclosed standard of care expert, and a
statement of undisputed facts. The summary judgment motion is based on Plaintiffs inability to
meet the requirements ofLC. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 regarding expert testimony as to the local
standard of care.
On Wednesday, November 10,2010, counsel for Plaintiff provided an untimely "courtesy
copy" of Plaintiffs opposition brief. The "courtesy copy" was not signed. On Friday,
November 1ih, Defendants received, via facsimile, Plaintiffs final, signed version of her
opposition brief and the Affidavit of Sarah Tamai, D.C., without exhibits. On Monday,
November 15 th , Defendants received a second copy of the Affidavit of Sarah Tamai, D.C. this
time with exhibits attached.
II. ARGUMENT
A.

Plaintiff Concedes That Idaho Law Requires An Expert Opinion Regarding the
Standard of Care For Chiropractic Physicians In The Nampa/Caldwell Area.
Plair-tiff is required to prove by "direct expert testimony ... that [Defendants] ... failed to

meet the applicable standard of health care practice of the community in which such
care ... was or should have been provided." 1. C. § 6-1012 (emphasis added). In her opposition
brief, Plaintiff concedes that she must provide expert testimony regarding the health care practice
of chiropractic physicians in the Nampa/Caldwell area. Plaintiff does not dispute that her entire
case must be dismissed if she is unable to provide direct expert testimony regarding the local
community standard of care. See Jones v. Crawforth, 147 Idaho 11, 205 P.3d 660 (2009); Mains
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v. Cach, 143 Idaho 221, 141 P.3d 1090 (2006); Hough v. Fry, 131 Idaho 230, 233,953 P.2d 980,
983 (1998).

B.

Dr. Tamai's Deposition Testimony Supports Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment and Plaintiff Concedes That Only Dr. Tamai's Subsequent,
Contradictory Affidavit Testimony Could Prevent Summary Judgment.
Dr. Tarnai was deposed on October 19,2010 in Oceanside California. In her deposition,

Dr. Tarnai provided clear testimony that she does not possess the knowledge to affirmatively
prove by direct expert testimony that Dr. Main breached the applicable standard of care of a
chiropractic physician practicing in Caldwell, Idaho on June 4,2007 or any other date. Dr Tarnai
testified that:
• she is not licensed as a chiropractic physician in Idaho (SUMF at, 3);
• she has never been to Idaho (SUMF at, 4);
• she had not spoken with any chiropractic physician in Idaho to determine the local
standard of care (SUMF at, 5);
• she doesn't know what the local standard of care is for a chiropractic physician
practicing in Caldwell, Idaho is (SUMF at , 6);
• Dr. Tarnai had only talked to one chiropractic physician in Idaho, Dr. Eri Crum, for
"about three minutes" to touch base with him to see if Plaintiffs attorneys in this case
were good guys (SUMF at, 7);
• Dr. Tarnai does not know if there is a different standard of care for chiropractic
physicians practicing in Caldwell, Idaho or for chiropractic physicians practicing
anywhere else in the country (Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to Strike
("Aff. of Counsel") at, 4 and Ex. Cat 77:18-78:20);
• Dr. Tarnai's opinions stated in her report and deposition are final. She will not be
performing any additional work or modification of her opinions (Aff. of Counsel at , 4,
and Ex. C at 132:10-19 and 152:16-22).
In her opposition brief, Plaintiff completely ignores Dr. Tarnai's deposition testimony.
Plaintiff cannot challenge the fact that Dr. Tarnai's deposition testimony is completely
insufficient to establish the local standard of care for chiropractic physicians practicing in the
Narnpa/Caldwell area or in the state of Idaho in general.
Plaintiff instead argues that the deposition testimony should be ignored because Dr.
Tarnai has provided an affidavit that contains new, contradictory opinions. Plaintiff concedes
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that this affidavit testimony is the only source of testimony for Plaintiff as to the local standard
of care for chiropractic physicians in the Narnpa/Caldwell area for June of 2007.

C. Dr. Tamai's Affidavit Is Inadmissible and Cannot Prevent Summary Judgment.
Faced with imminent dismissal of her case, Plaintiff has now haphazardly presented the
court with an untimely affidavit from Dr. Tarnai. This affidavit comes less than a month
following Dr. Tarnai's deposition and is in contradiction to her testimony given during that
deposition. This affidavit, filed in support of Plaintiffs opposition to Defendants' motion for
summary judgment, was filed and served three days late in contravention of this Court's
Scheduling Order.
Plaintiffs late argument essentially is that summary judgment can't be granted because
Dr. Tarnai's late and contradictory affidavit fix all of the problems with Plaintiffs lack of direct
expert testimony as to the local standard of care pursuant to I. C. § 6-1012 and 6-1 013. Dr.
Tarnai's affidavit, however, should, pursuant to law, be dismissed as it is untimely, it is a sharn
affidavit which openly contradicts very recent deposition testimony, and it lacks the required
foundation for an expert opinion in that it does not have any sufficient explanation as to the
reasons for Dr. Tarnai's new and contradictory testimony. Defendants have filed a motion to
strike the affidavit of Dr. Tarnai addressing all of these issues. l
The admissibility of expert testimony is an issue that is separate and distinct from
whether that testimony is sufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact sufficient to preclude
summary judgment. See Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 137 Idaho 160,45

I In order to avoid tedious duplication, Defendants refer the Court to the arguments asserted in Defendants
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Sarah Tarnai, D.C. Those arguments are
incorporated herein by reference.
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P.3d 816 (2002) citing to Kolin v. Saint Luke's Reg 'I Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 940 P.2d 1142
(1997).
Rule 56(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure states that affidavits must contain facts
that are admissible in evidence and must show that the affiant is competent to testify to the
matters in the affidavit. See Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal, Co., 92 Idaho 865, 869, 452
P.2d 362, 366 (1969); Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchinson, 145 Idaho at 14, 175 P.3d at 176;
I.R.C.P.56(e). Thus, if the admissibility of evidence presented in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment is challenged, the court must first make a threshold determination as to the
admissibility of the evidence "before proceeding to the ultimate issue whether summary
judgment is appropriate." Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 811,979 P.2d 1165, 1169 (1999)
(quoting Ryan v. Beisner, 132 Idaho 42, 45,844 P.2d 24,27 (Ct. App. 1992).)
For all of the reasons stated in the Defendants' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Sarah
Tarnai, D.C., the Court should make the threshold determination that Dr. Tarnai's affidavit
testimony is inadmissible and cannot be utilized to prevent summary judgment. Without Dr.
Tarnai's affidavit, Plaintiff has absolutely no evidence that can prevent summary judgment.
Instead, Plaintiff can only look to Dr. Tarnai's deposition testimony that unquestionably supports
dismissal of this case at summary judgment.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
should be granted. Plaintiff concedes that Dr. Tarnai's affidavit testimony is the only
testimony in the record that can prevent summary judgment and that affidavit testimony
is deficient and should be stricken as a matter of law.
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DATED this 16th day of November, 2010.

:~~HOEMAKERP.A
=cI1afdliGreeIl~
Loren K. Messerly
Attorneys for Defendants Rosalinda Gallegos-Main
And Full Life Chiropractic, P.A.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 16th day of November, 2010, a true and correct copy of
the within and foregoing instrument was served upon:
Sam Johnson
Johnson & Monteleone, L.L.P.
405 South Eighth Street, Suite 250
Boise,ID 83702
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

o U.S. Mail
o Facsimile
3 Hand Delivery
o Overnight Delivery
o Email
Ric ard H. Greener
Loren K. Messerly
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Attorneys for Defendants Rosalinda Gallegos-Main
and Full Life Chiropractic, P .A.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

MARTHA A. ARREGUI,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV 09-3450

v.
ROSALINDA GALLEGOS-MAIN, an
individual;: FULL LIFE CHIROPRACTIC,
P.A., an Idaho professional association; and
John and Jane Does I through X, whose true
identities are unknown,

MOTION TO STRIKE THE
AFFIDA VIT OF SARAH TAMAI, D.C.

Defendants.

Defendants Rosalinda Gallegos-Main and Full Life Chiropractic, P.A. ("Defendants"), by
and through their counsel of record, Greener Burke Shoemaker P.A., object to and hereby move
this Court to strike the Affidavit of Sarah Tarnai, D.C. ("Affidavit") which was filed in support
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of Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The Affidavit was
untimely served and filed on Friday, November 12,2010.
This Motion to Strike is made on the following grounds:
1.

The filing of the Affidavit was outside the filing deadline requirements imposed
by Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56(c);

2.

The Affidavit directly contradicts deposition testimony and should be stricken
pursuant to the sharn affidavit doctrine; and

3.

The Affidavit improperly contains expert opinions of Sarah Tarnai, D.C. without
proper foundation.

A Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Strike is filed concurrently
herewith.
DATED this 16th day of November, 2010.
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER P.A.

By____~____~~~~~==~-----Richard H. Greener/Lo
K. Messerly
Attorneys for Defendants Rosalinda Gallegos-Main
and Full Life Chiropractic, P.A.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 16th day of November, 2010, a true and correct copy of
the within and foregoing instrument was served upon:
Sam Johnson
Johnson & Monteleone, L.L.P.
405 South Eighth Street, Suite 250
Boise, ID 83702
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

o U.S. Mail
o Facsimile
IZI Hand Delivery
o Overnight Delivery
o Email
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ORIGINAL

Attorneys for Defendants Rosalinda Gallegos-Main
and Full Life Chiropractic, P .A.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
MARTHA A. ARREGUI,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV 09-3450

v.
ROSALINDA GALLEGOS-MAIN, an
individual; FULL LIFE CHIROPRACTIC,
P.A., an Idaho professional association; and
John and Jane Does I through X, whose true
identities are unknown,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE
THE AFFIDAVIT OF SARAH TAMAI,
D.C.

Defendants.

Defendants Rosalinda Gallegos-Main ("Dr. Main") and Full Life Chiropractic, P.A.
(collectively hereinafter "Defendants"), by and through their counsel of record, Greener Burke
Shoemaker P.A., respectfully submit this Memorandum in support of their Motion to Strike the
Affidavit of Sarah Tamai, D.C. ("Motion to Strike") which was filed in support of Plaintiffs
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Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendants' MSJ") which is
scheduled to be heard on November 23,2010 at 9:00 a.m. before this honorable Court.

FACTS
Plaintiff disclosed her experts on August 16, 2010. In her disclosures she identified
Sarah Tarnai, DC in Oceanside, California as an expert who would testify as to "whether the
Defendant Dr. Gallegos-Main met the standard of skill and care ordinarily exercised by
chiropractic physicians in similar setting and in like circumstances. Dr. Tarnai's testimony will
include her opinion that the Defendant Dr. Gallegos-Main failed to meet the standard of
healthcare practice when treating Plaintiff on or about June 4, 2007." (See Affidavit of Counsel
in Support of Defendants' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Sarah Tarnai, D.C. ("Aff. of
Counsel") at ~ 2 and Ex. A.) Defendants disclosed their experts on September 30, 2010. In their
disclosures, Defendants' disclosed that Robert Ward III, DC would testify to "the standard of
care for the practice of chiropractic medicine in Idaho at the time in question," arnong other
things. (See Aff. of Counsel at ~ 3 and Ex. B.)
On Friday October 15,2010 Plaintiff produced an expert report from Sarah Tarnai, D.C.
detailing her opinions in this matter. On Tuesday, October 19, 2010 Defendants took the
deposition of Sarah Tarnai, D.C. in Oceanside, California. During that deposition Dr. Tarnai
detailed what her testimony would be in this litigation and then stated that she did not have any
additional opinions and that she would not be doing any additional work. (See Aff. of Counsel at
~

4 and Ex. C at 132:10-19 and 152:16-22.)
On Tuesday, October 26,2010 Defendants filed and timely served their Motion for

Summary Judgment, Memorandum in Support, Affidavit of Counsel in Support and Notice of
Hearing reflecting a hearing date scheduled for Tuesday, November 23,2010 at 9:00 am
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(collectively hereinafter "Defendants' MSJ"). Defendants' MSJ seeks summary judgment on
Plaintiffs claims due to Plaintiffs failure to meet the requirements ofI.C. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013
in failing to provide direct expert testimony as to the local standard of care and Defendants
breach of the local standard of care.
On Friday, November 12, 2010, three days beyond the deadline to do so, Plaintiff filed
and served her Opposition to Defendants' MSJ along with an Affidavit of Sarah Tarnai, D.C. in
support of her opposition ("Tarnai Aff."). Plaintiff opposes Defendants' MSJ by arguing that the
applicable expert testimony necessary under I.e. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 is contained in the Tarnai
Aff.
Defendants now move this Court to strike the Tarnai Aff. filed on November 12,2010 in
support of Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as the Affidavit
was filed outside of the requirements oflRCP 56(c), the Affidavit is in direct contradiction to the
deposition testimony of Dr. Tarnai given less than one month prior, the Affidavit does not
provide an explanation as to why her testimony has changed and the Affidavit does not contain
the proper foundation to be admissible.
ARGUMENT

A.

Standard.
The admissibility of expert testimony is an issue that is separate and distinct from

whether that same testimony is sufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact sufficient to
preclude summary judgment. Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 137 Idaho
160,45 P.3d 816 (2002) citing to Kolin v. Saint Luke's Reg 'I Med Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 940 P.2d
1142 (1997). The liberal construction and reasonable inferences standard that is applied to
testimony in determining if there is a genuine issue of material fact, does not apply when
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deciding if that same testimony of the witness would be admissible. Dulaney, 137 Idaho at 163;
see also Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 868 P2d 1224 (1994). Whether the testimony of

the witness is admissible or not is determined under IRCP 56(e) which requires admissible
evidence in the affidavit which shows that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters
contained therein. In a medical malpractice action, in order for a standard of care expert's
testimony to be competent, the expert must show that she is familiar with the local standard of
care and must show how he/she familiarized herself with the local standard of care. See Kolin,
130 Idaho at 331.
Further, in medical malpractice cases, experts testifying as to the local standard of care
must meet the foundational requirements required by Idaho Code § 6-1013 which are: (a) that
such opinion is actually held by the expert witness; (b) that the expert witness can testify to the
opinion with a reasonable degree of medical certainty; (c) that the expert witness possesses the
professional knowledge and expertise; and (d) that the expert witness has actual knowledge of
the applicable community standard of care to which hislher expert opinion is addressed. See
Dulaney, 137 Idaho 160, 164. The Tarnai affidavit on its face does not comply with these

requirements.
B.

Affidavit Untimely.
Pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, a party seeking to oppose a motion for

summary judgment is required to serve opposing briefing and affidavits "at least 14 days prior to
the date of the hearing." I.R.C.P.56(c). This Court's Order Setting Case for Trial and Pretrial
Conference ("Scheduling Order"), dated September 29, 2009, supports the provisions of IRCP
56(c) in stating that "[a]ll motions for summary judgment shall be filed and noticed in
compliance with I.R.C.P. Rule 56(c)."
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The hearing on Defendants' motion for summary judgment was properly set with this
Court for November 23,2010. Notice of the hearing was properly filed with the Court and
served on the Plaintiff by hand delivery on October 26, 2010. Pursuant to Rule 56( c),
specifically incorporated into the Court's Scheduling Order, the Plaintiffs opposing briefing and
affidavit was required to be filed and served no later than Tuesday, November 9,2010. Instead,
Plaintiffs opposition and supporting affidavit from Dr. Tarnai was filed and served at 4:29 p.m.
on Friday, November 12,2010. This failure to comply with the Court's scheduling order is a
stand-alone basis for striking both the affidavit and Plaintiffs opposition brief.
The prejudice to Defendants is undeniable. Rather than fourteen days until the hearing,
Defendants received the opposing affidavit only eleven days prior to the hearing. More
importantly, Defendants had four days instead of seven days to draft their responsive pleadings.
In fact, because of the timing of the disclosure at 4:30 p.m. on a Friday evening, Defendants had
only two working days to file their reply brief as well as the responsive pleadings to address the
Tarnai Aff.
In Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc. v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, 133 Idaho 1,981 P.2d 236
(1999), the Idaho Supreme Court overturned a summary judgment ruling by the District Court
where the moving party had untimely filed an additional affidavit outside the 28-day
requirement. The non-moving party filed a Motion to Strike which the District Court denied,
stating there was no showing of prejudice. Sun Valley Potatoes, 133 Idaho at 3. In reversing the
summary judgment, the court ruled:
Rule 56(c) requires the moving party to serve the motion along with supporting brief and
affidavits not less than twenty-eight days before the hearing. The purpose is to give the
opposing party an adequate and fair opportunity to support its case. The rule requires the
adverse party, if it chooses, to respond with an opposing brief and affidavits no less than
fourteen days prior to the hearing. Again, the purpose is to give the moving party an
adequate opportunity to respond.
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Sun Valley Potatoes, 133 Idaho at 6. In accordance with the precedent of the ruling in Sun
Valley Potatoes, this Court should strike the untimely filed Tarnai Aff.
Undoubtedly Plaintiff will attempt to argue that the affidavit would have been filed on
time but for difficulties reaching Dr. Tarnai during the two-weeks following the filing of
Defendants' motion for summary judgment. This is not a valid excuse for avoiding the filing
and service requirements of Rule 56. However, the reality is that Plaintiff has had over a year
and half to obtain the necessary testimony to meet the requirements ofIe §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013.
Plaintiff knew or should have known when she filed her complaint on March 31, 2009, that she
would need an expert to testify as to the local standard of care. Even if Plaintiff was somehow
not aware ofthe requirements ofIC §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 at the time she filed her complaint, it
is obvious that Plaintiff should have been aware of these requirements by August 16, 2010 when
Plaintiff disclosed Dr. Tarnai as an expert witness in this case who would be addressing the
standard of care. (See AfT. of Counsel at ~ 2 and Ex. A) Plaintiff should have ensured at that
time that her chosen and designated expert, Dr. Tarnai, a California chiropractor, had
familiarized herself with the local standard of care. However, when Dr. Tarnai was deposed on
October 19,2010, just over three months after Dr. Tarnai was designated as an expert by
Plaintiff, it was abundantly clear Dr. Tarnai did not have any knowledge as to standard of care in
the State of Idaho. (See Defendants Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("SUMF") at ~~ 27.) Further it was abundantly clear that Dr. Tarnai had not made any attempt to obtain
knowledge as to the standard of care in the State of Idaho. (ld)
IRCP 56(t) provides a remedy for a party if they are faced with problems in obtaining an
affidavit in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff did not even attempt to
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me a motion for 56(t) relief in this instance; no doubt she knew that she had no excuse or reason
for not being able to timely file her opposition and any supporting affidavits.
Now, faced with a motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff is trying, at the last minute, to
patch together some testimony as to the local standard of care. Those last minute actions do not
meet the requirement of good cause for allowing a late filed affidavit. See, e.g., Maxwell v.
Baptist Memorial Hospital-DeSoto, Inc., 15 So.3d 427, 429-36 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (striking

affidavits, granting summary judgment to defendant, and noting that the plaintiffs "had almost
two years from the time their complaint was filed to obtain expert medical testimony in some
acceptable form"); see also Chambers v. NASCa, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,43-46 (1991) (confirming
that Court's inherent power and discretion to "fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which
abuses the judicial process" includes the discretion to dismiss a lawsuit outright and therefore
any less severe sanction is also within that discretion).
Defendants have abided by the requirements of IRCP 56 and the requirements of this
Court regarding notice and briefing of summary judgment motions. Plaintiff has plainly violated
the requirements of both IRCP 56 and the requirements of this Court by simply filing her
opposition and supporting affidavit late. Accordingly the Tarnai Aff. should be stricken.

C.

Dr. Tarnai's Affidavit Is Not Admissible Because It Directly Contradicts Her
Deposition Testimony.
Courts have consistently held that parties are not allowed to prevent summary judgment

by filing "sham" affidavits that directly contradict deposition testimony. See, e.g., Boise Tower
Associates, LLC v. Washington Capital Joint Master Trust, 2007 WL 1035158, 12-13 (D. Idaho

2007) ("[Courts] have held with virtual unanimity that a party cannot create a genuine issue of
fact sufficient to survive summary judgment simply by contradicting his or her own previous
sworn statement (by, say, filing a later affidavit that flatly contradicts that party's earlier sworn
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deposition) without explaining the contradiction or attempting to resolve the disparity.") (quoting
Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806 (1999)); Van Asdale v. Int'l Game
Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2009) ("[I]f a party who has been examined at length on

deposition could raise an issue of fact simply by submitting an affidavit contradicting his own
prior testimony, this would greatly diminish the utility of summary judgment as a procedure for
screening out sham issues offact.") (quoting Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262,266
(9th Cir.1991)); see also Matter of Estate of Keeven, 126 Idaho 290, 298,882 P.2d 457,465 (Ct.
App. 1994) ("[A] sham affidavit which directly contradicts prior testimony may be disregarded
on a summary judgment motion .... ").
The "sham affidavit" rule is well established in our federal courts and state courts.
Essentially the "sham affidavit" rules are in place to preclude a party from creating an issue of
fact to prevent summary judgment by simply submitting an affidavit which directly contradicts
prior deposition testimony by the affiant. Without such a rule in place, the utility of summary
judgment as a procedure for screening out sham issues of fact would be destroyed.
Here, Plaintiff is attempting to do precisely what our federal and state courts have worked
to eliminate through the "sham affidavit" rules. Plaintiff is attempting to put forth expert
testimony of Dr. Tamai to overcome summary judgment which is in complete contradiction to
the expert testimony that Dr. Tamai gave under oath in her deposition less than one month ago.
The contradictions in Dr. Tarnai's affidavit are as follows:

1. Local Standard of Care in Idaho.
In her deposition, Dr. Tarnai was very clear that she did not know what the standard of
care was for a chiropractic physician practicing in the State of Idaho and she made it very clear
that she had not attempted to determine what that standard was. (See SUMF ~~ 2-7.) Dr. Tamai
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also testified that she would not be doing any additional work and that she did not have any
additional opinions. (See SUMF ~ 15; Aff. of Counsel at ~ 4 and Ex. C at 132: 10-19 and 152: 1622.)
Now, in her affidavit of November 12, 2010, Dr. Tarnai states that she is familiar with the
local standard of care for the Nampa/Caldwell area in June of 2007. (See Tarnai Aff. at ~ 3, 4,
9.) Tamai's explanation for this contradictory evidence is that she has now spoken with a local
practitioner and confirmed the standard of care is the same. This explanation is inadequate as
discussed in greater detail below in Section 0 of this brief.

2. Local Standard of Care in California.
During her deposition and in her expert report of October 15, 2010, Dr. Tarnai defines the
standard of care as "[t]he level at which the average, prudent provider in a given community
would practice. It is how similarly qualified practitioners would have managed the patient's care
under the same or similar circumstances." (See Tarnai Aff. at Ex. B, p. 1.) This definition of the
standard of care was taken by Dr. Tamai from a PowerPoint presentation prepared by Leslie M.
Wise, D.C. which Dr. Tarnai found on the internet. (See Aff. of Counsel at ~ 4 and Ex. C at
77:18-78:20.) Dr. Tarnai testified that she wasn't sure if this definition of the standard of care by
Leslie M. Wise, D.C. was part of the standard of care in California or if it part of the standard of
care nationally. (See Aff. of Counsel at ~ 4 and Ex. Cat 84: 15-85: 15.)
Now, in her affidavit of November 12, 2010, Dr. Tarnai states that her opinions are based
upon "standards of care in Oceanside, California in June 2007." (See Tarnai Aff. at ~ 3.)
Tarnai's Aff. does not give any explanation as to this contradicting statement.

3. Standard of Care Nationally.
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During her deposition, Dr. Tarnai testified that she did not know if there was a national
standard of care for chiropractic physicians or what, if anything, that standard would entail. (See
Aff. of Counsel at ~ 4 and Ex. C at 85:20-86:15.)
Now, in her affidavit of November 12,2010, Dr. Tarnai testifies that the "national
standards of care applicable to chiropractors throughout the United States are the same as the
standards of care I have followed in my chiropractic practice in California." (See Tarnai Aff. at ~
9.) Tarnai's Aff. does not give any explanation as to this contradicting statement.

4. Treatment by Dr. Main - Adjustment.
In her deposition, Dr. Tarnai indicated that she could not give an opinion as to whether
Dr. Main actually performed a cervical adjustment to Plaintiff on June 4, 2007 or if Dr. Main had
merely performed a range of movement test as reflected in Dr. Main's chart notes. (See Aff. of
Counsel at ~ 4 and Ex. C at 163: 16-21.)
Now, in her affidavit of November 12,2010, Dr. Tarnai states, "Defendant's decision to
apply a cervical adjustment to her patient was a breach of the prevailing community standards of
care in June 2007 in the Nampa-Caldwell area ofIdaho." (See Tarnai Aff. at ~ 7.) Tarnai's Aff.
does not give any explanation as to this contradicting statement.

5. Treatment by Dr. Main - Emergency Room Evaluation.
In her deposition, Dr. Tarnai conceded that her opinions detailed in her October 15, 2010
report, regarding Dr. Main's actions to ensure Plaintiff was seen safely home or further evaluated
at a hospital, were not opinions based on the standard of care but were Dr. Tarnai's own personal
recommendations. (See Aff. of Counsel at ~ 4 and Ex. Cat 133:14-134:24.)
Now, in her affidavit of November 12,2010, Dr. Tarnai states that Dr. Main breached the
standard of care when she allegedly "failed to call paramedics or other emergency medical
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personnel or even to assist Plaintiff." (See Tarnai Aff. at

~~

5 and 8.) Tarnai's Aff. does not give

any explanation as to this contradicting statement.
Allowing an affidavit that completely contradicts deposition testimony is contrary to the
law and patently unfair to the moving party on summary judgment. Defendants have expended
many hours preparing their motion for summary judgment. Defendants proceeded with an expert
deposition in California, at Defendants expense. Defendants are entitled to rely upon the
deposition testimony provided by Plaintiffs local standard of care expert who was disclosed
months earlier. Plaintiff should not be able to avoid summary judgment by the tardy submission
of an affidavit that purportedly touches on all the necessary elements to prevent summary
judgment in contradiction of the affiant's prior sworn testimony. That affidavit cannot be used to
cover up all the holes in Plaintiffs case that were uncovered through cross-examination at Dr.
Tarnai's deposition. Dr. Tarnai's new affidavit testimony is a sharn affidavit and should be
stricken as a matter of law.

D.

Affidavit Contains Legal Deficiencies In Foundation.
Plaintiff argues that its contradicting affidavit testimony is acceptable because the new

testimony is based on new evidence that Dr. Tarnai obtained by talking with a chiropractor in
Idaho subsequent to her deposition. This is not newly discovery evidence that was previously
unavailable to Plaintiff. Rather, this "new" evidence has been available to Plaintiff since the
inception of this case. There is a distinct difference which the Court should note between new
evidence and the Plaintiff actually preparing her case. In this instance, there is no new evidence.
It is just that when faced with a motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff decided to attempt to

piece together the required expert testimony.
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As an initial matter, allowing an expert to speak with a local practicing health care
provider is acceptable under Idaho statute for an out of state expert to familiarize themselves
with the local standard of care. However, foundational issues must still be met to allow for such
testimony to be admissible. In medical malpractice cases, experts testifying as to the local
standard of care must set forth the foundational requirements required by Idaho Code § 6-1013
which are: (a) that such opinion is actually held by the expert witness; (b) that the expert witness
can testify to the opinion with a reasonable degree of medical certainty; (c) that the expert .
witness possesses the professional knowledge and expertise; and (d) that the expert witness has
actual knowledge of the applicable community standard of care to which hislher expert opinion
is addressed. Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 137 Idaho 160,45 P.3d 816
(2002).
Further, for an expert's testimony to be competent pursuant to IRCP 56(e), the expert
must show that she is familiar with the standard of care and must show how she familiarized
herself with the standard of care. Kolin v. Saint Luke's Reg 'I Med Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 940 P.2d
1142 (1997).
In this case, Dr. Tarnai's November 12, 2010 affidavit contains only broad
generalizations. She states that she has "educated myself regarding the local standards of care
prevailing in Nampa-Caldwell are ofIdaho as they existed in June 2007 ..... .1 have spoken with
a local chiropractor, who maintained a chiropractic practice, in Caldwell, Idaho, in June
2007 .......... This chiropractor indicated to me that he was familiar with the local standards of
care ... " (See Tarnai Aff. at ~ 2.)
Dr. Tamai' s affidavit does not state who the local chiropractor is that she spoke to; how
long she spoke to the local chiropractor; how long that chiropractor has been practicing in the
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area; what techniques that chiropractor regularly utilizes in his/her practice; what the
qualifications of the local chiropractor are; what the local chiropractor told her about the local
standard of care; and/or how the local chiropractor knows the local standard of care. Without
such facts, Dr. Tarnai's assertions lack adequate competency/foundation to be admissible under
IRCP 56(e). See I.R.C.P. 56(e); Kolin, 130 Idaho at 323.
Dr. Tarnai's November 12,2010 affidavit does not meet the foundational requirements to
be admissible into evidence and should therefore be stricken as a matter of law.

CONCLUSION
The affidavit of Dr. Tarnai is untimely; it contains inadmissible evidence because it
directly contradicts prior deposition testimony; there is not explanation as to why contradicting
testimony is being provided; and it lacks the foundation required under IC § 6-1013 and IRCP
56(e) to be admissible. For anyone of these reasons and for all of these reasons Defendants'
Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Sarah Tarnai, D.C. should be granted.
DATED THIS

lG1"\.. day of November, 2010.

By__~______________-.~___________
Ric rd H. Greener/Loren . Messerly
Attorneys for Defendants Ros mda Gallegos-Main
and Full Life Chiropractic, P .A.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~day of November, 2010, a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing instrument was served upon:
Sam Johnson
Johnson & Monteleone, L.L.P.
405 South Eighth Street, Suite 250
Boise,ID 83702
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

o U.S. Mail

o Facsimile
~ Hand Delivery
o Overnight Delivery
o Email
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NOV 16 20to
CANYON COUNTY t::l..SRK
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Richard H. Greener, ISB No. 1191
Loren K. Messerly, ISB No. 7434
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER P.A.
The Banner Bank Building
950 West Bannock Street, Suite 900
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 319-2600
Facsimile: (208) 319-2601
Email: rgreener@greenerlaw.com
lmesserly@greenerlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendants Rosalinda Gallegos-Main
and Full Life Chiropractic, P.A.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

MARTHA A. ARREGUI,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV 09-3450

v.
ROSALINDA GALLEGOS-MAIN, an
individual; FULL LIFE CHIROPRACTIC,
P.A., an Idaho professional association; and
John and Jane Does I through X, whose true
identities are unknown,

MOTION FOR ORDER SHORTENING
TIME ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO STRIKE

Defendants.

Defendants Rosalinda Gallegos-Main and Full Life Chiropractic, P.A. ("Defendants"), by
and through their counsel of record, Greener Burke Shoemaker P.A., hereby move this Court,
pursuant to Rule 7(b)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court's Civil Case
Scheduling Order, for an order shortening time for Defendants' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of
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Sarah Tarnai, D.C. ("Defendants' Motion"). Defendants seek expedited relief on the basis that
the hearing on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("MSJ") is set to commence in this
matter at 9:00 a.m. on November 23, 2010. The Affidavit of Sarah Tarnai, DC was filed by
Plaintiff in support of her opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Pursuant to
IRCP 56(e), any affidavits submitted in support of or in opposition of any motion for summary
judgment must be admissible in evidence.

Accordingly, it is appropriate that Defendants'

Motion to Strike be heard in conjunction with Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
DATED this ~day of November, 2010.
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER P.A.

By__~~____~~~~_____________
Ric ard H. Greener/ en K. Messerly
Attorneys for Defendants Rosalinda Gallegos-Main
and Full Life Chiropractic, P.A.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Ij,~ day of November, 2010, a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing instrument was served upon:
Sam Johnson
Johnson & Monteleone, L.L.P.
405 South Eighth Street, Suite 250
Boise,ID 83702
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

D

U.S. Mail

.

Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email

~Facsimile
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NOV 2 ~ 2010
CANYON COUNTY CUiRt<

./T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
MARTHA A. ARREGUI,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV 09-3450

v.
ROSALINDA GALLEGOS-MAIN, an
individual; FULL LIFE CHIROPRACTIC,
P.A., an Idaho professional association; and
John and Jane Does I through X, whose true
identities are unknown,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT AND
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.
For the reasons stated in this Court's oral ruling issued on November 23, 2010, the
Defendants Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Sarah Tamai, D.C., filed on November 16,2010,
is GRANTED, and Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on October 26,2010, is
also GRANTED.
DATED this _ _ day of November, 2010.

NOV 2 4 2010

JOO~~~
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT AND MOTION
FORS~RYJUDGMENT-1
00223-031 (360298)
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11/23/2010 :rUB 111,.58

I2l~03/004

FAX

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

:~~37~
Attorneys for Plaintiff

SHOEMAKER P.A.

By.

~~~

______~_________

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT AND MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ''d ~ day of November, 2010, a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing instrument was served upon:
Sam Johnson
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P.
405 South Eighth Street, Suite 250
Boise, 10 83702
{Attorneys for Plaintiff}

Richard H. Greener
Loren K. Messerly
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER P.A.
950 West Bannock Street, Suite 900
Boise, 10 83702

~. Mail
0
0
0

o

Facsimile
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email
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~.S. Mail

o Facsimile

o Hand Delivery
o Overnight Delivery
o Email

{Defendants Rosalinda Gallegos-Main
and Full Life Chiropractic, P.A.}

Clerk of the District Court

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT AND MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3
00223-031 (360298)
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8ANYON COUNTY CLERK
8 RAYNE, DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TmRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

MARTHA A. ARREGUI,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV 09-3450

v.
ROSALINDA GALLEGOS-MAIN, an
individual; FULL LIFE CHIROPRACTIC,
P.A., an Idaho professional association; and
John and Jane Does I through X, whose true
identities are unknown,

FINAL JUDGMENT

Defendants.
This matter having been fully resolved by the Court's Order, issued on November 24,
2010, which granted Defendants' Rosalinda Gallegos-Main, and Full Life Chiropractic, P.A.,
("Defendants") Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Sarah Tarnai, D.C., filed November 16, 2010,
and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed October 26,2010, against Plaintiff
Martha A. Arregui ("Plaintiff');
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Plaintiffs Complaint
and Demand for Jury Trial is dismissed with prejudice.
This Judgment may be amended following the Court's determination of Defendants'
attorneys fees and/or costs.
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DEC
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DATED this ___ day of December, 201 .

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

J-

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of December, 2010, a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing instrument was served upon:
Sam Johnson
Johnson & Monteleone, L.L.P.
405 South Eighth Street, Suite 250
Boise, ID 83702
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

Richard H. Greener
Loren K. Messerly
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER P.A.
950 West Bannock Street, Suite 900
Boise, ID 83702

o U.S. Mail

0- Facsimile (208) 947-2424

oo Overnight
Hand Delivery
Delivery
o Email
o~ Facsimile
U.S. Mail
(208) 319-2601

sam@treasurevalleylawyers.com.
Grasiela@treasurevalleylawyers.com

I?J

Hand Delivery

o Overnight Delivery
o Email (rgreener@greenerlaw.com.
Imesserly@greenerlaw.com)

[Attorneys for Defendants]
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Sam Johnson
Idaho State Bar No.4 777
sam@treasurevalleylawyers.com
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P.
_ 405 South Eighth Street, Suite 250
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 331-2100
Facsimile: (208) 947-2424

CANYON COUNTY CLEHK

D.8UTLER,DEPUT't

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

MARTHA A. ARREGUI,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. CV 09-3450

ROSALINDA GALLEGOS-MAIN, an
individual; FULL LIFE CHIROPRACTIC,
P.A., an Idaho professional association; and
John and Jane Does I through X, whose true
identities are unknown,

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

Defendants.

COMES NOW Plaintiff, by and through her attorney of record, Sam Jolmson of the
law fil111 Johnson & Monteleone, L.L.P., and pursuant to 11(a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure, hereby moves this court for the following relief:

RELIEF SOUGHT
1.

An order reconsidering the grant of the Defendants' Motion to Strike the
Affidavit o/Sarah Tamed, D.C.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION· I

000242

12/02/2010 THU 18:01

2.

~003/005

PAX

As a corollary, Plaintiff further seeks an order reconsidering the grant of
summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.
GROUNDS FOR RELIEF

THIS MOTION is made and based upon the premise that the Affidavit of Sarah
Tarnai, D.C., does not involve the manufacturing of evidence which the "shan1 affidavit"
doctrine was designed to preclude. It is important to note here that Dr. Tarnai has been
disclosed as an expert witnes..~, not as a fact/eye witness. Accordingly, we do not have the
scenario, where an eye witness had originally divulged under oath, during a deposition that
the light was "green" and later swore in an affidavit that the same light was "red" in an
effort to overcome summary judgment. Instead, we have an expert witness whose affidavit
testimony reflects new information the expert learned upon further investigation and upon
consultation with other professionals in her field. See Affidavit o/Sarah Tarnai, D.C.,

~3.

THIS MOTION is further made and based upon the premise that, "It has long been
judicial policy in Idaho that controversies be detelmined and disposed of each on its own
palticular facts and as substantial justice may require. The exercise of judicial discretion
should tend to bring about a judgment on the merits." Bunn v. Bunn, 99 Idaho 710, 7 I I
(1978).
ORAL ARGUMENT AND BRIEFING

Movant does desire to present oral argument on the motion pursuant to Rule
7(b)(3)(C), of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure; the movant likewise reserves the right to
submit a memorandum of law within fourteen (14) days in support of this motion pursuant
to Rule 7(b)(3)(C) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure; the movant further reserves the
right to file a reply brief in accordance with Rule 7(b)(3)(E), of the Idaho Rules of Civil
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FAX
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Procedure after reviewing any opposition papers which may hereafter be filed by the
Defendants.
DATED: This

2-

day of December, 2010.

Attomeys for Plaintiff

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 3

000244

1~/U~/~U1U

THU lij:Ul

~005/005

FAX

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING, DELIVERY, OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
I CERTIFY that on December 2, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to be:
Clmailed
Cl hand delivered
Cl CM/ECF Electronic Filing
Cl transmitted fax machine
to: (208) 319-2601

Richard H. Greener
Greener, Burke & Shoemaker, P.A.
The Banner Bank Building
950 W. Bannock St., Ste. 900
Boise, ID 83702

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 4
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Sam Johnson
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P.
405 South Eighth Street, Suite 250
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 331-2100
Facsimile: (208) 947-2424
sam@treasul'evalleylawvers.com
Idaho State Bar No. 4777
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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D.BUTLER,DEPUTY
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

MARTHA A. ARREGUI,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. CV 09 3450
w

ROSALINDA GALLEGOS-MAIN, an MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
individual; FULL LIFE CHIROPRACTIC, PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION
FOR
P.A., an Idaho professional association; RECONSIDERATION
and John and Jane Does I through X,
whose true identities are unknown,
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
This case involves Plaintiff Martha Arregui's (hereinafter "Arregui") claim for
bodily injuries brought against her chiropractor for negligently causing Arregui to suffer
a stroke. It comes before the COUl1 on Arregui's motion for reconsideration. In her
motion, Arregui asks this Court to reconsider its order granting Defendants' Motion

10

Strike the Affidavit qfSarah Tarnai, D.C., and its order granting Defendants' Motion/or
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SummalY Judgment. The remainder of this memorandum shall demonstrate Arregui's

cause is just.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Arregui filed suit on April 1,2009. See Complaint and Demandfor JUlY Trial, on
file herein. In her Complaint, Arregui alleges, inter alia, that Defendant Dr. Main owed

All'egui a duty to medically treat her in a non-negligent manner, and in conformance with
the applicable community standard of chiropractic care. lei, at ~7.
Defendants filed their Answer to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, on or
about April 21, 2009. See Answer to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, on file
herein.

In the Answer to the Complaint, "Defendant Rosalinda Gallegos-Main, an

individual, admits that she owes Plaintiff a duty regarding her treatment as a licensed
chiropractor .... " ld, at

,,7 (emphasis added).

When Answering the Complaint,

Defendants however made no reference to the Medical Malpractice Act (I.e. § 6-1001

el

seq.), and did not defend on the grounds that Plaintiff had to comply with the statutory

mandates set forth in Idaho Code §§ 6-1012/6-1013. See generally Answer to Complaint.
Thereafter, Arregui disclosed Dr. Sarah Tarnai, D.C., as an expert witness who
would testify at trial on behalf of Arregui. On October 15, 2010, Arregui produced a
report authored by Dr. Tarnai which outlined her opinions on whether Defendant Dr.
Main breached the standard of care when treating Arregui. In her October 15, 2010,
report Dr. Tarnai defined the applicable standard of care for chiropractic physicians in the
following manner:
The level at which the average, prudent provider in a given
community would practice. It is how similarly qualified
practitioners would have managed the patient's care under
the same or similar circumstances.
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See a true and correct copy

0/ the October 15, 2010, report authored by Dr. Tarnai,

aI/ached and incorporated into her affidavit as Exhibit "B", on.file herein. A few days
later, on October 19,2010, Defendants took the deposition of Dr. Tarnai. See a {rue and
correct copy

0/ the deposition transcript ([a111al Depo. Tr.) 0/ Dr. Sarah Tamai, D. c.,

attached as Exhibit HC" to the Affidavit a/Counsel in Support o//he De/endants' Motion
to Strike the Affidavit

0/ Sarah Tamai, D.C. During her deposition, Dr. Tarnai's same

October 15,2010, written repOlt was marked and attached to the deposition transcript as
Exhibit 7. Tamai Depo. Tr., p. 74, Ll.

15~17.

Further, during her deposition, Dr. Tamai

directly quoted the same standard of care contained in her written report, described its
origin, and indicated, "J was looking for a standard of care that was clean and easily
understood and something that was, I felt representative of the standard of care in
chiropractic." Id. at pp. 74-77.
Not long after completing the deposition of Dr. Tarnai, but more than one year
and six months after filing the Answer to the Complaint, Defendants filed their motion
for summary judgment, on October 26, 2010. In this motion, the Defendants argued
Arregui's claims are subject to Idaho Code §§

6~IOI2/6-I013

for the first time, and

argued, for the first time, how Arregui's "failure to meet those requirements is grounds
for dismissal of Plaintiff's claims as a matter of law." See De/endant's Malian
Summary Judgment, p. 2.

/01'

In an effort to defeat the motion for summary judgment,

Arregui lodged her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for SumrnCIIY
Judgment, and filed the Affidavit o/Sarah Tamal, D.C. The same report written by Dr.
Tamai and disclosed to Defendants before Defendants took her deposition, and then used
and marked as Exhibit 7 to her deposition, was also referenced and appended as Exhibit
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"B" to the subsequent Affidavit of Dr. Tarnai. See Affidavit, ~15, and Exhibit "B" 10 the

Affidavit. For purposes of the motion for summary judgment only, Arregui conceded to
the application of Idaho Code §§ 6·1012/6·1013. See Memorandum in Opposition to

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2. Arregui next contended that she had in
fact satisfied the proof elements from the aforementioned statutes. Id.
On November 23, 2010, the Defendants' motion to strike and for summary
judgment came before the Court. After hearing oral argument from counsel, the Court
granted the motion to strike the Tarnai affidavit on the basis that it clearly contradicted
her prior deposition testimony. Without the Tamai affidavit, the Court was of course
constrained to grant the motion for summary judgment as a corollary. As stated above,
Arregui now asks this C0U11 to reconsider its rulings on the motion to strike and the
motion for summary judgment.
ARGUMENT

A.

The Affidavit of Sarab Tarnai, D.C., Does not Involve the
Manufacturing of Evidence which the "Sham Affidavit" J)octrine was
Designed to Preclude.

This case does not implicate the "sham affidavit" doctrine. As stated in Boise

Tower Associates, LLC v. Washington Capital Joint Master Trust; 2007 WL 1035158,
12· 13 (D. Idaho), the doctrine "prevents the use of manufactured testimony" as a means
of creating an issue of fact to overcome summary judgment. The Boise Tower case
involved a dispute between a lender and a bon"ower over breach of contract. There, the
lender sought to strike the affidavit of the bon'ower's principal on the basis that it was
"replete with sham testimony, statements based upon a lack of personal knowledge, and
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hearsay." Id at 12. In addressing the motion to strike, the court referenced the "sham
affidavit" doctrine and set forth its basic tenet:
[Courts] have held with virtual unanimity _that a party
cannot create a genuine issue of fact sufficient to survive
summary judgment simply by contradicting his or her own
previous sworn statement (by, say, filing a later affidavit
that flatly contradicts that party's earlier sworn deposition)
without explaining the contradiction or attempting to
resolve the disparity.

ld
After citing to the above rule, the cou11 next generally indicated, "To the extent
that various portions of the affidavit contained conclusions of law, were based on
speculation or contradicted Peterson's testimony in his affidavit, they were not
considered by the C01l11." Id at 13. Without delineating the nature of the contradictions
in the testimony, the court ultimately granted the motion to strike in part and denied it in
part. Id For our purposes here, it may have been helpful if the cOUl1 in Boise Tower had
specifically cited to the different versions of the contradictory testimony. Nonetheless, it
is clear the evidence in question did not involve the testimony of an expert witness.
Rather, it involved the principal of one of the parties - the borrower. In our case here, we
are dealing with an expert witness who obviously does not have any personal knowledge
of the facts of the case. An expert, of course, testifies on facts made know to the expert.
As more information is made know to the expert, her opinions are subject to
modification.
Such is the case here. At the time of her October 19, 2010, deposition, Dr. Tamai
did not know whether the standard of care she cited in her report was the same standard
of care applicable to the Nampa-Caldwell community at the time Arregui suffered the
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stroke. At that point in time, 01'. Tamai admittedly had not spoken to a chiropractic
physician in the Nampa-Caldwell area to discuss the standard of care in such locality.

Tarnai Depo. Tr., pp. 37-38. After Defendants filed for summary judgment and argued
for the first time how Arregui's claim was subject to the provisions of Idaho Code §§ 61012/6-1013, Dr. Tamai did, however, familiarize herself with the local standard of care

and did so by following the statutory prescripts in Idaho Code § 6-1013:
[PJrovided, this section shall not be construed to prohibit or
otherwise preclude a competent expert witness who resides
elsewhere from adequately familiarizing Iher]self with the
standards and practices of (a particular) such area and
thereafter giving opinion testimony in such a trial.
(Emphasis added).
In line with Idaho Code § 6-1013, Dr. Tamai explained the familiarization process
in paragraph three (3) of her subsequent affidavit dated November 12, 2010:
I have educated myself regarding the local standards of
care prevailing in the Nampa-Caldwell area of Idaho, as
they existed in June 2007. In addition to my education and
experience, I have spoken with a local chiropractor, who
maintained a chiropractic practice, in Caldwell, Idaho, in
June 2007, the time period relevant to this litigation, as it
was the time period, when Defendant chiropractically
treated Plaintiff, Martha Arregui. It is my understanding
that this chiropractor was appropriately licensed in Idaho as
a chiropractor and maintained an active practice of
chiropractic medicine during the relevant period. This
chiropractor indicated to me that he was familiar with the
local standards of care for performing chiropractic
procedures in the Nampa and Caldwell communities by
licensed chiropractors at the time that the chiropractic care
at issue in this case was rendered to the patient. This
physician further confirmed to me that the local standards
of care at that time were, in all respects, consistent with
and, in fact, identical to the standards of care upon which
my opinions in this case have been based, namely. the
standards of care in Oceanside, California in June 2007.
(Emphasis added).
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There can be nothing wrong with what Arregui and her expert did in the context
of this case. As stated above, this case does not actually draw into play the "sham
affidavit" doctrine. Here, the evidence in Dr. Tamai's subsequent affidavit was not
manufactured or contrived in any shape, matter or form. Dr. Tarnai properly gained
familiarity with the local standard of care upon her further inquiry into the case, including
consulting with other professionals in her field. Dr. Tarnai did not testify as an eye
witness with personal knowledge about a given fact, only to later change her testimony
thereafter. In fact, the same standard of care has been used by Dr. Tamai throughout her
involvement in the case. The only aspect of her opinion that is different is that Dr. Tarnai
confirmed through further examination that the standard of care from which she rendered
her opinions was the same standard of care which applied in Nampa-Caldwell on the date
in question. Counsel for Defendants anticipated Dr. Tamai may conduct further analysis
of the issues in the case by requesting during the deposition to be updated in the event she
did:
MR. GREENER: Counsel, if there is any additional work
done, we would like to be advised of it, if there are any
modifications. We would like to take the deposition or get
updated on the deposition of the witness on that.

See Tarnai Depo. Tr., p. 152, L. 23 - p. 153, L. 2.
It is not as though Defendants here have cited to legal authority suggesting that a
party cannot familiarize an expert with the local standard of care after a motion for
summary judgment has been filed. Especially, like here, where the issue was raised for
the first time by the Defendants in the motion for summary judgment. Again, this case
does not involve the manufacturing of evidence which the "sham affidavit" was designed
to exclude. We do not have an eye witness first testifying the light was red and later
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testifying the light was green. Furthermore, consistent with Boise Tower, supra, the
difference in testimony has been adequately explained by Dr. Tamai. As she states in her
affidavit, the difference is derived from her effort to familiarize herself with the local
standard of care by consulting with a local professional in her same field.
A recent ninth circuit opinion discusses the need for restraint when applying the
"sham affidavit" rule. See Van Asdale v. International Game Technology, 577 F.3d 989
(91h Cir. 2009). In Van Asdale, the court fluently described the concern surrounding the
over application of the "sham affidavit" doctrine:
The Supreme Court has explained that "[s]ummary
judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a
disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part
of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to
secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action." Ceiolex Corp. v. Calrel/, 477 U.S. 317,327,
106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Some form of the
sham affidavit rule is necessary to maintain this principle.
This is because, as we have explained, "if a party who has
been examined at length on deposition could raise an issue
of fact simply by submitting an affidavit contradicting his
own prior testimony, this would greatly diminish the utility
of summary judgment as a procedure for screening out
sham issues of fact." Kennedy, 952 F.2d at 266 (quoting
Foster v. Arcata ASSOCi., 772 F.2d 1453, 1462 (9 1h Cir.
1985».
At the same time, however, it must be recognized that the
sham affidavit rule is in tension with the principle that a
court's role in deciding a summary judgment motion is 110t
to make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting
evidence. Aggressive invocation of the rule also threatens
to ensnare parties who may have simply been confused
during their deposition testimony and may encourage
gamesmanship by opposing attorneys. We have thus
recognized that the sham affidavit rule "should be applied
with caution." Sch. Disl. No. 1J v. ACcmdS, Inc., 5 F.3d
1255, 1264 (91h Cir. 1993); see also Nelson v. City of Davis,
571 F.3d 924 (9 1h Cir. 2009).
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1d at 999 (emphasis added). The above warnings apply with additional force to the

testimony of expert witnesses. Unlike lay witnesses, experts do not testify from personal
knowledge based upon a fixed set of historical facts. Experts testify in the form of
hypotheticals, often times from a presumed set of facts. Again, such is the case here.
For these reasons, the Court should not have struck the Tamai affidavit from the
summary judgment record.
B.

An Expert Witness is Permitted if not Expected to mal(e Factual
Assumptions when Rendering Opinions.

Defendants also claim Dr. Tarnai has been inconsistent in rendering opinions on
whether Defendant Dr. Main "actually performed a cervical adjustment to Plaintiff on
June 4, 2007 or if Dr. Main had merely performed a range of movement test as reflected
in Dr. Main's chart notes." See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Strike
the A,ffidavil of Sarah Tarnai, D.C., p. 10. However, as Dr. Tamai explained during her

deposition, it is not so much that she has been inconsistent on this point, but more so that
the record is in conflict on this point. On several occasions during the course of her
deposition, Dr. Tamai made note of the conflict in the record between Arregui's
description of the treatment provided compared to Defendant Dr. Main's description of
the treatment provided. See Tama; Depo. Tr., p. 27, Ll. 10-24; p. 34. Ll. 18 - p. 35, Ll. 6;
pp. 159 - 161. When Dr. Tamai presumes a cervical rotational adjustment was done, she

has consistently opined that this would be unreasonable and imprudent or contraindicated
or in breach of the standard of care. See Tarnai Depo. Tr., p. 16/. Ll. 10 - p. 162, Ll. 1;
see also Affidavit of Sarah Tarnai, D. C.

,,7; see also Dr. Tarnai's October 15, 2010,

written reporl, second 10 last paragraph.
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In situations such as this one here, an expert is pennitted if not expected to make
factual presumptions when testifying. In Evans v. Cavanagh, 58 Idaho 324, 327, 73 P.2d
83, 86 (1937), the Idaho Supreme Court succinctly addressed the role of the expert when
faced with conflicting evidence:
The testimony of an expert as to his opinion is not evidence
of a fact in dispute, but is advisory, only, to assist the triers
of fact to understand and apply the testimony of other
witnesses. Its value depends on, among other things, the
expert confining himself in his testimony to the facts
incorporated in the question propounded to him, and if he
does not assume these facts to be true and base his answer
on them, his testimony is worthless and should be rejected.
It is for the triers of fact to determine whether the evidence
on which the expert bases his opinion is true or not. It is
not for the expe11 to assume the responsibility of
detennining the truth or falsity-the reliability or
unreliability, of the testimony of other witnesses. For this
reason he should not be asked to base his opinion on the
testimony of other witnesses which he has heard, but the
facts which that testimony tends to establish, and which is
relied on by the party propounding the question, should be
hypothetically stated, and the testimony of the expert
should be responsive to that question, and it is his duty to
assume those facts to be true.
Citing Cochran v. Gritman, 34 Idaho 654, 203 P. 289. Thus, to the extent Dr. Tamai's

testimony in relation to whether Defendant Dr. Main simply tested An-cgui's range of
motion or performed a cervical adjustment is inconsistent, it is adequately explained on
the basis that in one instance Dr. Tamai presumes Arregui's version is true and in other
instances presumes Defendant Dr. Main's version is true. This is the role of the expert.
As stated in the above quote, "It is not for the expert to assume the responsibility of
determining the truth or falsity ... of the testimony of other witnesses." Id In this case,
it is ultimately a question for the jury to determine whether the evidence on which Dr.

Tamai bases her opinion is true or not. lei
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Accordingly, when Dr. Tamai states in her affidavit that the, "prevailing standards
of care for chiropractors treating torticollis as presented by Martha Arregui in June 2007
would dictate that the chiropractor refrain from treating a patient in the manner described
by Plaintiff in this case." (Emphasis added).

The presumptions imbedded in this

aforementioned statement set the table for Dr. Tamai's relating opinion: "Defendant's
decision to apply a cervical adjustment to her patient was a breach of the prevailing
community standards of care in June 2007 in the Nampa-Caldwell area of Idaho." In
other words, when Dr. Tamai presumes the patient's version of treatment is accurate, she
likewise presumes Defendant Dr. Main made the decision to perform a cervical
adjustment. As Dr. Tamai confessed in her deposition, she does not know who is right doctor or patient - but it is 110t her job to make such a determination as that task belongs
to the jury. Based upon on the totality of circumstances and the evidence, it is thus for
the jury to determine whether or not Defendant Dr. Main performed a cervical
adjustment, and thereby violated the applicable standard of care.
For these additional reasons, the Court should not have struck the Tarnai affidavit
from the summary judgment record.

c.

Arregui has Lnid the Foundation Required under Idaho Code § 6·
1013 for Admitting the Testimony of Dr. Tarnai.

A propel' foundation has been laid for admitting the opinions of Dr. Tamai. In

Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 137 Idaho 160, 164, 45 P.3d 816, 820
(2002), the Idaho Supreme Court delineated the foundational elements under Idaho Code
§6-1013:
To do so, the plaintiff must offer evidence showing: (a) that
such opinion is actually held by the expert witness; (b) that
the expert can testify to the opinion with a reasonable
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degree of medical certainty; (c) that the expert witness
possesses professional knowledge and expertise; and (d)
that the expelt witness has actual knowledge of the
applicable community standard of care to which his expert
opinion testimony is addressed.
There truly can be no doubt that all of the four (4) elements from above have been
satisfied by AITegui. Arregui's expelt has testified that the opinions set forth in her
affidavit and in her October 15, 2010, written report are held to a reasonable degree of
medical probability. See Affidavit of Sarah Tamai, D. c.,

~5.

The Defendants have not

attacked Dr. Tamai's expert on the basis that she lacks professional knowledge and
expeltise. Nonetheless, the testimony of Dr. Tamai contained in her affidavit which
incorporates her curriculum vitae as Exhibit "A", together with her professional
background described in her deposition more than adequately establishes that Dr. Tamai
carries the requisite professional knowledge and expertise to render the opinions she has
in this case. Finally, the record establishes Arregui's expert has familiarized herself with
the operative community staildard of care by following the procedure outlined in Idaho
Code § 6-1013, and thereby has acquired "actual knowledge" of the local standard of
care.
Since a proper foundation exists for admitting the testimony of Dr. Tanlai, her
affidavit should not have been struck from the summary judgment record.
D.

Arrcgui Alternatively Contends Idaho Code §§ 6-1012/6-1013 do not
Apply to Claims brought against Chiropractic Physicians.

Arregui conceded only for the purposes of summary judgment to the application
of Idaho Code §§ 6-1012/6-1013.

See Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants'

Motion for Summmy Judgment, p. 2. For purposes of her motion for reconsideration,

Arregui no longer makes any such concessions. Instead, Arregui takes the alternative
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position that the above sections do not apply to claims brought against chiropractic
physicians. This seems to be a matter of first impression as no reported case speaks to
the application of the above provisions to claims against chiropractic physicians. Worth
noting as a starting point for the analysis is the fact the language of the statute does not
expressly enumerate "chiropractic physicians" as being subject to its provisions:
In any case, claim or action for damages due to injury to or
death of any person, brought against any physician or
surgeon or other provider of health care, including, without
limitation, any dentist, physicians' assistant, nurse
practitioner, physical therapist, hospital or nursing home ..
. on the account of the provision of or failure to provide
health care ....
Thus, the above statutory reference to "any physician" applies to those physicians
meeting the definition stated in the Medical Practice Act. See Idaho Code § 54-1801 et
seq.

Under the Medical Practice Act, the tenu physician means: "[A]ny person who

holds a license to practice medicine and surgery, osteopathic medicine and surgery, or
osteopathic medicine, provided further, that others authorized by law to practice any of
the healing arts shall not be considered physicians for the purposes of this act." See
Idaho Code § 54-IB03(3)(emphasis added).

Interestingly, under the Chiropractic

Practice Act, the legislature defined the term physician to mean: "[AJny person who
holds a license to practice chiropractic; provided further, that others authorized by law to
use the term "physician" shall not be considered physicians for the purpose of this
chapter." See Idaho Code § 54-703(3) (emphasis added). This Act further provides,
"Chiropractic practice, as herein defined is hereby declared not to be the practice of
medicine within the meaning of the laws of the state of Idaho defining the same, and
physicians licensed pursuant to this chapter shall not be subject to the provisions of
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chapter 18, title 54, Idaho Code, nor liable to any prosecution thereunder, when acting
within the scope of practice as defined in this chapter." (Emphasis added).
When viewing Idaho Code §§ 6-1012/6-1013 in the context of the other relevant
statutory provisions and definitions referenced above, it is clear the legislature intended
only for those physicians licensed to practice medicine in the state of Idaho to reap the
benefits and protections of Idaho Code §§ 6-1012/6-1013. Since the term physician
carries different and distinct meanings under Idaho law the legislature could not have
intended to include more than one class of physician in Idaho Code §§ 6-1012/6-1013. In
the overall context of the relevant statutory provisions, the legislature must have intended
for medical physicians and not chiropractic physicians to be included under the Medical
Malpractice Act. In other words, the use of the tenTI "any physician" in Idaho Code § 61012 means any physician falling under the purview of Idaho Code § 6-1001 which
establishes the prelitigation hearing panel for claims against physicians subject to the
Idaho state board of medicine. From the above definitions, chiropractic physicians do not
practice medicine within the meaning of the laws of the state of Idaho, and are not subject
to the Idaho state board of medicine.
For these additional reasons, the Court should reconsider its grant of the
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Arregui respectfully asks this Court to reconsider its
grant of the motion to strike and the motion for summary judgment. Arregui further asks
this Court to reschedule her case for jury trial.
DATED: This

1. .'5day of December, 2010.
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Sam Johnson
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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I CERTIFY that on December 15, 20] 0, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to be:
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IJ CM/ECF Electronic Filing
IJ transmitted fax machine
to: (208) 3] 9-260 I

Richard H. Greener
Greener, Burke & Shoemaker, P.A.
The Banner Bank Building
950 W. Bannock St., Ste. 900
Boise, ID 83702
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Attorneys for Defendants Rosalinda Gallegos-Main
and Full Life Chiropractic, P.A.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
MARTHA A. ARREGUI,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV 09-3450

v.
ROSALINDA GALLEGOS-MAIN, an
individual; FULL LIFE CHIROPRACTIC,
P.A., an Idaho professional association; and
John and Jane Does I through X, whose true
identities are unknown,

DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

Defendants.
Defendants Rosalinda Gallegos-Main ("Dr. Main") and Full Life Chiropractic, P.A.
(collectively hereinafter "Defendants"), by and through their counsel of record, Greener Burke
Shoemaker P.A., respectfully submit the following Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Plaintiff.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are undisputed and specifically relevant to the Plaintiffs motion for
reconsideration. Plaintiff filed her Complaint on March 31, 2009, alleging that Dr. Main "owed
Plaintiff a duty to medically treat Plaintiff in a competent and non-negligent manner, and in
conformance with the applicable community standard of chiropractic care" but "failed to meet the
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applicable community standard of chiropractic care ...." (Complaint at "7-8.) In her expert
disclosures of August 16,2010, Plaintiff disclosed that Sarah Tamai, DC of Oceanside, California
would testify as to "whether the Defendant Dr. Gallegos-Main met the standard of skill and care
ordinarily exercised by chiropractic physicians in similar setting and in like circumstances. Dr.
Tamai's testimony will include her opinion that the Defendant Dr. Gallegos-Main failed to meet
the standard of healthcare practice when treating Plaintiff on or about June 4, 2007." (See
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Sarah Tamai,
D.C., filed on November 16, 2010 ("Aff. of Counsel") at , 2 and Ex. A.).

In Defendants'

subsequent expert disclosures of September 30, 2010, they disclosed that Robert Ward III, DC
would testify to "the standard of care for the practice of chiropractic medicine in Idaho at the time
in question." (See Aff. of Counsel at' 3 and Ex. B.)
On Friday, October 15,2010 Plaintiff produced an expert report from Dr. Tamai detailing
her opinions.

On Tuesday, October 19th Defendants took the deposition of Dr. Tamai in

Oceanside, California. During her deposition, Dr. Tamai admitted she had no knowledge of the
relevant standard of care in Idaho or specifically Nampa/Caldwell, Idaho and then she stated that
she did not have any additional opinions and would not be doing any additional work. (See Aff. of
Counsel at, 4 and Ex. Cat 132:10-19 and 152:16-22.)
On Tuesday, October 26th Defendants filed and timely served their Motion for Summary
Judgment, accompanied by the appropriate briefing, affidavit, and notice of hearing (collectively
hereinafter "Defendants' MSJ").

Defendants' MSJ was scheduled for hearing on Tuesday,

November 23,2010 at 9:00 am. Defendants' MSJ sought summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims
due to Plaintiff's failure to meet the requirements of I.C. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 in failing to
provide direct expert testimony as to the local community standard of care.
On Wednesday, November 10th one day beyond the deadline to file and serve any
opposition brief, counsel for Plaintiff provided an untimely "courtesy copy" of Plaintiff s
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opposition brief. The "courtesy copy" was not signed nor was it filed with the Court. On Friday,
November 12th three days beyond the deadline to do so, Plaintiff filed and served her untimely
Opposition to Defendants' MSJ along with an untimely Affidavit of Sarah Tarnai, D.C. ("Tarnai
Affidavit"). Plaintiff opposed Defendants' MSJ by arguing that the applicable expert testimony
required by I.C. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 is contained in the Tarnai Affidavit.
On November 16th, Defendants filed their Motion to Strike the Tarnai Affidavit ("Motion
to Strike") because (1) the Tarnai Affidavit was untimely filed pursuant to IRCP 56(c); (2) was a
sharn affidavit that directly contradicted Dr. Tarnai's deposition testimony, and (3) lacked proper
foundation to be admissible. Plaintiff did not file an opposition to the Motion to Strike.
On November 23 rd, the Court heard argument on Defendants' MSJ and Motion to Strike.
After arguments, the Court issued its oral ruling:
I conclude that the affidavit was not filed timely and that there was no request
for shortening of time. I further conclude that the affidavit clearly contradicts the
prior deposition testimony and that it was clear that at that time, Dr. Tarnai was
not aware of the local standard of care in this community.
Pursuant to Rule 56(c), the opposing affidavit was not timely filed and clearly
contradicts prior testimony. As a result, I arn going to grant the motion to strike
the affidavit, which leaves the remaining issue, then, of summary judgment. ....
And, of course, I cite to Idaho Code Section 6-1012 and 6-1013. 6-1012
clearly provides that as an essential part of the plaintiff's case in chief, they
affirmatively prove by direct expert testimony and by a preponderance of all the
competent evidence that such defendant, then and there negligently failed to meet
the applicable standard of health care practice ....
. . . [T]he evidence in this case indicates that that affidavit contradicts prior
opinions of Dr. Tarnai from a deposition previously held, and that until the filing
of that untimely affidavit, she was not farniliar with the local standard of care.
As a result, I find that summary judgment is appropriately granted in this case
as there is no issue -- genuine issue of material fact
(See Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, filed

concurrently ("2nd Aff. of Counsel"), Ex. A, 36: 17-39:22).
On November 24th, the Court correctly issued an Order Granting Defendants' Motion to
Strike and Defendants' MSJ.

On December 2nd, the Court entered Final Judgment which

dismissed Plaintiff s Complaint in its entirety with Rr~udice. On December 3rd, Plaintiff filed her
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Motion for Reconsideration asking the Court to reconsider its Order granting the Motion to Strike
and, "as a corollary," the Court's Order granting Defendants' MSJ.
On December 15th, Plaintiff filed her Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration ("Memorandum"). This Memorandum repeats several arguments raised in prior
briefing and unsuccessfully argued at the November 23rd hearing: namely 1) that the sham
affidavit doctrine should not apply to preclude this type of expert affidavit testimony; and 2) that
the Tamai Affidavit had sufficient facts to lay a foundation for Dr. Tamai's expert knowledge of
the local community standard of care. The Memorandum also raised two new arguments: 1) that
Plaintiff was blindsided by the Defendants' assertion of the applicability of I. C. §§ 6-1012 and 61013; and 2) that 1. C. § 6-1012 does not apply to chiropractor malpractice cases. Each of these
arguments is incorrect and contrary to the law as will be detailed below.

II. LEGAL STANDARD
Plaintiffs motion is brought pursuant to IRCP II(a)(2)(B). This rule provides for a review
of interlocutory orders, not final judgments. Plaintiff has invoked the wrong rule. Plaintiff did not
file her Motion for Reconsideration until December 3, 2010, a day after the Court had entered
Final Judgment. Thus, Plaintiffs request for reconsideration must be brought pursuant to IRCP
59(e). See, e.g., Noreen v. Price Development Co. Ltd Partnership, 135 Idaho 816, 820,25 P.3d
129, 133 (Ct. App. 2001) ("The question whether it is Rule II(a)(2)(B) or Rule 59(e) that applies
here is resolved by our Supreme Court's decision in Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. David Steed &
Assoc., Inc., . . . . Thus, Steed establishes that until entry of a final judgment or a Rule 54(b)
certificate, an order for summary judgment must be considered interlocutory and subject to
reconsideration under I.R.C.P. II(a)(2)(B)." (Emphasis added».
The decision to grant or deny a motion to reconsider, under either Rule II(a)(2)(B) or Rule
59(e), rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. The purpose of a motion for
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reconsideration is to allow the trial court to correct errors that occurred in its proceedings that
would otherwise necessitate appeal. The moving party has the burden of clearly establishing a
manifest error of law or fact and the standard for granting such a motion is strict "in order to
dissuade repetitive arguments on issues that have already been considered fully by the Court.
Granting such a motion means that a court must find that it overlooked matters or controlling
decisions which, if it had considered such issues, would have mandated a different result." Eisert
v. Town of Hempstead, 918 F. Supp. 601,606 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (citations and quotations omitted).
Plaintiff is unable to show a manifest error of law or fact.
Rearguing old issues or raising issues that should have been raised prior to final judgment
is not a valid basis for a reconsideration motion. See Wilderness Society v. U.S. Forest Service,
2009 WL 1033711, *2 (D. Idaho 2009) ("Where Rule 59(e) motions are merely being pursued as a
means to reargue matters already argued and disposed of and to put forward additional arguments
which [the party] could have made but neglected to make before judgment, [S]uch motions are not
properly classifiable as being motions under Rule 59(e) and must therefore be dismissed.")
(Quotation omitted); Rhoades v. Arave, 2007 WL 2344923, *1 (D. Idaho 2007) ("... Rule [59(e)]
offers an 'extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation
of judicial resources.' Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003). A losing party
cannot use a Rule 59(e) motion to relitigate old matters or to raise arguments that could have been
raised before the entry of judgment.").
In the Memorandum, Plaintiff is impermissibly rearguing issues that were rejected by the
Court, and Plaintiff has not provided any arguments to suggest the Court "overlooked matters or
controlling decisions." In addition, Plaintiff is now raising a new issue of law that should have
been raised prior to final judgment and accordingly can no longer be considered under Rule 59(e).
Plaintiff s sole recourse is to pursue an appeal if Plaintiff believes the issues were wrongly
decided.
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III. ARGUMENT
The Court correctly granted the Motion to Strike and Defendants' MSJ. Rather than bring
an appeal of the final judgment, Plaintiff raises old or previously conceded arguments.

As

discussed below the Court should deny Plaintiff s Motion for Reconsideration.

A.

Plaintiff Could Not Have Been Blindsided By the Local Community Standard Issue.
In her Memorandum, Plaintiff repeatedly attempts to convince the Court that she was

somehow not given proper notice of the local community standard of care issue. For example,
Plaintiff argues, incorrectly, that the Answer "did not defend on the grounds that Plaintiff had to
comply with the statutory mandates set forth in I.C. §§ 6-1012/6-1013." Plaintiff then points out
several times that Defendants argued I.C. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 "for the first time" in their
summary judgment motion. (See Memorandum at pp. 2 and 3.) Plaintiff hopes to convince the
Court that it was excusable that her standard of care expert was not prepared to testify regarding
the appropriate local standard of care.
The simple fact is that Defendants could not have known that Plaintiff would utterly fail to
comply with the statutory requirements regarding standard of care prior to taking the deposition of
Dr. Tamai. Defendants are unclear at what earlier point they had any obligation to assert this
defense.
Plaintiff cannot legitimately argue that she was blindsided by the I.C. §§ 6-1012 and 61013 issues. The record shows that Plaintiff's own complaint alleged a "duty to medically treat
Plaintiff in a competent and non-negligent manner, and in conformance with the applicable
community standard of chiropractic care" and "Defendants fail[ure] to meet the applicable
community standard of chiropractic care." (Complaint at" 7-8 (emphasis added).) Defendants,

in paragraph six of their Answer, specifically denied that they breached the community standard of
chiropractic care, and that denial put Plaintiff on notice that she would have to prove that element
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of her case. See, e.g., F.T.c. v. Ameritel Payphone Distributors, Inc., 2000 WL 35593261, *2-3
(S.D. Fla. 2000) ("The denial of allegations in a complaint relating to an intrinsic element of
plaintiffs claim is sufficient to put those matters in issue and therefore pleading by way of
affirmative defense is unnecessary.")(citing Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §
1271 (1998).)
In addition, the expert disclosures from both Plaintiff and Defendants made reference to the
lssue.

Plaintiff's disclosure of Dr. Tarnai stated she would testify regarding "whether the

Defendant Dr. Gallegos-Main met the standard of skill and care ordinarily exercised by
chiropractic physicians in similar setting and in like circumstances." (See Plaintiff's Expert
Disclosures filed August 16, 2010 @ p. 2 (emphasis added).) The Defendants' standard of care
expert's disclosure stated that he would testify to "the standard of care for the practice of
chiropractic medicine in Idaho at the time in question." (Emphasis added.)
More importantly, it is clearly irrelevant whether the Defendants had ever raised this issue
in any pleading or otherwise. The statute makes clear that evidence of the local community
standard of care is a requirement of the Plaintiff's prima facie case. The Plaintiff is required to
prove her own case and the Defendants are not required to plead an affirmative defense that
addresses the Plaintiff's prima facie case. See, e.g., Sanden v. Mayo Clinic,495 F.2d 221, 224 (8th
Cir.1974) ('''[I]fthe defense involved is one that merely negates an element of the plaintiff's prima
facie case . . . it is not truly an affirmative defense and need not be pleaded despite rule
8(c).''')(quoting 2A J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice §8.27(2), at 1843 (2d ed. 1974»; Sprague
v. Sumitomo Forestry Co., Ltd, 709 P.2d 1200, 1203-04 (Wash. 1985) ("It would follow,
therefore, that if notice of intent to resell is part pf the seller's prima facie case, then lack of such
notice would not have to be affirmatively denied.").
Plaintiff is required to be aware of the elements of her own case and there is no legal
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requirement that Defendants provide any specific notice to Plaintiff regarding Plaintiff s burden to
establish her own prima facie case. Everyone is presumed and required to know the law.

B.

A Chiropractor Is a "Provider of Health Care" and Chiropractor Malpractice Cases
Require Local Community Standard of Care Testimony, Pursuant to I.C. §§ 6-1012,
6-1013 and Idaho Case Law.
Throughout the briefmg regarding Defendants' MSJ, Plaintiff conceded that I. C. §§ 6-1012

and 6-1013 are applicable to chiropractors. Plaintiff now is taking a contrary position arguing that
chiropractors should be treated differently than all other health care providers.

As an initial

matter, this new legal argument is not properly raised after final judgment has already been
granted. See Rhoades, 2007 WL 2344923 at

*1 (D.

Idaho 2007) ("A losing party cannot use a

Rule 59(e) motion to relitigate old matters or to raise arguments that could have been raised before
the entry of judgment."); see also First Sec. Bank of Idaho, N.A. v. Webster, 119 Idaho 262, 266,
805 P.2d 468, 472 (Idaho,1991) ("Consideration ofI.R.C.P. 59(e) motions must be directed to the

status of the case as it existed when the court rendered the decision upon which the judgment is
based." (Emphasis added).) On that basis alone, the argument is untimely and should not be
considered.
In addition, Plaintiff was correct in conceding the issue. As discussed more fully below,
pursuant to a plain language interpretation of the statute and pursuant to Idaho case law,
chiropractors clearly are health providers and fall within the catch all provision ofI.C. § 6-1012.
The Idaho Courts have not ruled

~pecifically

on the applicability of I.C. § 6-1012 to

chiropractors. However, the logic for application of this statute to chiropractic physicians is clear.
The plain and unambiguous language ofI.C. § 6-1012 requires that the Plaintiff "[i]n any case...for
damages due to injury ... brought against any physician and surgeon or other provider of health
care ... on account of the provision of or failure to provide health care ... plaintiff must ...
affirmatively prove by direct expert testimony ...that such defendant ... failed to meet the
applicable standard of health care practice of the community in which such care ... was or should
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have been provided. . ." (Emphasis added.) So, the issue, as raised by Plaintiff, is whether a
chiropractor should fall within the catchall category of "other provider of health care."
Although ignored in Plaintiff s briefing, Idaho has a case on point that provides a simple
test for detennining whether various professions would fit within the definition of a "provider of
health care" pursuantto I.C. § 6-1012. In Jones v. Crawforth, 147 Idaho 11,205 P.3d 660 (2009),
the Idaho Supreme Court found that a cell saver technician fit within the health care providers that
are protected by I.C. § 6-1012. The Court found it irrelevant that the cell saver technician did not
fit within the specific statutory definitions of the various health care professions listed in I.C. § 61012. Instead, the Court noted:
The plain language of I.C. § 6-1012 makes the statute applicable to actions
'brought against any physician and surgeon or other provider of health care,
including, without limitation, any dentist, .... on account of the provision of or
failure to provide health care or on account of any matter incidental or related
thereto ... .'(Emphasis added). Respondents argue that the plain language of the
statute indicates an intent to be extremely broad in scope through its application to
any case brought against any "other provider of healthcare," and the inclusion of
the words "without limitation" to the list of other providers. We find this
argument to be a valid interpretation of the plain meaning of I.C. § 6-1012.
Therefore, Kurtz, as a cell saver technician with an important role in the surgery
of Ms. Jones, was a health care provider within the scope ofI.C. § 6-1012.

Crawforth, 147 Idaho at 15,205 P.3d. at 664 (citations omitted). The Court went on to explain:
Furthennore, this Court in Hough v. Fry, 131 Idaho 230, 233, 953 P.2d 980, 983
(1998), stated that "by its plain and unambiguous language, [I.C. § 6-1012]
applies when the damages complained of result from providing or failing to
provide health care. Thus, to detennine if I. C. § 6-1012 applies, courts need only
look to see if the injury occurred on account of the provision of or failure to
provide health care." (Emphasis added). While there was not a question in Hough
as to whether someone was a health care provider within the meaning of the
statute, the test provided in that case is useful in analyzing B & B' s arguments.
Ms. Jones's injury did occur on account of the provision of or failure to provide
health care by Kurtz. Kurtz's role in the operating room was to gather, clean, and
deliver the blood of the patient lost during the surgery into the reinfusion bag, and
she was specifically trained as to the dangers of placing a pressure device on a
reinfusion bag and of her responsibility to warn the doctor of the dangers.
Therefore, Kurtz was providing, or failing to provide, health care at the time of
Ms. Jones's death.
Jd at 16.
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The same analysis applies in this case and the same result should be reached as in
Crawforth. Although a chiropractor is not specifically listed in I.C. § 6-1012, that statute is

intended ''to be extremely broad in scope" and, by its plain language, applies to much more than
just the specific listed health care professions. Id
There is no relevant distinction between the chiropractic health care providers and the other
health care providers listed in I.C. § 6-1012. In fact, Idaho statute, Title 54, has similar statutory
provisions for the licensing and regulating of chiropractors and all the other health care
professionals listed in I.C. § 6-1012: dentist (ch. 9), physicians' assistant (ch. 18), nurse
practitioner (ch. 14), registered nurse (ch. 14), licensed practical nurse (ch. 14), nurse anesthetist
(ch. 14), medical technologist, physical therapist (ch. 22), hospital or nursing home (ch. 16), and
chiropractor (ch. 7).
It is clear that a chiropractor is providing health care as contemplated by the statute.

Common sense and common knowledge of chiropractic care unquestionably supports the view that
chiropractors provide health care. In addition, the statutory definition of chiropractic care, as
found in Title 7 of the Chapter 54 (the "Chiropractic Practice Act"), provides:
(1) The "practice of chiropractic" means:
(a) To investigate, examine, and diagnose for any human disease, ailment,
injury, infirmity, deformity, or other condition; and
(b) To apply principles or techniques ofchiropractic practice as set forth in
section 54-704, Idaho Code, in the prevention or treatment of any of the
conditions listed in subsection (a) of this section; or
(c) To offer, undertake, attempt to do or hold oneself out as able to do any
of the acts prescribed in subsections (a) and (b) of this section.

(Emphasis added). Any claim of malpractice against a chiropractor based on ''the

prac~ice

[or

attempted practice] of chiropractic care" would certainly fit the test found in Crawforth and
Hough: ''to determine if I.C. § 6-1012 applies, courts need only look to see if the injury occurred

on account of the provision of or failure to provide health care." Crawforth, 147 Idaho at 16.
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In this case, Plaintiffs Complaint alleged that "Defendants failed to meet the applicable
community standard of chiropractic care." Plaintiff has claimed injury that "occurred on account
of the provision of or failure to provide health care," and a chiropractor is entitled to the
protections of I.C. § 6-1012. Since Plaintiff failed to provide the evidence required by I.C. § 61012, summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's complaint was properly granted.

C.

The Tamai Affidavit Was Untimely Filed Without Explanation.
The Court struck the Tarnai Affidavit for two independent reasons: "Pursuant to Rule

56(c), the opposing affidavit was not timely filed and clearly contradicts prior testimony...."

(See 2nd Aff. of Counsel, Ex. A, 36:24-37:1). In her Memorandum, Plaintiff fails to address the
untimeliness of the affidavit or the Court's ruling that it was untimely.
The Court correctly struck the untimely affidavit. A party seeking to oppose a motion for
summary judgment is required to serve opposing briefing and affidavits "at least 14 days prior to
the date of the hearing." I.R.C.P. 56(c). Additionally, this Court's Scheduling Order of September
29, 2009 specifically requires compliance with I.R.C.P. Rule 56(c). The hearing on Defendants'
MSJ was properly set with this Court for November 23,2010 and Notice was properly filed and
served via hand delivery on October 26th. Accordingly, Plaintiff's opposition and supporting
affidavit(s) were due to be filed and served no later than November 9th. Plaintiff, however, served
her opposition and supporting affidavit from Dr. Tarnai at 4:29 p.m. on Friday, November 12th.
The motion to strike was properly granted based on the prejudice caused when the affidavit
was filed several days too late, leaving Defendants prejudiced in its ability to respond "The rule
requires the adverse party, if it chooses, to respond with an opposing brief and affidavits no less
than fourteen days prior to the hearing. Again, the purpose is to give the moving party an adequate
opportunity to respond." Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc. v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, 133 Idaho 1,
6,981 P.2d 236 (1999) (striking affidavit as untimely filed).
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Plaintiff has never provided the Court with an explanation for the late affidavit, has never
filed any briefing in opposition to the motion to strike, did not address the issue at the summary
judgment hearing, and still has not addressed the issue in her reconsideration Memorandum.
Defendants have abided by the notice and briefmg requirements of IRCP 56. Plaintiff plainly
violated the requirements of both IRCP 56 and this Court's scheduling order. Accordingly the
Tamai Affidavit was properly stricken as untimely.

D.

The Sham Affidavit Doctrine Was Properly Applied to Preclude Affidavit Testimony
Contradicting Deposition Testimony Without Adequate Explanation.
Defendants fully briefed the sham affidavit issue prior to the summary judgment hearing.

In it's ruling, the Court first noted that decisions regarding the admissibility of an affidavit are not
governed by the summary judgment standards that give deference to the non-moving party. See
Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 137 Idaho 160, 163,45 P.3d 816, 819 (2002)

("The liberal construction and reasonable inferences standard does not apply, however, when
deciding whether or not testimony offered in connection with a motion for summary judgment is
admissible.

The trial court must look at the witness' affidavit or deposition testimony and

determine whether it alleges facts which, if taken as true, would render the testimony of that
witness admissible.") (Citations omitted). The Court then concluded that the affidavit should be
stricken based on the sham affidavit doctrine:
The defendant further argues that this is a sham affidavit -- and that is the term
that has been used in the case law -- because it contradicts Dr. Tamai's deposition
testimony and was merely presented today to prevent summary judgment.
Boise Tower versus Washington ... addresses the issue of sham affidavits in
the Ninth Circuit. . . . "The 'sham affidavit' doctrine prevents the use of
manufactured testimony as a means of creating an issue of fact to get past
summary judgment. Courts have held with virtual unanimity that a party cannot
create a genuine issue of fact sufficient to survive summary judgment simply by
contradicting his or her own previous sworn testimony by, say, filing a later
affidavit that flatly contradicts the party's earlier sworn deposition without
explaining the contradiction or attempting to resolve the disparity. The general
rule in the Ninth Circuit is that a party cannot create an issue of fact by an
affidavit contradicting prior deposition testimony."
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. . . I further conclude that the affidavit clearly contradicts the prior
deposition testimony and that it was clear that at that time, Dr. Tamai was not
aware of the local standard of care in this community.
Pursuant to Rule 56(c), the opposing affidavit . . . clearly contradicts prior
testimony. As a result, I am going to grant the motion to strike the affidavit ....
(See 2nd Aff. of Counsel, Ex. A at 35:20-37:3 (emphasis added).)

1. The Sham Affidavit Doctrine Applies To Experts Who Change Their Testimony.
In her Memorandum, Plaintiff repeats the arguments raised during the summary judgment
hearing which were previously rejected by the Court. Plaintiff also cannot deny:
•
•
•
•

that Dr. Tamai's deposition testimony clearly states that she had no knowledge of the local
community standard of care;
that the Tamai Affidavit contradicted Dr. Tamai's deposition testimony regarding the key
issue of local community standard of care;
that this contradiction was created in order to prevent summary judgment; and
that Dr. Tamai was not confused during her deposition and her testimony is not being
taken out of context.
Plaintiff's sole argument is that the sham affidavit rule does not apply to expert witnesses,

i. e. clear contradictions and changed testimony from an expert is allowed because experts are

allowed to update their testimony at any time. However, many courts have applied the sham
affidavit doctrine to expert testimony. See, e.g., Rohrbaugh v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 916 F.2d 970,
976 (4th Cir. 1990) ("Given the conflicts between [the expert's] affidavit and his deposition
testimony, the district court was left not with a genuine issue of material fact, but with trying to
determine which of several conflicting versions of [his] testimony was correct .... [T]he district
court was justified in disregarding the affidavit."); Adelman-Tremblay v. Jewel Cos., 859 F.2d 517,
521 (7th Cir. 1988) ("We can think of no reason ... not to apply [the sham affidavit] rule to [a] case
involving the testimony and affidavit of [an] expert witness."); Magoffe v. JLG Industries, Inc.,
2008 WL 2967653, 24-30 (D.N.M. 2008) ("[The expert] was cross-examined extensively
regarding all of these topics at his deposition. He had access to the pertinent evidence at the time
of his earlier deposition testimony and was acting under a subpoena which directed him to bring
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that evidence to the deposition. Finally, his earlier deposition testimony does not reflect confusion
which calls for clarification in his subsequent affidavit. Far from expressing confusion, doubt, or
uncertainty about his testimony or the completeness of his expert reports, Dr. Proctor plainly stated
during his deposition that 'there wouldn't be any other changes. The changes expressed in his
subsequent affidavit did not arise until Plaintiffs' response to Defendant JLG's motion for summary
jUdgment became due, thereby creating the need to manufacture a "sham fact issue" . . . .
Accordingly, Dr. Proctor's affidavit meets all the criteria for exclusion under the "sham affidavit"
rule .... "); Lescs v. Dow Chem. Co., 976 F. Supp. 393, 398 n.2 (W.D. Va. 1997) ("To the extent
that Plaintiff seeks to rely on [the expert's] affidavit ... the court finds this affidavit to be
inconsistent with his prior deposition testimony; accordingly, the court will disregard the
affidavit."); Harris Teeter, Inc. v. Moore & Van Allen, PLLC, 701 S.E.2d 742, 749-50 (S.C. 2010)
("Even if we were to accept [Plaintiff's] argument that [the two experts] were qualified to render
an expert opinion, we agree with the trial court that their deposition testimony failed to present
evidence of a breach of the standard of care or a genuine issue of material fact regarding proximate
cause. [Plaintiff] apparently recognized the clear insufficiency of the [experts'] testimony, for it
submitted post-deposition affidavits in an attempt to rescue its malpractice claims. The trial court
properly characterized these post-deposition affidavits as 'sham' affidavits.").
As discussed in the above case law, the same basic principles of the sham affidavit rule
apply with an expert.

Permitting the admission of an affidavit that completely contradicts

deposition testimony is contrary to the law and patently unfair to the moving party on summary
judgment. An expert must provide adequate explanation of any contradictions. Here, the only
explanation provided is that the expert did not know the local community standard. However, the
expert's only effort to learn the local community standard occurred after providing clear and
unequivocal deposition testimony and after Defendants properly brought a summary judgment
motion that Plaintiff's could not oppose without changing the expert's testimony.
DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFPs(}IJfidN1oR RECONSIDERATION -14

This is not a mere supplementation based on newly discovered evidence; the expert did not
become aware of new evidence that was not already available. This is a complete contradiction
based on evidence that the expert failed to gather prior to her deposition. In this case, Defendants
proceeded with an expert deposition in California more than two months after the expert was
disclosed, at Defendants expense, and Defendants are entitled to rely upon the deposition
testimony. Defendants incurred great expense in bringing a valid summary judgment motion
based on the clear, unequivocal statements of Plaintiffs expert. Plaintiff should not be able to
avoid summary judgment by the tardy submission of an affidavit that purportedly touches on all
the necessary elements to prevent summary judgment in contradiction of the affiant's prior sworn
testimony. That affidavit cannot be used to cover up all the holes in Plaintiffs case that were
uncovered through the expert's deposition.

Dr. Tamai's new affidavit testimony is a sham

affidavit and should be stricken as a matter oflaw.
2. The Tamai Affidavit Contains Two Additional Relevant Contradictions That
Demonstrate Its Status as a Sham Affidavit.
In addition to the issue of local community standard of care, Dr. Tamai's affidavit
contradicts her deposition testimony on both key issues of negligence that Plaintiff has raised.
These multiple key contradictions, plus the conclusory nature of many of the opinions in the
affidavit, clearly show the sham nature of the affidavit. The contradictions point out what often
happens when summary judgment threatens to end a case: lawyers draft an affidavit to fit the facts
they need, despite the fact that their witness has already testified to the contrary under crossexamination. The sham affidavit doctrine prevents this false/incorrect testimony from undermining
the efficacy of summary judgment.
Plaintiff s two negligence claims are most easily referred to as the "treatment" and "posttreatment" negligence claims. Plaintiff came to Dr. Main's chiropractic offices claiming pain in
her neck and back. Dr. Main treated Plaintiff(the extent of the treatment is a factual dispute that is
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irrelevant to this motion) and then Plaintiff went home. Plaintiff went to the hospital the next day
and within a few weeks was diagnosed with a stroke. Plaintiff claims Dr. Main was negligent in
the treatment that she alleges caused the stroke (the "treatment" negligence claim) and Plaintiff
claims Dr. Main was negligent in sending Plaintiff home after the treatment without some
additional medical evaluation or supervision l (the "post-treatment" negligence claim).
First, with regard to the post-treatment negligence claim, Dr. Tamai provided expert
testimony as to the standard of care for Dr. Main in allegedly sending Plaintiff home alone:
So I want to make sure I understand this. You are not going to express an
opinion in this case then that Dr. Gallegos-Main's failure to either drive or make
sure that the plaintiffwas driven home was a deviation from the standard ofcare?
Q.

A. I don't think that that is required; but, again, recommended
Q. And the second part of that. In your opinion was -- we know Dr. Main didn't

send Ms. Arregui to an emergency room or to any medical doctor. In your
opinion was her failure to do that under the circumstances a deviation of the
standard ofcare?
A. Was a deviation? No. I think as I understand your question.

(See Aff. of Counsel at , 4 and Ex. C at 132:20-134:24 (emphasis added).) In her affidavit,
however, Dr. Tamai is suddenly providing contradictory testimony, testimony that mimics what
Plaintiff had hoped Dr. Tamai would say: "The doctor also failed to call paramedics or other
emergency medical personnel or even to assist plaintiff, once plaintiff was experiencing symptoms
of stroke. Each of these amounted to a breach of the applicable standards of care ...." (Tamai
Aff., p.3, , 8.) That is a glaring contradiction that has never been explained and shows the sham
nature of Dr. Tamai's affidavit in opposition to summary judgment.
As to the treatment negligence claim, Dr. Tamai was asked, during her deposition, about

1 Dr. Main actually did send Plaintiff home with supervision because Plaintiff was accompanied to the chiropractic
offices by a friend and employee, Ms. Chavez, who drove the Plaintiff home after her brief treatment. The factual
dispute about who was with Plaintiff that evening aftera({027t~ irrelevant to this motion.
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her claim that Dr. Main's treatment of Plaintiffs neck and back was negligent:

In reading Martha Arregui's deposition transcript, the
portions that were provided to you, did it contain a description of a cervical
rotational adjustment?
A. She -- according to her deposition, she didn't know what it was. But she said
that her head -- she said her head was rotated from side to side when she was both
face down and face up. So I don't know . ...
Q.
Would the rotation of the head as described by Martha Arregui in her
deposition be consistent with a cervical rotational adjustment in chiropractic?
Q. [plaintiffs Counsel]

THE WITNESS: It's possible. It could also be the range of motion, but it's
possible it was an attempt to an adjustment as well.
Q. [Defendant's counsel] And then as we sit here today,you're unable toform an
opinion on whether or not there was actually an adjustment or it was a range of
motion test in the two instances that counsel discussed with you, correct?
A. Yes. Because there's conflicting statements in the depositions.

(See Aff. of Counsel at, 4 and Ex. C at 159:24-160:19; 163:16-21 (emphasis added).)
Dr. Tarnai's deposition testimony honestly recognizes the conflict in the testimony about
the treatment Dr. Main provided to Plaintiff. Dr. Tarnai admits that she does not know whether a
range of motion or a cervical adjustment was performed on Plaintiff. However, her affidavit
contradicts that admission and instead asserts that a cervical adjustment did unequivocally occur:
"Defendant's decision to apply a cervical adjustment to her patient was a breach of the prevailing
community standards of care in June 2007." (Tarnai Affidavit, p.2, at '7.)
Dr. Tarnai's affidavit contains three glaring contradictions and each contradiction goes to a
central issue of this case. These contradictions point out the sharn nature of her affidavit. The
Court correctly struck Dr. Tarnai's affidavit.

E.

The Tamai Affidavit Did Not Provide Sufficient Facts To Lay Foundation For Dr.
Tamai to Provide Expert Testimony About the Local Community Standard of Care.
At summary judgment, the Defendants also sought to strike Dr. Tarnai's affidavit based on

lack of foundation to offer opinions regarding the local community standard of care. The Court
struck Dr. Tarnai's affidavit without reaching this issue. Defendants renew their argument that this
is yet another, independent basis for striking the Tarnai Affidavit.
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As with the sham affidavit issue, challenges to the foundation and admissibility of an
affidavit are not governed by the summary judgment standards that give deference to the nonmoving party. See Dulaney, 137 Idaho at 163, 45 PJd at 819 ("The liberal construction and
reasonable inferences standard does not apply, however, when deciding whether or not testimony
offered in connection with a motion for summary judgment is admissible.").

The Dulaney

decision explains further the foundation for an expert opinion regarding local community standard
of care:
To avoid summary judgment for the defense in a medical malpractice case, the
plaintiff must offer expert testimony indicating that the defendant health care
provider negligently failed to meet the applicable standard of health care practice.
In order for such expert testimony to be admissible, the plaintiff must lay the
foundation required by Idaho Code § 6-1013. To do so, the plaintiff must offer
evidence showing: (a) that such opinion is actually held by the expert witness; (b)
that the expert witness can testify to the opinion with a reasonable degree of
medical certainty; (c) that the expert witness possesses professional knowledge and
expertise; and (d) that the expert witness has actual knowledge of the applicable
community standard of care to which his expert opinion testimony is addressed.
. . . The party offering such evidence must show that it is based upon the
witness' personal knowledge and that it sets forth facts as would be admissible in
evidence. The party offering the evidence must also affirmatively show that the
witness is competent to testify about the matters stated in his testimony. Statements
that are conclusory or speculative do not satisfy either the requirement of
admissibility or competency under Rule 56(e).
An expert testifying as to the standard of care in medical malpractice actions
must show that he or she is familiar with the standard of care for the particular
health care professional for the relevant community and time. The expert must also
state how he or she became familiar with that standard of care....

Dulaney, 137 Idaho at 164,45 PJd at 820 (citations omitted).
In this case, the only foundation to Dr. Tamai's opinions regarding the local community
standard of care are found in paragraph 3 of Dr. Tamai's affidavit, which in summary states that
she "educated [her]self' by speaking with a "local chiropractor" who indicated to her "that he was
familiar with the local standards of care for performing chiropractic procedures in Nampa and
Caldwell communities" and who confirmed that the "local standards of care... were .. .identical to
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the standards of care upon which [her] opinions in this case have been based ... " (See Tamai
Affidavit, p.2, at , 3.)
The foundational deficiencies in this paragraph are obvious. First, the consulting local
chiropractor is not even named and the affidavit does not mention the consulting chiropractor's
career work experience, education, or work experience in the Nampa/Caldwell area. The only
information provided about the consulting chiropractor is that he had a practice in June of 2007,
that he was licensed in Idaho at that time, and that he claimed to know the community standard of
care for the Nampa and Caldwell communities.
Conclusory statements are not sufficient to lay a foundation for the consulting expert's
expertise regarding the local community standard of care. The expert may claim to know the local
community standard of care but the affidavit must lay a foundation that supports that claim. The
affidavit contains nothing to support that claim. Merely having an active chiropractic license in
June 2007 is not sufficient to lay foundation for expert testimony about the local community
standard of care.
In addition, there is no foundation regarding this consulting chiropractor's familiarity with
the issues of negligence in this case. The consulting chiropractor does not even specifically
mention the standard of care opinions that he has been asked to confirm: namely the issues
surrounding alleged symptoms of a stroke and chiropractic treatment that includes an alleged
cervical adjustment. The consulting chiropractor does not explain his experience or education in
treating patients with symptoms like Plaintiff s symptoms. The consulting chiropractor does not
explain how he obtained his knowledge regarding the local community standard of care on these
issues. Without addressing these foundational issues, an out-of-state expert cannot ask the Court
to rely on the alleged expertise of the consulted local expert.
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Several Idaho cases involve similar situations: a medical malpractice case is dismissed on
summary judgment because the standard of care expert is out-of-state and does not properly lay a
foundation for testifying regarding the local community standard of care. One good example is the
Dulaney case previously cited. There, the Court found that that affidavit wasn't sufficient and

refused to reverse a district court's decision to grant summary judgment. In Dulaney, the affidavit
in question had many more facts than those provided in this case: the out of town expert was
relying upon an anonymous professor (the Court noted the anonymity but did not rule based on
that issue), and the professor said that he trained orthopedic physicians that presently practice in
Boise, that he'd maintained personal and professional relationships with the physicians in Boise,
and that he had taught and lectured in Boise. Despite the detailed affidavit in Dulaney the Court
still struck the affidavit and granted summary judgment because the affidavit did not relate all of
the consulting professor's experience to the time period in question.
In sum, Idaho Courts require sufficient foundation. The affidavit in this case provides
virtually no foundation and the foundation provided is clearly insufficient. Thus, the Court would
be correct in striking Dr. Tamai's affidavit on this alternate theory, not previously addressed.

IV. CONCLUSION
For all of the above reasons, Defendants respectfully request that this Court enter an order
denying Plaintiff s Motion for Reconsideration.
DATED THIS

J~y of December, 2011.

ren K. Messerly
Rosalinda Gallegos-Main
hkc~,ctic, P .A.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

MARTHA A. ARREGUI,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

Case No. CV-2009-3450

)
)

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT

ROSALINDA GALLEGOS-MAIN, an)
individual; FULL LIFE
)
CHIROPRATIC, P.A., an Idaho)
professional association;
)
and John and Jane Does I
)
through X, whose true
)
identities are unknown,
)
)

Defendants.

)
)

BEFORE
THE HONORABLE RENAE HOFF
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Third Judicial District
Canyon County
BE IT REMEMBERED that the above-entitled
action pending in the above-entitled court, came on
regularly for hearing at 10:45 a.m. on November 23,
2010, at the Canyon County Courthouse, Courtroom 3,
Caldwell, Idaho, before the HONORABLE RENAE HOFF,
District Judge.

COURT REPORTER:

Carole A. Bull, CSR #71

1
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APPEARANCES
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

JOHNSON

&

MONTELEONE, LLP

By: Sam Johnson
405 South 8th Street, Suite 250
Boise, Idaho 83702
FOR THE DEFENDANTS: GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER P. A.

By: Loren K. Messerly
950 West Bannock st., Suite 900
Boise, Idaho 83702
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1

CALDWELL, IDAHO, NOVEMBER 23, 2010, 10:45 A.M.

2
**********

3

4

THE COURT:

5

All right.

We're taking up

6

the last matter of the day, Martha Arregui versus

7

Rosalinda Gallegos, 2009-3450C.

8
9

This matter comes before me today on the
defendants' motion for summary judgment and to strike

10

the affidavit of Dr. Tarnai.

The plaintiffs had moved

11

for continuance, but it was my understanding that that

12

was going to be withdrawn.

13

Johnson?

Is that correct, Mr.

MR. JOHNSON:

14

Essentially, it is, your

15

Honor.

To the extent that it falls into play with

16

respect to the motion to strike for untimeliness, I

17

suppose it may be referenced, but we're not looking for

18

a ruling on it at this point.
THE COURT:

19
20

Okay.

Messerly; is that correct?

21

MR. MESSERLY:

22

THE COURT:

23

And then I have Mr.

Yes, your Honor.

All right, here on behalf of

the defendant.

24

This matter has been briefed, and I do

25

have the affidavit, obviously, that's at issue, and I

3
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1

have reviewed the documents and I'm ready to hear

2

argument at this time.

Mr. Messerly.

3

MR. MESSERLY:

4

Your Honor, I appreciate this

5

opportunity.

6

for you.

7

today.

8
9

Thank you, your Honor.

I know it's already been a long morning

I'll try and be brief with my arguments

To start, I guess I would start the
argument by saying I believe it's fair and accurate to

10

represent to the Court that plaintiff, in their

11

opposition brief, conceded the points that were raised

12

in the initial motion for summary judgment, namely,

13

that a chiropractor falls within the definition of a

14

health care provider under the Idaho statute 6-1012,

15

and there certainly isn't -- there doesn't appear to be

16

any dispute about that, that 6-1012 requires expert

17

testimony about local standards, local community of

18

experts, and third, that during deposition testimony,

19

the plaintiff's standard of care expert was unable to

20

provide any testimony regarding the local standard of

21

care for the area of Nampa/Caldwell for the time

22

period -- relevant time period, 2007.

23

And so that based on the record that had

24

been established through -- up to that point and

25

through the deposition that was taken of the

4
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1

plaintiff's standard of care expert, this case was ripe

2

for being dismissed on summary judgment.

3

believe all those points were conceded in the

4

opposition brief.

5

And so I

The opposition -- certainly, the

6

plaintiff can speak to that, but the opposition brief

7

then brought -- all of its arguments were based on this

8

new affidavit from Dr. Tarnai, who, again, had already

9

been deposed in this matter.

10

So then the question

I believe the

11

central issue is this motion to strike and whether this

12

affidavit testimony should be stricken or should be

13

allowed to prevent summary judgment.

14

And our arguments are based on basically

15

two arguments, your Honor.

There's a large amount of

16

case law regarding sham affidavits and affidavits that

17

contradict deposition testimony, and the second being

18

that there's also a number of cases, and two in

19

particular that I'm going to point the Court to, that

20

discuss when the local standard of care is not

21

sufficiently -- there's not sufficient foundation laid

22

for an expert testifying in the affidavit as to the

23

local standard of care, then that leaves the case ripe

24

for summary judgment in cases -- the case should be

25

dismissed on summary judgment for failure to provide

5
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1

sufficient foundation for an expert's testimony about

2

local standard of care, particularly an out-of-state

3

expert.

4

So speaking first to the sham affidavit,

5

your Honor, the cases -- we cited a number of cases,

6

and they uniformly note that the purpose of the sham

7

affidavit doctrine is to provide all movants with the

8

opportunity to use summary judgment as an effective way

9

to resolve the case.

And if parties are allowed to

10

prevent summary judgment merely by creating affidavits

11

through their attorneys that could directly contradict

12

testimony that was elicited through cross-examination

13

at deposition, then summary judgment becomes a

14

worthless avenue of resolving a case because all

15

non-movants would use that as a way to get out of what

16

they've said at deposition.

17

So in this case, that's what's happened.

18

As I noted earlier, this case was very much ripe for

19

summary judgment.

20

Dr. Main which we provided in the statement of

21

undisputed facts in support of our motion for summary

22

judgment pointed out that Dr. Tarnai had absolutely no

23

knowledge of the local standard of care for the

24

Nampa/Caldwell area.

25

All the deposition testimony from

She points out that she was licensed

6
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1

only in California, has never been to Idaho, doesn't

2

know where Dr. Main, the defendant's clinic,

3

chiropractic clinic, was located in Idaho.

4

talked with any physician in Idaho other than a Dr.

5

Crum for just about three minutes to see if the

6

plaintiff's attorneys were good guys, which apparently

7

he confirmed, and I'll confirm that as well.

8
9

She never

But Dr. Tarnai had not discussed with
anyone what the local standard of care was.

She

10

readily admitted that.

11

at the end of her deposition testimony, she was asked

12

on page 147 of her deposition, she was asked, "I

13

think we've covered everything we need to do there, so

14

you are not going to do any additional work and modify

15

your opinion, I trust?"

16

And then to confirm all that,

And the witness's eventual answer, "Not

17

that I'm aware of, unless something in terms of

18

evidence comes up that someone would ask me to render

19

my opinion upon."

20

And then again, our counsel, Mr.

21

Greener, "Counsel, if there's any additional work done,

22

we would like to be advised of it.

23

modifications, we'd like to take the deposition or get

24

an update on the deposition of the witness on that."

25

If there are any

So she testified that that was the

7
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1

extent of her opinions at that time.

2

then we went to the effort of filing a motion for

3

summary judgment, expended all the fees that go into

4

that, and had this case cued up to be dismissed on

5

summary judgment.

6

contradicts all that testimony, summary judgment -- the

7

process is being undermined.

8
9

So that's why

And now, through an affidavit that

So in looking to some of these
contradictions, the contradictions are basically

10

threefold.

11

And I would point out the affidavit of Dr. Tarnai,

12

pointing to paragraph 3, is now her reversal and saying

13

that she does know what the local standard of care is.

14

The contra- -- one, this affidavit now.

Paragraph 6 and 7, specifically

15

paragraph 7, basically, in this case, I'll represent

16

again, but I think it's fair to say that there are

17

basically two opinions being offered regarding

18

negligence by Dr. Tarnai in the breach of the standard

19

of care, one being that Dr. Gallegos-Main, the

20

defendant, in her chiropractic care of the plaintiff,

21

should not have performed a cervical adjustment based

22

on what symptoms she had seen, and the second being

23

that at the end of her treatment that day, she should

24

have done more to make sure that the plaintiff got home

25

safely, either sent her to an emergency room or made

8
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1

sure that someone was there to take her home.

2

Those are the two areas where she is

3

claiming that our defendant fell below the standard of

4

care.

5

differently in the affidavit testimony and contradict

6

deposition testimony, your Honor.

Both of those opinions are stated very

7

So I would point the Court first to the

8

deposition testimony, pages 132, 133, 134.

On those

9

pages, Dr. Tarnai here, where there's cross-examination

10

and we get to the truth of the matter of what Dr. Tarnai

11

testifies about about the standard of care, she's asked

12

specifically about her opinion that Dr. Gallegos-Main

13

should not have let her leave alone without assistance

14

at a minimum and requested emergency room transport at

15

a maximum.

16

When she's asked about that, she says,

17

"I don't think there's anything written down.

But for

18

patient safety and other people's safety, you know, I

19

think it's independent of being a health care

20

professional as well.

21

able to drive themselves or ambulate alone, they should

22

be -- require some help."

If you see someone who's not

23

"Do you have any facts" -- the attorney,

24

"Do you have any facts that would show that Ms. Arregui

25

was unable to drive or unable to walk?"

9
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1
2

The answer, "Nothing other than her
testimony deposition."

3

And then the question, "So I want to

4

make sure I understand this.

5

express an opinion in this case that Dr.

6

Gallegos-Main's failure to either drive or make sure

7

the plaintiff was driven home was a deviation from the

8

standard of care?"

9
10

You're not going to

And then her answer, "I don't think that
that is required but, again, recommended."

11

Then later on in the second part of

12

that, "In your opinion, was -- we know Dr. Main didn't

13

send Ms. Arregui to an emergency room or to her medical

14

doctor.

15

under the circumstances, a deviation of the standard of

16

care?"

17
18
19

In your opinion, was her failure to do that,

The witness's answer, "Was a deviation?
No, I think as I understand your question."
So in both of those responses, the

20

witness points out that she would have done certain

21

things differently but that it's not a breach of the

22

standard of care.

23

is that a deviation of the standard of care.

24

her affidavit testimony, she states a complete

25

contradiction to that.

She specifically says no when asked

10
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Then in

C)
1

In paragraph 8, "Dr. Main's patient

2

examinations"

3

"The doctor also failed to call paramedics or other

4

emergency medical personnel or even to assist

5

plaintiff, once plaintiff was experiencing symptoms of

6

stroke.

7

applicable standards of care."

sorry.

Moving to after the semicolon,

Each of these amounted to a breach of the

8

So that would be the -- one of the

9

first -- one of the main issues of this case, the

10

standard of care.

11

care breaches, one of them, in her deposition, she

12

totally states that she's not going to give an opinion

13

about that being

14

then in her affidavit, she contradicts that.

15

The two arguments for standard of

~

breach of the standard of care, and

The second main argument for a breach of

16

the standard of care in this case is that the doctor

17

shouldn't have done a cervical adjustment based on the

18

symptoms that the patient was having.

19

So I would reference the Court to pages

20

159 and 160 and 161 of the deposition testimony again.

21

The attorney asks, "You were asked by counsel about

22

whether you're mindful of certain risk categories that

23

a patient that you work on may have.

24

the potential risks for a VBA stroke resulting from a

25

cervical manipulation?"

11
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Does that include

c
1

Answer, "Yes, it's something that is

2

mentioned a lot in the community and it's something

3

that I think all chiropractors are aware of and don't

4

want to happen to them."

5

Question, "In reading Mr. Arregui's

6

deposition transcript, the portions that you were

7

provided with, did it contain a description of the

8

cervical rotation adjustment?"

9

Answer, "She

according to her

10

deposition, she didn't know what it was.

11

that her head -- she said her head was rotated from

12

side to side when she was both face down and face up,

13

so I don't know.

14

according to the plaintiff -- I'm just trying to recall

15

from the deposition.

16

down and her head was rotated from side to side both

17

face down and face up.

18

doesn't know if that was an adjustment or not, but her

19

head was rotated, so I don't know because she doesn't

20

know."

21

But she said

According to the patient -- I mean,

The plaintiff said she was face

According to her testimony, she

Question, "Would the rotation of the

22

head as described by Martha Arregui in her deposition

23

be consistent with a cervical rotation adjustment in

24

chiropractic?"

25

"It's possible.

12
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It could also be a

1

range of motion, but it's possible it was an attempt to

2

be an adjustment as well."

3

So in this conversation here in her

4

deposition, she's

5

explaining that she doesn't know whether a cervical

6

adjustment happened.

7

has that there was actually a cervical adjustment that

8

would breach the standard of care, in her opinion, was

9

from the deposition testimony of plaintiff who has put

10

the expert, Dr. Tarnai, is

In fact, the only evidence she

that name on what happened to her.

11

But plaintiff also just merely described

12

a rotation of her head which could fit within just a

13

normal range of motion, which Dr. Tarnai has testified

14

wouldn't have been a breach of the standard of care.

15

And Dr. Tarnai in that testimony indicates that the only

16

reason that she -- the only evidence that that movement

17

of her head was a cervical adjustment is what the

18

plaintiff called it.

19

The plaintiff, we know in this case, is

20

a layperson.

21

cervical adjustment or a range of motion.

22

layperson.

23

She doesn't know whether she's getting a
She's a

She's not a chiropractor.
Well, then -- so the testimony from

24

Dr. Tarnai is that she can't know basically whether or

25

not a cervical adjustment happened.

13
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The testimony

(

1

isn't clear, and so, at most, her testimony would be if

2

there was a cervical adjustment, then that cervical

3

adjustment would have breached the standard of care in

4

her opinion, but that's not the testimony that she

5

gives in her affidavit.

6

In paragraph 7, she says affirmatively,

7

"Defendant's decision to apply a cervical adjustment to

8

her patient was a breach of the prevailing community

9

standards of care in June 2007," again changing

10

dramatically the import of her deposition testimony on

11

a central issue of this case.

12

she does know that there was i cervical adjustment and

13

that that was a breach of the prevailing community

14

standard.

15

She's now claiming that

Based on the sham affidavit doctrine,

16

your Honor, we would ask the Court to strike this

17

affidavit.

18

contradicts deposition testimony and it should not be

19

allowed to prevent summary judgment.

20

On the central points of this case, it

It doesn't give -- and I guess to add to

21

that, the sham affidavit doctrine points out that you

22

can explain what your contradictions are, but in this

23

case, there are no explanations for how she suddenly

24

has this new testimony regarding these two central

25

issues of the case.

It doesn't explain why she

14
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1

suddenly now believes it is a breach of the standard of

2

care for not calling an emergency room doctor.

3

doesn't explain why she suddenly now knows for sure

4

that there was a cervical adjustment.

5

It

Then on the final point, your Honor, I

6

would point to -- in addition to the sham affidavit

7

doctrine, we would rely on the cases that deal with

8

out-of-town doctors who call on local doctors to find

9

out what the local standard of care is.

10

Specifically, I'd point the Court to two

11

cases, Ramos -- two very recent cases, Ramos v. Dixon,

12

which is 144 Idaho 32, and that's a 2007 case, and

13

Dulaney versus Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center,

14

that's 137 Idaho 160.

15

In both these cases, the Court found

16

upheld a decision to grant summary judgment by

17

striking -- well, by finding that the affidavit

18

testimony of an out-of-town doctor was not sufficiently

19

clear as to how they had obtained knowledge of the

20

local of standard of care and, therefore, was not

21

sufficient to preclude summary judgment.

22

In our case, the only affidavit

23

testimony that we have in the record regarding how

24

Dr. Tarnai has now, after the fact, obtained knowledge

25

of the local standard of care is found in paragraph 3.

15
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1

In paragraph 3, Dr. Tarnai includes some conclusory

2

statements about how she now has this knowledge of the

3

local standards of Nampa and Caldwell.

4

she spoke with an anonymous local chiropractor who

5

maintained a chiropractic practice in Caldwell, Idaho

6

in June of 2007.

She says that

7

She said, "It is my understanding that

8

this chiropractor was appropriately licensed in Idaho

9

as a chiropractor and maintained an active practice of

10

chiropractic medicine during the relevant period.

11

chiropractor indicated to me that he was familiar with

12

the local standards of care for performing chiropractic

13

procedures in Nampa and Caldwell."

14

The

And then it also points out that he

15

confirms that the local standards of care were

16

consistent with what she believed were the standards of

17

care in her location in California.

18

So the deficiencies of this paragraph

19

are several.

First, anonymity of the chiropractor.

20

Now, I can't point to an Idaho case that specifically

21

says you can't withhold their name, the underlying name

22

of the local practitioner.

23

Dulaney case, all it says is -- in that case, it says

24

even assuming that the use of an anonymous informant is

25

an acceptable manner of adequate familiarizing an

The

16
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I believe it's the

1

out-of-town -- an out-of-area physician of the local

2

standard of care, and then it goes on to state why that

3

affidavit still wasn't enough.

4

So it doesn't -- it doesn't make a

5

conclusion one way or the other whether this is an

6

acceptable form of providing local standard of care by

7

using an anonymous chiropractor.

8

to that anonymity is if you're going to withhold their

9

name, you have to provide better facts about what their

But I think related

10

practice is, how long they've been practicing in the

11

area, and most importantly, how do they claim to know

12

what the local practice is in the area of

13

Nampa/Caldwell, and specifically to the standard of

14

care that Dr. Tarnai is saying was breached.

15

How does this doctor -- and nowhere in

16

this document does it say how does this doctor

17

sorry -- this chiropractor know that the local standard

18

in Nampa/Caldwell is that if you have symptoms like the

19

plaintiff in this case, you are not to give a cervical

20

adjustment, assuming that there was one.

21

this case obviously denies that there ever was one.

22

Of course,

But even assuming that there was one,

23

where anywhere in this affidavit does it give any

24

foundation for this anonymous chiropractor knowing that

25

the standard of care in Nampa/Caldwell is that if you

17
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1

come in with the symptoms of this plaintiff, you

2

cannot -- you should not be given a cervical

3

adjustment, that that might harm that person.

4

Instead, all there is is a conclusory

5

statement that this anonymous chiropractor, who, for

6

all we know, worked for one year in 2007 and is now out

7

of the practice, was familiar with the local standards

8

of care for that one year.

9

that local chiropractor received.

We don't know what training
We don't know how

10

long they've practiced.

We don't know what training

11

they received specific to symptoms like this patient

12

had and how to treat those symptoms.

13

of those sorts of facts.

We don't know any

14

And it's important -- the point of -- I

15

know the Court knows the point of a local standard and

16

requiring an expert to speak to the local community

17

standard is that Dr. Tarnai's experience in California

18

and what she believes to be the standard of care in

19

California is not necessarily the same as what it is in

20

Caldwell/Nampa and what's understood by the defendant

21

in this case.

22

She shouldn't be held to the standards

23

of Dr. Tarnai, and if Dr. Tarnai wants to say, well, my

24

standards also happen to be the standards in

25

Nampa/Caldwell, then she's got to be able to provide

18
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1

affidavit testimony to back that up.

2

able to say I've talked to this chiropractor, he's got

3

ten years of experience working in this area, he or

4

she, and he or she's been trained in this way about how

5

to handle these symptoms, he agrees with me on this

6

point and this point, that if a person comes in with

7

these symptoms, I shouldn't give chiro- -- I shouldn't

8

give a a cervical adjustment.

9

laid out in this affidavit, and none of them are, your

10
11

Those facts should be

Honor.
So in pointing to the Dulaney case --

12

and I'm about done here, your Honor.

13

on at such length.

14

myself too much.

15

She's got to be

I'm sorry to go

I hope that I'm not repeating

But in the Dulaney case, the Court talks

16

about the affidavit of a -- the local care that the

17

person that they were -- that this out-of-town expert

18

was relying upon was this anonymous professor, and the

19

professor said that he trained orthopedic physicians

20

that presently practice in Boise, that he'd maintained

21

personal and professional relationships with the

22

physicians in Boise, that he had taught and lectured in

23

Boise, all of these facts which are much more than the

24

facts we have in our case, and yet the Court still

25

finds that this wasn't sufficient because they didn't
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1

relate all of these facts to the time period in

2

question.

3

Well, that's a little different because

4

here in this affidavit, they were careful enough to at

5

least put the date correctly in there to say that this

6

anonymous person knew about the time period in

7

question.

8

been -- that should be in there to help give the

9

foundation that's required aren't there.

10

But all of these extra facts that would have

I mean, much more was given in this

11

Dulaney case, and yet the Court still found that that

12

affidavit wasn't sufficient and then granted -- did not

13

reverse a district court's decision to grant summary

14

judgment because that information was insufficient.

15

Similarly in the Ramos/Dixon case in

16

2007, the Court says what occurred in this case

17

demonstrates an error too often made when trying to

18

develop an adequate foundation for the opinion of a

19

medical expert whose experience is outside the relevant

20

community.

21

in touch with Dr. Speirs and left it up to Dr. Richter

22

to make a sufficient inquiry into the applicable

23

standard of care.

24
25

Plaintiff's counsel simply put Dr. Richter

How an expert becomes familiar with the
standard of care is a legal issue, not a medical issue.
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1

There's no reason to believe that Dr. Richter, a

2

physician practicing in New Jersey, would be familiar

3

with the requirements of 6-1012, 6-1013, Rule 56(e).

4

The attorney must be directly involved in advising the

5

expert as to how to learn the applicable standard of

6

care in determining whether the expert has done so.

7

And that's very important in this case

8

because, as I mentioned, we don't have any facts that

9

would show us how this Dr. Tarnai from California, who

10

obviously was completely ignorant to the whole idea of

11

local standard of care, as in her deposition, she

12

readily admits that she hadn't done anything to try to

13

figure out what the local standard of care is.

14

totally ignorant to this whole issue, and then we're to

15

conclude that she's now done what's essential just in

16

one paragraph that says she talked to an anonymous

17

chiropractor who worked in 2007, and that's all we're

18

told about this chiropractor.

19

She's

That's not enough for us to be able to

20

rely on and say, oh, yes.

We can't be sure that this

21

chiropractor now knows the local standard of care for

22

Nampa/Caldwell.

23

different reasons, your Honor, we'd ask the Court to

24

grant summary judgment in this case based on the sham

25

affidavit doctrine which has been used by courts

So, your Honor, so for those two
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1

readily through the years.

2

of practice that when deposition testimony is directly

3

contradicted by affidavit testimony, that that

4

affidavit testimony has to be adequately explained,

5

which it hasn't been in this case, and, therefore, it

6

can't be used to preclude summary judgment.

7

And it's uniformly a rule

And second, that the local standard of

8

care has not been adequately detailed in this

9

affidavit.

And when that happens as well, Courts like

10

in the Dulaney and Ramos case, will grant summary

11

judgment.

12

Thank you.

In fact, I just ask the Court to do that.

13

THE COURT:

14

Mr. Johnson.

15

MR. JOHNSON:

16

Good morning to the Court.

17

counsel, Mr. Messerly.

18

All right.

Thank you.

Thank you, your Honor.
May it please the Court and

Of course, your Honor, I'm here on

19

behalf of the plaintiff, Martha Arregui, and I'm

20

prepared to argue in opposition to the entry of summary

21

judgment in this case.

22

Your Honor, by and large, the facts, at

23

least as they're germane to the current motion, can be

24

stated quite quickly and succinctly.

25

to visit this chiropractor in June 2007 in a

22
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My client went in

1

Caldwell-based chiropractic clinic.

2

chiropractor was treating my client, the chiropractor

3

did some cervical adjustment rotation, worked the neck,

4

for lack of perhaps a better expression, your Honor,

5

and in doing so, caused my patient to undergo a stroke.

6

The stroke is not disputed here on summary judgment.

7

And while the

As a result of the chiropractic care, we

8

brought suit, believing that the chiropractor had been

9

negligent.

And, your Honor, we still maintain that the

10

chiropractor was negligent in handling our patient on

11

the day in question.

12

You know, of course, the summary

13

judgment standard -- oh, by the way, your Honor, one

14

fact that we now know is not in dispute is that, as

15

counsel for plaintiff, I am a good guy.

16

counsel had to concede that point, your Honor.

17

almost tempted to ask the Court for judicial notice of

18

that, but I won't go so far.

19

arguments to the contrary.

20

Even this
So I'm

I'm sure there are

But, you know, it's interesting, your

21

Honor.

Of course, on summary judgment standards, the

22

facts are to be liberally construed and all the

23

inferences are to be drawn -- reasonable inferences are

24

to be drawn in favor of plaintiff, your Honor.

25

this particular case, we don't believe that the
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000307

And in

(~

1

defendants have anchored their position consistently

2

with that standard.

3

affidavits and other sources and shedding it in a light

4

most favorable to their position, and then, once doing

5

so, asking for summary judgment.

6

They're taking information from

And so I would just point out that the

7

standard that's been around for a long time, your

8

Honor, if it's applied properly to this case, we would

9

submit that summary judgment is not appropriate here.

10

You know, part of the summary judgment

11

process, and the case law is consistent with this, I

12

think the Rule 56 is consistent with this, is that a

13

party canLt rest upon mere allegations, but in response

14

to the motion, must set forth specific facts.

15

your Honor, that's what we've done here.

16

And,

This is a case where, on summary

17

judgment, the defendants argue that 6-1012 and 13 apply

18

to a chiropractic physician.

19

long and hard about whether or not we wanted to

20

challenge the application of 6-1012 and 13.

21

concluded that it was more reasonable, more efficient,

22

and more prosperous to the judicial process to just go

23

ahead and educate our expert on the standard of care by

24

having her consult with local chiropractors that

25

practiced in Caldwell, the spot of the negligence, and

Your Honor, we thought

24
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Ultimately

"

1

practiced in Caldwell at the time of the negligence on

2

June 4th of 2007, your Honor.

3

The anonymity -- the affidavit doesn't

4

identify the chiropractor, but this chiropractor has

5

been identified through other means.

6

Robin King, a chiropractic physician here in the

7

Caldwell area, as our rebuttal expert, your Honor.

8

so although again Dr. Tarnai didn't expressly identify

9

him, it's not as though we have an anonymous

We disclosed Dr.

10

chiropractic person here educating Dr. Tarnai on the

11

local standard of care.

12

And

But in any event, we were faced with

13

this decision to either challenge the position of the

14

defendants under 6-1012 and 13.

15

was easier -- you know, we didn't want to create an

16

issue that would likely be on appeal by whoever the

17

aggrieved party ultimately was, your Honor.

18

host of reasons, strategically, it made sense for us to

19

do what we've done here and have our out-of-town expert

20

familiarize herself with the local standard of care.

21

Again, we decided it

So for a

And for doing this, we've been accused

22

of submitting sham affidavits, and that's in the

23

briefing and it's reiterated here from counsel's

24

arguments, your Honor.

25

that we have submitted a sham affidavit in this case.

And we certainly don't believe
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1

And I would submit to the Court that if

2

you look at the October 15th, 2010 report that

3

Dr. Tarnai authored, in light of the October 19th

4

deposition testimony that she gave, including the

5

testimony elicited by Mr. Monteleone during that

6

deposition, and her November 16th affidavit, your

7

Honor, that everything, perhaps barring some trivial

8

inconsistencies, is right down the line.

9

What we have here is Dr. Tarnai

10

announcing in her report that she believes that the

11

standard of care is X.

12

X in her deposition, and she confirms that it's X in

13

her affidavit.

14

did was confirm with someone here locally that the

15

standard of care that she believed applied was in fact

16

the same standard of care that existed at the time of

17

the alleged negligence of Dr. Gallegos.

18

She says that she believes it's

The only thing in addition to what she

And so, your Honor, with respect to the

19

foundational analysis -- and we've looked at the case

20

that counsel cited, the Dulaney case, I believe it is,

21

and the reasons for granting summary judgment in that

22

case are certainly distinguishable from the facts of

23

this case, your Honor.

24

went off on a reason that doesn't exist here.

25

the person who was the supplier of the local standard

In each instance, the Court
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1

of care hadn't practiced in the area or wasn't in the

2

same field or didn't speak to the standard of care at

3

the right time, your Honor.

And we've done that here.

We had our expert consult again with

4

5

Dr. Robin King.

6

practicing in this area in 2007, that as a result of

7

his practice, he's familiar with the standard of care

8

that applies to the Nampa/Caldwell area.

9

he's familiar with it.

10

She confirmed through him that he was

Of course

He's there practicing in it on

a regular, daily basis, your Honor.

11

And that between the consultations of

12

these two chiropractic physicians, the conclusion is

13

drawn that the standard of care that Dr. Tarnai

14

discussed and outlined in her medical report and in her

15

deposition and in her affidavit following her

16

deposition is consistent with the standard that was in

17

place in Nampa/Caldwell at the time my client was

18

caused to suffer a stroke by the actions of the

19

defendant here.

20

Your Honor, all of the foundational

21

prerequisites are here in the affidavit.

And, of

22

course, you know, the 6-1012 and 13 and the judicial

23

gloss that has been painted over it over time has sort

24

of forced plaintiff's lawyers to prepare a formulaic

25

affidavit.

I mean, we have to build the affidavit to
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1

meet the buzzwords, the legal buzzwords that spring

2

from the statute and the judicial decisions.

3

doesn't make it a sham affidavit, your Honor.

4

just means we're trying to do our best to comply with

5

the governing principles of law here, and that's what

6

we've done in this affidavit, your Honor.

7

That
That

Our expert talks about how she actually

8

holds these opinions, that she can testify to these

9

opinions with a reasonable degree of medical -- I think

10

she said "probability."

11

"medical certainty" is often used in medical

12

malpractice cases, but I think "medical probability"

13

and "medical certainty" are certainly phrases that can

14

be used synonymously and interchangeably.

15

And I know that the word

She has made a showing that she

16

possesses professional knowledge and expertise of a

17

chiropractic physician.

18

here.

19

familiarizing herself with the local standard of care,

20

has actual knowledge of that standard of care as it

21

existed in the site and at the time.

22

That hasn't been challenged

And she, through her affidavit, after

And there's no question that, you know,

23

Dr. Robin King, a local physiCian in chiropractic

24

medicine, is in essentially the same field as Dr. Tarnai

25

practices down in California.
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It just so happens that
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1

Dr. Tarnai, in her deposition -- you know, she hasn't

2

been retained as an expert before.

3

familiar with the process.

4

in a way that asked her to assume certain facts.

5

She's not entirely

Questions were posed to her

And, in fact, I believe during some of

6

the examination of Dr. Tarnai, Mr. Greener asked her to

7

assume that the chiropractic physician's version of the

8

disputed facts was in fact the one that he would like

9

her to render her opinions and based on that.

10

And so

the doctor had done that.

11

And I think there were occasions when

12

she did so that the doctor testified that based on what

13

the chiropractic physician has indicated, there may not

14

be a breach of the standard of care.

15

Honor, we're here on summary judgment and we're not to

16

look at a one-sided statement of a conflicted area of

17

the facts.

But again, your

18

In these cases, of course, our expert is

19

allowed to take into consideration the testimony of our

20

client, the patient of Dr. Gallegos's, and everything

21

that that patient said and did and render her ultimate

22

opinions based on the totality of all the evidence,

23

which she did in her report, she did to some degree in

24

a deposition format, and then she did again in her

25

affidavit, your Honor.
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1

And interestingly, I continue to go back

2

to this, the standard of care hasn't changed.

3

know, that's the part that I struggle with with respect

4

to the sham affidavit sort of concept.

5

of care had somehow switched and become something

6

different and we were utterly inconsistent on it, your

7

Honor, I suppose it would be easier to accept the

8

arguments offered by the defense in this case.

9

aren't.

10

You

If the standard

But we

The standard of care hasn't changed.
All we did in response to the motion for

11

summary judgment was educate our out-of-town expert on

12

the local standard of care.

13

there's this rule that says you can't do that after a

14

motion for summary judgment has been filed and you're

15

stuck with whatever the expert said prior to filing of

16

the motion for summary judgment.

17

The defense pretends like

Well, there's no case law or anything to

18

support that, your Honor.

19

cases on this standard of care issue, a single case has

20

come back to the same court on several occasions based

21

on motions to reconsider and those sorts of things and

22

kind of matriculates in a moving target sort of

23

fashion.

24
25

In fact, as I read these

So, your Honor, we just feel that we
were faced with this issue on 6-1012.
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We didn't want

1

to again make the argument for purposes of the motion

2

that we didn't have to comply with 6-1012.

3

the circumstances, it was easier just to come into

4

conformity with it, and we believe that we've done that

5

in good faith.

6

judgment should not be granted in this case.

In light of

And in doing, we believe that summary

7

Thank you, your Honor.

8

any questions that the Court may have, I'm finished.

9

10

13

THE COURT:

I do not at this time.

All right.

Mr. Messerly, you may

Thank you.

11
12

Unless there are

respond.
MR. MESSERLY:

Thank you, your Honor.

14

Just to make it clear, in response to a few of the

15

statements, it is our position that the standard of

16

care has changed in the affidavit.

17

Our position would be that there is

18

initially a letter written by Dr. Tarnai -- or Tarnai I

19

guess is how it's being pronounced; I've been getting

20

it wrong all the time -- initially back on October 15th

21

right before her deposition.

22

challenged in her deposition.

23

deposition and why it's trusted above an affidavit is

24

because of the ability to cross-examine.

25

Those opinions were
That's the point of a

They were challenged.
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She backed off

(

1

on -- completely backed off on her opinion that Dr. --

2

that the defendant did something wrong by not sending

3

her to an emergency room after these alleged symptoms

4

of dizziness at the end of their appointment.

5

completely backed off on that and said, no, that's not

6

a breach of the standard of care, that's not going to

7

be my testimony.

8
9

She

And she also changed her testimony -- or
she also confirmed, as I would point out -- and I

10

didn't read this the first time.

On page 163 of her

11

deposition, she's asked, let's see, "Do you know if the

12

standard of care" -- I'm sorry.

13

"And then as we sit here today, you're

14

unable to form an opinion on whether or not there was

15

actually an adjustment or it was a range of motion test

16

in the two instances that counsel discussed with you,

17

correct?"

18
19
20

Answer, "Yes, because there's
conflicting statements in the deposition."
And again, she then -- when she's

21

challenged on her claim that there was a cervical

22

adjustment and that, therefore, that's a breach of the

23

standard of care.

24

they then go right back to what her original opinion

25

was, even through in deposition she was challenged and

And then again in her affidavit,
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1

she changed her opinion.

2

her deposition, and then they've gone back to her

3

original opinions from her original letter, which

4

again, those aren't as trustworthy, they're not

5

challenged in cross-examination.

6

used to subvert what she really said in her deposition.

7

She gave her true opinion in

They should not be

So that's our argument on this in terms

8

of the sham affidavit and why we would call it a sham

9

affidavit.

I don't think that's a personal attack on

10

counsel.

It's just that that's the term that's used in

11

the case law in terms of when affidavits contradict

12

depositions.

13

Then as to the foundation for the local

14

standard of care, I would just point out, as the Court

15

likely is already aware, but just to remind the Court,

16

when it was argued that this is summary judgment and,

17

therefore, all benefits, inferences, and such should be

18

granted to the non-moving party.

19

actually, on issues of foundation with regard to the

20

local standard of care as found in Dulaney, is that

21

with foundation questions and whether evidence should

22

be even admissible to be considered on a summary

23

judgment, the liberal construction and reasonable

24

inference standard does not apply, however, when

25

deciding whether or not testimony offered in connection
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Well, the case law

()

1

with a motion for summary judgment is admissible.

2

So we're not basing that higher

3

standard.

Instead, this is just a question of was

4

there sufficient foundation that this -- that Dr. Tarnai

5

had knowledge of the local standard of care.

6

And all of this additional testimony

7

that this anonymous physician is Dr. Robert King, you

8

know, that is not in the affidavit and can't be

9

considered at this point.

What his background is can't

10

be considered.

None of that was put into the

11

affidavit.

12

chiropractor, that wasn't put in the affidavit.

13

are all things that have just been proffered now by

14

plaintiff's counsel.

The fact that he's still a practicing'

15

Those

And the case law is clear when it says

16

that, for example, in Dulaney, the professor's

17

conclusory statement that he is familiar with the

18

standard of care in Boise in 1994 is simply not

19

sufficient.

20

contains is a conclusory statement.

And that's all that this affidavit

21

It doesn't say how this anonymous

22

chiropractor came to have the knowledge of the local

23

standard of care.

24

was practicing.

25

whether he could really testify to local standard of

It doesn't even tell us how long he
Obviously, that would help us to know
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1

care, but it doesn't say that.

2

training he received about cervical adjustments, he or

3

she.

4

Honor.

5

It doesn't say what

It doesn't say any of this information, your

So those are the only points that I

6

would add and ask the Court to grant summary judgment.

7

Thank you, your Honor.

8

THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you.

9

The defense has moved to strike the

10

affidavit of Sarah Tarnai that was filed on November

11

15th, 2010 in support of plaintiff's opposition to the

12

motion for summary judgment.

13

The defendant argues first that the

14

affidavit is untimely under Rule 56(c) and that it is

15

inadmissible under 56(e) and case law.

16

Procedure addresses summary judgment and provides, if

17

the adverse party desires to serve opposing affidavits,

18

the party must do so at least fourteen days prior to

19

the date of hearing.

20

56(c) Rule of

The defendant further argues that this

21

is a sham affidavit -- and that is the term that has

22

been used in the case law -- because it contradicts

23

Dr. Tarnai's deposition testimony and was merely

24

presented today to prevent summary judgment.

25

Boise Tower versus Washington, this is a
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1

District of Idaho 2007 case, L 1035158, addresses the

2

issue of sham affidavits in the Ninth Circuit.

3

And I quote, "The 'sham affidavit'

4

doctrine prevents the use of manufactured testimony as

5

a means of creating an issue of fact to get past

6

summary judgment.

7

unanimity that a party cannot create a genuine issue of

8

fact sufficient to survive summary judgment simply by

9

contradicting his or her own previous sworn testimony

Courts have held with virtual

10

by, say, filing a later affidavit that flatly

11

contradicts the party's earlier sworn deposition

12

without explaining the contradiction or attempting to

13

resolve the disparity.

14

Circuit is that a party cannot create an issue of fact

15

by an affidavit contradicting prior deposition

16

testimony."

17

The general rule in the Ninth

I conclude that the affidavit was not

18

filed timely and that there was no request for

19

shortening of time.

20

affidavit clearly contradicts the prior deposition

21

testimony and that it was clear that at that time,

22

Dr. Tarnai was not aware of the local standard of care

23

in this community.

24
25

I further conclude that the

Pursuant to Rule 56(c), the opposing
affidavit was not timely filed and clearly contradicts
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1

prior testimony.

2

motion to strike the affidavit, which leaves the

3

remaining issue, then, of summary judgment.

4

As a result, I am going to grant the

Having granted the motion to strike

5

based on the plaintiff's failure to meet its burden

6

with regard to local of standard of care and with

7

regard to contradictory statements, I am called upon at

8

this time to look at the summary judgment issue which

9

the parties have been arguing here before me this

10

morning.

11

And, of course, I cite to Idaho Code

12

Section 6-1012 and 6-1013.

13

that as an essential part of the plaintiff's case in

14

chief, they affirmatively prove by direct expert

15

testimony and by a preponderance of all the competent

16

evidence that such defendant, then and there

17

negligently failed to meet the applicable standard of

18

health care practice of the community in which such

19

care allegedly was or should have been provided, as

20

such standard existed at the time and place of the

21

alleged negligence of the purveyor -- alleged purveyor

22

of negligence.

23

6-1012 clearly provides

And I also cite, then, 6-1013, which

24

provides under subsection (c) that such expert witness

25

possessed professional knowledge and expertise coupled
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1

with the actual knowledge of the applicable said

2

community standard to which his or her opinion

3

testimony is addressed.

4

the section shall not be construed to prohibit or

5

preclude a competent expert who resides elsewhere from

6

adequately familiarizing himself with the standards and

7

practices of a particular area.

8
9

It then goes on to say that

In looking at the issue of summary
judgment, I also am relying heavily on Dulaney versus

10

Saint Alphonsus, 137 Idaho 160, and that's a 2002 case

11

and the cite that Mr. Messerly in his responding

12

argument made.

13

And that is, "The liberal construction

14

and reasonable inferences standard does not apply,

15

however, when deciding whether or not testimony offered

16

in connection with a motion for summary judgment is

17

admissible."

18

And I'm going to leave out the cites.
"The trial court must look at the

19

witness's affidavit or deposition testimony and

20

determine whether it alleges facts which, if taken

21

true, would render the testimony of that witness

22

admissible."

23

"To avoid summary judgment for the

24

defense in a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff

25

must offer expert testimony indicating that the
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1

defendant health care provider negligently failed to

2

meet the applicable standard of care.

3

such expert testimony to be admissible, the plaintiff

4

must lay the foundation required by 6-1013.

5

the plaintiff must offer evidence showing:

6

such opinion is actually held by the expert witness;

7

(b) that the expert witness can testify to the opinion

8

with a reasonable degree of medical certainty; (c) that

9

the expert witness possesses professional knowledge and

In order for

To do so,
(a) that

10

expertise; and (d) that the witness has actual

11

knowledge of the applicable standard of care to which

12

his opinion testimony is addressed."

13

Now, plaintiff has responded with the

14

affidavit in this matter.

15

this case indicates that that affidavit contradicts

16

prior opinions of Dr. Tarnai from a deposition

17

previously held, and that until the filing of that

18

untimely affidavit, she was not familiar with the local

19

standard of care.

20

However, the evidence in

As a result, I find that summary

21

judgment is appropriately granted in this case as there

22

is no issue

23

genuine issue of material fact.
All of my stated findings and

24

conclusions will stand for the record.

25

you shall draft an order striking the affidavit and
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Mr. Messerly,

c

,\

1

granting summary judgment, submit a copy to opposing

2

counsel.
Mr. Johnson, if you have objection as to

3
4

form of that order, let me know.

5

objection as to the form,

6

execute it within seven days.

If I don't hear

then I'll go ahead and

7

Anything further from either side?

8

MR. MESSERLY:

9

MR. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:

10
11

folks.

No, your Honor.
No, your Honor.

All right.

Thank you,

We are in recess.

12
13
14

(End of proceedings.)

15
16

17
18

19

20
21

22
23
24

25
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

1
2

STATE OF IDAHO

)

COUNTY OF CANYON

)

)

3

ss.

4

5

I, CAROLE A. BULL, Certified Shorthand

6

Reporter and acting Official Court Reporter of the

7

District Court of the Third Judicial District of the

8

State of Idaho and Notary Public in and for the State

9

of Idaho, do hereby certify:

10

That said hearing was taken down by me in

11

shorthand at the time and place therein named and

12

thereafter transcribed by means of computer-aided

13

transcription, and that the foregoing transcript

14

contains a full, true, and correct copy of said

15

hearing, consisting of pages 3 through 40, inclusive.

16
17
18
19

I further certify that I have no interest in
the event of this action.
WITNESS my hand and seal this 22nd day of
December, 2010.

20

21
22
23

CAROLE A. BULL, CSR NO. 71
Notary Public in and for the State
of Idaho, residing in Caldwell,
Idaho.
My commission expires 10-29-2011.

24
25
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Sam Johnson
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P.
405 South Eighth Street, Suite 250
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 331-2100
Facsimile: (208) 947-2424

~i oP.M.
JAN 25 2DlI

sam@treasurevallevlawvers.com

Idaho State Bar No. 4777

CANYoN COUNTY CLI"K
D. Bln'LIA, DEPUTY

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

MARTHA A. ARREGUI,
Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. CV 09-3450

ROSALINDA GALLEGOS-MAIN, an REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
individual; FULL LIFE CHIROPRACTIC, SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
P.A., an Idaho professional association; RECONSIDERATION
and John and Jane Does I through X,
whose true identities are unknown,
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
On December 2, 2010, Plaintiff Martha Arregui (hereinafter "Arregui") moved
this

COUIt

to reconsider its order granting Defendants' Motion

10 Strike the Affidavit of

Sarah Tarnai, D.C., and its order granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

Thereafter, on January - 20, 2011, the Defendants filed Defendants' Opposition to
Plaint{f!'s Motion for Reconsideration and the Affid(lvil of Counsel in Support of

I~EPLV MEMOI~ANDlJM

IN SUPPORT OF MOTION

FOI~
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Opposition to Plainttfl's Motion for Reconsideration. Nothing more than the Reporter's
Transcript of the November 23,2010, hearing was attached to the Affidavit of Counsel in

Support of Opposition

10

Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. (See Exhibit "A

11

attached thereto).
In accordance with Rule 7(b)(3)(E), of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
All'egui now takes this opportunity to submit the following Reply Memorandum in

Support of MOlionfor Reconsideration. In doing so, Arregui does not attempt to reply to
every point raised by the Defendants in their opposition to the pending motion for
reconsideration. To the extent Arregui does not expressly reply here, she relies on the
previously recorded filings made by her in this matter.

REPLY
1.

The Defendants first argue, "Plaintiff Could Not Have Been Blindsided By The

Local Community Standard Issue." See Defendants' Opposing Memorandum, p. 6. First,
Arrcgui never uses the term "blindsided" in her motion for reconsideration or in the
supporting memorandum. Arregui recognized from the outset an obligation on her part to
prove Defendant Dr. Main breached the applicable community standard of "chiropractic"
care. However, Arregui was not of the opinion that she must prove such element in strict
compliance with Idaho Code §§ 6-101216-1013, and only through the offering of direct
expert testimony, etc. Arregui, moreover, was not arguing that Defendants necessarily
had an obligation to asse11 the defense before filing the motion for summary judgment.
Arregui's only point is that in fact the Defendants did not raise the defense at any lime
before seeking summary judgment, and therefore Arregui was not precluded from
thereafter familiarizing her expert in compliance with Idaho Code in an effort to defeat

REPLY MEMOI~ANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 2
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the motion for summary judgment.

The Defendants have not cited any authority,

statutory or otherwise, supporting the proposition that Arregui has to familiarize her
expert in compliance with Idaho Code before a motion for summary judgment is brought
rather than in response thereto. Especially here where the applicable provisions of Idaho
Code do not make specific reference to "chiropractic" physicians. See Idaho Code §§ 6-

1001 and 6-1012. Rather the statute refers to any physician who holds a license to
practice medicine. Id. In Idaho, chiropractic physicians clearly do not practice medicine:
Chiropractic practice, as herein defined is hereby declared
not to be the practice of medicine within the meaning of the
laws of the state of Idaho defining the same, and physicians
licensed pursuant to this chapter shall not be subject to the
provisions of chapter 18, title 54, Idaho Code, nor liable to
any prosecution thereunder, when acting within the scope
of practice as defined in this chapter. (Emphasis added).

See 1daho Code § 54-703(3).
Quite frankly, if the Defendants are correct that the law does not allow a party to
come into compliance with Idaho Code §§ 6-1012/6-1013 in response to a motion for
summary judgment, then let the law be damned.
2.

The Defendants also argue, "The Sham Affidavit Doctrine Applies To Experts

Who Change Their Testimony." See Defendanls' Opposing Memorandum, p. 13. No
doubt the sham affidavit doctrine should apply to experts who say one thing and then
manufacture evidence to say something different later on. However, that clearly did not
happen here. In this case, Arregui's expert first indicated she had not consulted with a
local chiropractor about the standard of care, and later testified she had consulted a local
chiropractor. But, in the interim, Arregui's expert did in fact speak to a local physician,
and so it was not as though she manufactured the evidence by making it lip out of whole
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000328

..... .

I4lJVU:.J1 VU I

cloth. It was true. Additionally, as previously stated and consistently with Boise Tower

Associates, LLC v. Washington Capital Joint Master Trust, 2007 WL 1035158, 12-13 (D.
Idaho), any conflict in her testimony has been adequately explained by Dr. Tamai. As
she states in her affidavit, the difference stems from her effOlt to familiarize herself with
the local standard of cal'e by consulting with a local professional in her same field.
3.

The Defendants further claim, "The Tamai Affidavit Was Untimely Filed Without

Explanation." See Defendanls' Opposing Memorandum, p. JJ. To the contrary, the late
nature of the Tamai Affidavit was explained. In fact, the explanation came in the fOlm of
a motion under LR.C.P. 56(f), supported by the Affidavit of Sam Johnson. (See Rule

56(f) motion and supporting affidavil on file herein). Although the Defendants have
professed to suffer prejudice as a result of the timing of the Tamai Affidavit, there clearly
has been none. In fact, the Defendants acknowledged any lack of prejudice by stating in
their opposition to the instant motion that, "Defendants fully briefed the sham affidavit
issue prior to the summary judgment hearing."

(Emphasis added).

It was the

Defendants, after all, who moved the Court to shorten the time frame for hearing the
Defendants' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Sarah Tarnai, D.C.

(See Defendants'

Motion For Order Shortening Time On Defendants' Motion to Strike, on file herein).
Ironically, it was Arregui who did not receive the allotted time to respond to Defendants'

Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Sarah Tamai, D. C. The motion to strike was filed on
November 16, 2010, and heard only seven (7) days later, on November 23, 2010. Under
Rule 7(b)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the motion to strike and notice of
hearing thereon "shall be filed with the court, and served so that it is received by the
parties no later than (14) days before the time specified for the hearing." And, although
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Defendants submitted a proposed Order Shortening Time on Defendants' Motion to
Strike, to Arregui's knowledge it was never issued by the Court. The lack of fourteen
(14) day notice prejudiced Arregui, as the Defendants have recognized, such that,
"Plaintiff did not file an opposition to the Motion to Strike." See Defendants' Opposing

Memorandum, p. 3.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the Affidavit of Sarah Tamai, D.C., should not be stricken from the
record, since it does not involve the manufacturing of evidence for which the "sham
affidavit" doctrine was designed to preclude. Furthermore, the contradictions from the
deposition and affidavit testimony have been adequately explained by Dr. Tarnai. See

Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. Washington Capital Joint Master Trust, 2007 WL
1035158, 12-13 (D. Idaho). The legislature did not intend for Idaho Code §§ 6-1012/61013 to apply to chiropractic physicians, but only to those physicians holding a license to
practice medicine. To the extent the Tarnai affidavit was untimely, it should have been
excused by Arregui's motion under I.R.C.P. 56(f), seeking additional time to secure it.
To the extent the Tamai affidavit was untimely, the Defendants have all but
acknowledged they suffered no resulting prejudice. In fact, the record shows it was
Arregui who suffered prejudice by not receiving fourteen (14) days to respond to the
motion to strike the Tarnai affidavit.
Based upon the foregoing reasons and those reasons previously recorded, Arregui
respectfiJlly asks this Court to grant her motion to reconsider and allow this case to
proceed to jury trial.
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DATED: This

Jf

day of January, 2011.

JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P.

~j;y~-

Sam ohnson
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING, DELIVERY, OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thisd!i- day of January, 2011, I served a true and

con-ect copy of the foregoing document by delivering the same to each of the following,
by the method indicated below, addressed as follows:

CJ mailed
CJ hand delivered
l(transmitted fax machine
to: (208) 319-2601

Richard H. Greener
Greener, Burke & Shoemaker, P.A.
The Banner Bank Building
950 W. Bannock St., Ste. 900
Boise, ID 83702

JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P.
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Sam Johnson
Idaho State Bar No. 4777
sam@treasurevalleylawyers.com
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P.
405 South Eighth Street, Suite 250
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 331-2100
Facsimile: (208) 947-2424
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JAN 28 2011
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
B RAYNE, DEPUTY

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

o

MARTHA A. ARREGUI,
Plaintiff!Appellant,

v.

Case No. CV 09-3450

ROSALINDA GALLEGOS-MAIN, an NOTICE OF APPEAL
individual; FULL LIFE CHIROPRACTIC,
P.A., an Idaho professional association;
and John and Jane Does I through X,
whose true identities are unknown,
Defendants/Respondents.

TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENTS, ROSALINDA GALLEGOS-MAIN
AND FULL LIFE CHIROPRACTIC, P.A., AND THEIR COUNSEL OR RECORD,
RICHARD H. GREENER, GREENER, BURKE & SHOEMAKER, P.A.; THE
BANNER BANK BUILDING, 950 WEST BANNOCK STREET, SUITE 900, BOISE,
IDAHO 83702, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Plaintiff!Appellant, Martha Arregui, appeals against the
above-named DefendantslRespondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from

NOTICE OF APPEAL - I
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the order denying Plaintiff/Appellant's motion for reconsideration entered
in the above entitled action on the 27th day of January, 2011, by the
Honorable Renae Hoff, District Judge, presiding.
2.

The above-named Plaintiff!Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho
Supreme Court, and the order described in paragraph 1 above is an
appealable order under and pursuant to I.A.R. II(a).

3.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL:
(a) Whether the district court erred by granting summary judgment in
favor of the DefendantslRespondents.
(b) Whether the district court erred in striking the Affidavit of Sarah
Tamai, D. c., and when applying the "sham affidavit" doctrine to the

facts of this case.
(c) Whether the district court erred in denying Plaintiff/Appellant's
Motion for Reconsideration.
4.

No order has been entered which has sealed any portion of the record in
these proceedings.

5.

(a)

Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes.

(b)

Plaintiffs!Appellants request the preparation of the following
portions of the reporter's transcript in hard copy format: (1) the
reporter's transcript from the hearing on Plaintiff/Appellants'
Motion for Reconsideration held on January 27,2011.
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6.

Plaintiff!Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the
Clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28,
I.A.R.
(a)

All documents filed in support of and in opposition to
DefendantslRespondents' Motion for Summary Judgment.

(b)

All documents filed in support of and in opposition to
Plaintiff!Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration.

7.

I certify:
(a)

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the
reporter as named below at the addresses set out below:
Carole Bull
Official Court Reporter
1115 Albany St.
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

(b)

The estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript has
been paid.

(c)

The estimated fee of $100.00 for preparation of the Clerk's record
has been paid;

(d)

The appellate filing fee has been paid; and

(e)

Service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20, I.A.R.
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DATED: This ~ day of January, 2011
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this Kday of January, 2011, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by delivering the same to each of the following,
by the method indicated below, addressed as follows:

I:J mailed
I:J hand delivered
51 transmitted fax machine
to: (208) 319-2601

Richard H. Greener
Greener, Burke & Shoemaker, P.A.
The Banner Bank Building
950 W. Bannock St., Ste. 900
Boise, ID 83702

NTELEONE, L.L.P.

laintiffslAppellants
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JAN 3 1 2011
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
B RAYNE, DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
MARTHA A. ARREGUI,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV 09-3450

v.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

ROSALINDA GALLEGOS-MAIN, an
individual; FULL LIFE CHIROPRACTIC,
P .A., an Idaho professional association; and
John and Jane Does I through X, whose true
identities are unknown,
Defendants.

For the reasons stated in this Court's oral ruling issued on January 27, 2011, the
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, filed on December 2,2010, is DENIED.
DATED this _ _ day of January, 2011.

JAN 28 2011

Judge Renae Hoff- · ...../

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

?---(

day of January, 2011, a true and correct copy of
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
the within and foregoing instrument was served upon:
Sam Johnson
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P.
405 South Eighth Street, Suite 250
Boise, ID 83702

(Attorneys for Plaintiff)
Richard H. Greener
Loren K. Messerly
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER P.A.
950 West Bannock Street, Suite 900
Boise, ID 83702

_m.8. Mail
D
D
D
D

Facsimile
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email

Q1r.S':Mail
~ Facsimile
D Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery
D Email

{Defendants Rosalinda Gallegos-Main
and Full Life Chiropractic, P.A.]

Clerk of the District

C~

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 2
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MAR 0 1 2011
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
J HEIDEMAN, DEPUTY

Richard H. Greener, ISB No. 1191
Loren K. Messerly, ISB No. 7434
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER P.A.
The Banner Bank Building
950 West Bannock Street, Suite 900
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 319-2600
Facsimile: (208) 319-2601
Email: rgreener@greenerlaw.com
lmesserly@greenerlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendants Rosalinda Gallegos-Main
and Full Lifo Chiropractic, P.A.

IN TIlE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, m AND FOR TIlE COUNTY OF CANYON
MARTHA A. ARREOUI,
Plaintiff!Appellant,

Case No. CV 09-3450

v.
ROSALINDA GALLEGOS-MAIN, an
individual; FULL LIFE CHIROPRACTIC,
P.A., an Idaho professional association; and
John and Jane Does I through X, whose true
identities are unknown,

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
TRANSCRIPT AND CLERK'S
RECORD, PURSUANT TO RULE I.A.R.
19

DefendantsIRespondents.
TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED APPELLANT(S) AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, AND
THE REPORTER AND CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Respondents in the above-entitled proceeding
hereby request, pursuant to Rule 19, I.A.R., the inclusion of the following material in the
reporter's transcript and the clerk's record in addition to that required to be included by the
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND CLERK'S RECORD, PURSUANT
TOlARl9 -1
00223'()31 (376740)
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I.A.R. and the notice of appeal. Appellant's notice did not specify as to the specific documents
requested, so this is merely an attempt to confirm that all the relevant documents will be before
the appellate court. Further, Appellant has only asked for the transcript of the beann!: on the
motion for reconsideration but Appellees are also requesting that the transcript of the Motion for
Summary Judt:ment and the Motion to Strike Affidavit of Dr. Tarnai be included in the record to
the appellate court. We request the following documents/transcripts for the appellate record:
I.

Reporter's TraDscript

a.

The entire reporter's transcript for the November 23,2010 heating on

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judt:ment and Motion to Strike the Affidavit orDr. Tamai.
b.

The entire reporter's transcript for the January 7, 2011 hearing on

Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration (already specifically requested by Plaintiff.)

II.

Clerk's Record
a.

Complaint - filed 4/1/09;

b.

Answer to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial- filed 4121/09;

c.

Request for Trial Setting - filed 7/6/09;

d.

Order to File Stipulated Trial Dates· filed 7128/09;

e.

Stipulated Trial Dates· filed 8/11109;

f.

Order Setting Case For Trial and PT .. filed 9129/09 ;

g.

Stipulation re: Disclosure of Expert Witnesses-filed 7/7/10;

b.

Order on Stipulation to Extend OIL for Disclosure of Expert Witnesses filed 7/12110;

i.

Plaintiff's Disclosure of Expert Witness - tiled 8-16-10;

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND CLERK'S RECORD, PURSUANT
TOlAR19 -2
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j.

Defendants List of Expert Witnesses - filed 9130/10;

k.

Notice of Taking Deposition of Plaintiff's Expert Sarah Tarnai - flled
10/12110;

1.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment .. filed 10126/10;

m.

Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgmentfiled 10/16/10;

n.

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants Motion for Summary
Judgment - filed 10126/010;

o.

Defendants Statement of Undisputed Material Facts - tiled 10126110;

p.

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary
Judgment - filed 11112110;

q.

Affidavit of Sarah Tamai • filed 11115/10;

r.

Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment-filed 11/16110;

s.

Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Sarah Tamai, D.C - filed 11116110;

t.

Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of

Sarah Tamai, D.C. - filed 11116110;
u.

Affidavit OfCoWlsel In Support Of Defendants' Motion To Strike

Affidavit Of Sarah Tarnai, D.C.· tiled 11116110;
v.

Motion For Order Shortening Time On Defendants' Motion To Strike,
dated 11/16/1 0;

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND CLERK'S RECORD, PURSUANT
TOlAR19 -3
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Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavit and Motion for

Summary Judgment - filed 11124/10;
x.

Final Judgment .. filed 12/2/10;

y.

Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration - filed 1213110;

z.

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration - filed
12115/10;

aa.

Defendants Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration - filed
1120/11;

bb.

Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration - filed 1120/11;

co.

Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration - filed

1125/11;
dd.

W.

Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration - filed 1131110;

Certification

I certify that a copy of this request was served upon the reporter and clerk of the district

court and upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20.
Dated this

l~ day of March,2011.
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SHOEMAKER P.A.

______+-__________
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

-.bt

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of March, 2011, a true and correct copy of
the within and foregoing instrument was served upon:
Sam Johnson
Johnson & Monteleone, L.L.P.
405 South Eighth Street, Suite 250
Boise, ID 83702

[Attorneys /01' l'/ainlifJ]

IS U.S. Mail
181 Facsimile

o Hand Delivery
o Overnight Delivery
o Email

K. Messerly

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND CLERK'S RECORD, PURSUANT
TOIARl9 -6
lI027.l.(I11 {17ti74tl'
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF CANYON

MARTHA A. ARREGUI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vsROSALINDA GALLEGOS-MAIN, etal.,
Defendants-Respondents,

And
JOHN AND JANE DOES, etal.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-09-03450*C
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT

I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the following
is being sent as an exhibit:

NONE

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this ---'-""""-_ day

_-'-'-/=-.:.-'--_ _ _,

2011.

CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
in and
County of Canyon.
By:
Deputy
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT

000344

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

MARTHA A. ARREGUI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vsROSALINDA GALLEGOS-MAIN, etal.,
Defendants-Respondents,

And
JOHN AND JANE DOES, etal.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-09-034So*C
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK

I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the above and
foregoing Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my
direction as, and is a true, full correct Record of the pleadings and documents under
Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, including all documents requested.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this ___' - = - _ day of

Mpr< I

,2011.

\

CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
III
the County of Canyon.
By:
Deputy
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNIY OF CANYON

MARTHA A. ARREGUI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vsROSALINDA GALLEGOS-MAIN, eta!.,
Defendants-Respondents,

And
JOHN AND JANE DOES, etal.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No. 38496
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or had delivered by United State's Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the
Clerk's Record and one copy of the Reporter's Transcript to the attorney of record to each
party as follows:
Sam Johnson, JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, LLP.
Richard H. Greener and Loren K. Messerly, GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER PA.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this ---"--=-_day of_-+A-+f\'I",,-o.l-f"-lt1_ _ _ ,2011.
I

CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
in and
the County of Canyon.
By:
Deputy
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

000346

